The Dissertation Committee for Paula Valeria Muñoz Chirinos Certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:

Campaign Clientelism in Peru: An Informational Theory

Committee:

Kurt G. Weyland, Co-Supervisor

Raúl L. Madrid, Co-Supervisor

Javier Auyero

Henry Dietz

Kenneth F. Greene

Wendy Hunter

Campaign Clientelism in Peru: An Informational Theory

by

Paula Valeria Muñoz Chirinos, B.A.; M.A.

Dissertation

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of

The University of Texas at Austin

in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Texas at Austin

May, 2013

Dedication

Para mi mami, Edda, quien, entre muchas otras cosas, me enseñó a ser perseverante.

Para Edu, mi compañero de aventuras.

Acknowledgements

During the years that took me to develop this project I have incurred in numerous intellectual and personal debts. I am extremely grateful for the generous intellectual support of Raúl Madrid and Kurt Weyland, of my co-supervisors. Since I started working on my dissertation proposal, Raúl and Kurt have been great at providing me detailed, prompt, and constant feedback. They accompanied me through the "collapse" of my original project, the uncertainty of a long transitional phase, until the birth and maturation of this final academic product. Through all the stages of this intellectual process, my supervisors were extremely supportive and pushed me to keep working and improving my work. Moreover, Raúl and Kurt worked very closely while supervising my project. The three of us met innumerable times to talk about my progress, doubts, and challenges. During these meetings and through numerous email exchanges, my supervisors made sure they were on the same track while guiding me. Thank you both for your mentorship. I could not have asked for more accessible and engaged advisors.

I would also like to thank the other members of my dissertation committee. Henry Dietz, Wendy Hunter, Javier Auyero, and Ken Greene also contributed to the development of this project. Henry was my advisor when I began my doctoral studies. His interest and dedication to Peruvian politics have always been moving for me. Our brown-bag meetings throughout these years were always encouraging. I also learned a lot during Wendy's Latin American Politics and Ken's political parties graduate seminars. I am particularly grateful with Javier with whom I met several times when I was trying to re-frame my project. His experience studying poor people's politics in Latin America and his intellectual generosity were extremely helpful to clarify my ideas. This help came when I needed it the most. Henry, Wendy, Javier, and Ken also gave me valuable

feedback for a dissertation-related article and chapters of my dissertation. In addition, the comments, criticisms, and suggestions they provided during my dissertation defense were exceptional. As a college and good friend of mine used to tell me, I had *un comité de lujo* (a "luxury" committee).

Many other persons at the Department of Government of The University of Texas at Austin gave me invaluable support. Among the many professors that contributed to my academic advance I am indebted to Catherine Boone. Her Political Economy seminar and Research Colloquium were very important for my academic education. Different staff members were also very helpful through the years I spent at the Department of Government. In particular, Annette Carlile, our Graduate Coordination, was always kind, patient, and supportive. She helped me with the university procedures and saved me from making awful errors more than once. Annette also invited me many chocolates that helped me keep going during the sometimes tedious hours of dissertation writing... More generally, this dissertation was possible thanks to grants and fellowships provided by the Department of Government and the Lozano Long Institute of Latin American Studies at The University of Texas at Austin.

During these years I also learned from my peers and friends. I thank the participants of the Latin American Faculty-Student Group for their constructive comments and criticisms of my work. There are no words to express how much I owe to two very good friends and generous colleges: Austin Hart (UT-Austin) and Ezequiel González de Ocanto (Notre Dame). Austin and Ezequiel encouraged me and gave me insightful suggestions to improve my project during the most challenging stages of the research process. Daniel Nogueira-Budny read some of my chapters and accompanied me very closely during the last (crazy) stage of writing. Ilana Lifshitz accompanied me as well. We met always throughout the semester during office hours and, more importantly,

for food and drinks. Other colleagues and friends also made grad school and life more enjoyable: Laura Field, Erin Bird, Luis Camacho, Mary Slosar, Manuel Balán, Rodrigo Nunes, Sandra Botero, Rachel Sternfeld, and Kate Bersch. Several other friends accompanied me in Austin as well: Carla, Solange, Lissette and Huáscar, Nora, María José, Isabel, Omar and Belén, Nino and Paola, Pucho and Kris, among many others. Bo and Ambjörn, my friends and roommates this semester, made it easier to get through this last and stressful stage in Austin.

While conducting fieldwork many people opened several doors for me. Many politicians, experts, journalists, and citizens generously shared their opinions and experience with me. This dissertation would be unthinkable without them. I cannot go without particularly thanking Sergio Sullca, Marco Zeisser, Roberto Romero, and Julio Carrión (Cusco), and Luis Loja, Elizabeth Rodríguez, and Rodrigo Urbina (Piura) for their help. My work in Piura would have been difficult without the generosity and kindness of Ceci Trelles and Raúl Aragón, my host family. I got to know the "Aragones" circumstantially. But they became a real family to me and made my stay in Piura unforgettable. I will always remember my conversations with Fernando, who left us before I got back to Peru.

Besides of those I interviewed in Peru, I would like to recognize the Instituto de Opinión Pública – Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú for their genuine interest in supporting academic research in Peru, in particular my colleagues David Sulmont and Vania Martínez. The IOP included several items in their 2012 national survey without which it would have been unmanageable to finish this research project. My friend and colleague Arturo Maldonado (Vanderbilt) attended the IOP's meetings and couched me with the design and analysis of the survey experiment. I am also indebted with Steve Levitsky who discussed with me several dissertation-related products during his stay in Peru.

Finally, I cannot finish without thanking my closest family and friends for their emotional support during these years. My mom was super strong during the time we were apart, which coincided with the relapse of her cancer. Despite this, she never stopped encouraging me about finishing my doctoral studies. She even learned to use Skype so we managed to stay close despite the physical distance. Mirella and Hilda, my mom's friends, as well as Inés accompanied me each in their own way during the hardest time of my life. My parents in law, Leti and Yayo, have been extremely supportive and encouraging during all these years. Leti and Yayo also welcomed and took care of our "babies", Lucas and more recently Kusi, when we were not able to do so. In spite of being abroad, my friendship with Pepa, Lorena, and Ale, my "sisters", only grew stronger during these years. Felipe, Gabriela, Alberto, and Miné kept always in touch from Montreal, as did my father, Jorge, from Chile. Ada, Matt, Noah and Sofía Brewster made my final stay in Austin nicer. Finally, and most importantly, I want to thank Eduardo Dargent, my loving husband, mate, and college. Eduardo has helped me in so many ways during these years that this dissertation would just have been impossible without him. For one, he has been the "hidden" advisor of this academic project: Eduardo has been patient enough for (endlessly) listening to me while trying to clarify my ideas and has given me extensive comments for tons of dissertation-related documents. Besides his intellectual generosity, Edu's enthusiasm for life, strength, love, and care helped me go through the many hardships that coincided with my doctoral studies. And the illusion of reuniting with him soon pushed me to finish the writing process.

Campaign Clientelism in Peru: An Informational Theory

Paula Valeria Muñoz Chirinos, PhD

The University of Texas at Austin, 2013

Co-Supervisors: Raúl L. Madrid and Kurt G. Weyland

Abstract: While clientelism has been intensively studied in comparative politics from very different theoretical perspectives and angles, scholars typically emphasize the importance of organized networks and long-term relations for sustaining electoral clientelism. However, electoral clientelism continues to be widespread in many countries despite the absence of organized parties or electoral machines. In order to account for this puzzle, I propose an informational approach that stresses the *indirect* effects that investments in electoral clientelism have on vote intentions. By distributing minor consumer goods, politicians buy the *participation* of poor voters at rallies and different sorts of campaign events. I argue that this particular subtype of electoral clientelism—"campaign clientelism"— helps politicians improvise political organizations, influence indifferent clients, and signal their electoral viability to strategic actors. Thus, by influencing competition and the dynamics of the race, campaign clientelism shapes vote choices and electoral outcomes.

Campaign clientelism affects vote choices through two causal mechanisms. First, this subtype of electoral clientelism can help establish candidates' electoral viability, especially where alternative signals provided by well-organized parties are weak. By turning out large numbers of people at rallies, candidates establish and demonstrate their

electoral prospects to the media, donors, rent-seeking activists, and voters. In this way, politicians induce more and more voters to support them strategically. Second, campaign clientelism can convince unattached rally participants of the candidates' electoral *desirability*. While providing different sorts of information at campaign events, politicians help campaign clients make choices. Other things being equal, viable *and* desirable candidates have better chances of actually achieving office. Qualitative, quantitative, and experimental evidence from Peru, a democracy without parties, supports the informational theory's expectations.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

Chapter One: Introduction

> "You must have a wide variety of people around you on a daily basis. Voters will judge you on what sort of crowd you draw both in quality and numbers. The three types of followers are those who greet you at home, those who escort you down to the Forum, and those who accompany you wherever you go." (Quintus Tullius Cicero)[1]

Peruvian politicians know that they *have* to deliver goods in order to run effective campaigns. As mentioned by a campaigner, "You need to know how to invest. You have to hand out construction materials, cement, calves, beer. It is an investment. If you don't deliver, you are done: someone else will come and give away more."[2] However, as candidates lack stable organizations, these handouts cannot guarantee voters' support at the polls. And politicians are well aware of it: "People receive handouts, but they do not commit. 'Let him spend his money,' they say."[3] Another politician is even more direct: "All the candidates give away goods. … If they offer you something, you accept. But you vote for whichever candidate you prefer."[4]

This indiscriminate distribution of goods would be considered unlikely under prevailing theories of electoral clientelism in the context of an effective ballot secrecy (e.g., Auyero 2001; Stokes 2005; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Schaffer 2007 ed.; Díaz-Cayero, Magaloni, and Estévez 2007; Nichter 2008; Finan and Schechter; Lawson and Greene 2011; Zarazaga 2011; Stokes et al. 2011). These theories cannot explain the prevalence of electoral clientelism in countries with loose political organizations. The conventional wisdom among political scientists holds that, in the absence of traditional

[1] Cicero 2012
[2] Personal interview with campaign manager Jorge Nuñez. Puno, June 12, 2010.
[3] Personal interview with Jorge Martorell, former candidate and political advisor to Cusco's mayor. May 17, 2010.
[4] Personal interview with Edmundo Gatica, campaign manager of *Fujimorismo*. Cusco, September 6, 2010.

bonds of deference, electoral clientelism requires well-organized political machines.[5] Clientelistic practices, it is argued, require extended organizations and enduring political relations in part because of the monitoring problem. Given that politicians usually deliver benefits such as food or cash before election day, voters could potentially "receive the benefit with one hand and vote with the other."[6] Politicians, therefore, need local agents to target distribution and enforce the clientelistic bargain. According to this logic, it would be foolish to engage in clientelistic distribution during elections in developing democracies without the support of a dense grassroots infrastructure.

In Peru, however, democracy survives *without* organized parties (Levitsky and Cameron 2003, Tanaka 2005, Levitsky forthcoming) yet *so does* electoral clientelism. Although political parties collapsed in the early 1990s and local brokers continuously change their political affiliations to improvised personalistic vehicles, electoral clientelism remains a common practice. Furthermore, no state apparatus-based machine substitutes for the absence of decentralized party organizations, as was the case during the 1990s under President Fujimori. Indeed, despite the absence of organized political parties in many countries, electoral clientelism continues to be a widespread phenomenon across Latin America. As Table 1.1 indicates, reports that politicians have offered material benefits in exchange for votes are actually more common in countries with loosely organized parties (e.g., Panama, Bolivia, Guatemala, and Peru) than in the region as a whole.

Why, then, do candidates continue to employ clientelistic strategies in countries like Peru where, in the absence of political machines, they lack a key tool for enforcing

---

[5] See, for example, Kitschelt 2000: 849-850; Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes 2004: 85; Stokes 2005: 317; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 8-9, 17; Magaloni, Díaz-Cayeros, and Estévez 2007: 185.

[6] Argentine politician quoted by Mariela Szwarcberg in an unpublished manuscript written in 2001. Reference taken from Stokes 2007.

the clientelistic bargain? Existing approaches fail to elucidate this puzzle, I argue, because they concentrate on the direct effects of clientelistic investments only and fail to take competition and campaigning into account. Their theories have exaggerated the importance of organized networks and long-term relations for sustaining electoral clientelism. As discussed in depth in the second chapter, scholarly approaches focused on monitoring, reciprocity, or the conditional loyalty of clients all conceive electoral clientelism as an iterated relation backed up by political organizations. Consequently, these theories cannot account for short-term clientelistic transactions in unorganized

Table 1.1 Clientelistic Offers in Latin America

	Have been offered a material benefit in exchange for their vote sometimes or often
Dominican Republic	22.2%
Argentina	18.0%
Panama	17.8%
Belize	17.1%
Bolivia	16.7%
Mexico	16.7%
Paraguay	16.2%
Colombia	15.2%
Guatemala	13.7%
Brazil	13.4%
Peru	11.9%
Average	**11.8%**
Venezuela	11.6%
El Salvador	10.1%
Costa Rica	8.5%
Ecuador	8.3%
Suriname	7.3%
Nicaragua	6.4%
Jamaica	6.0%
Guyana	5.9%
Uruguay	5.6%
Chile	5.5%
Trinidad & Tobago	5.3%

Source: LAPOP 2010

settings. While recent theoretical studies (Szwarcberg 2012; Kramon 2011) address some shortcomings of this scholarly consensus and show that electoral clientelism can have an informational role, they do not solve the paradox of how electoral clientelism would persist without machines.

To explain this puzzle I propose an informational approach that stresses the indirect effects that early investments in electoral clientelism during campaigns have on vote choice. From this perspective, electoral clientelism is a campaigning tool. In this chapter I first present my core arguments. Then, I discuss the theoretical relevance of this novel approach to electoral clientelism. Subsequently I define the main concepts used in this thesis and present my research design. I conclude by providing an overview of the dissertation.

THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF

Prevailing approaches that analyze clientelism as an electoral strategy assume that the main goal of politicians who distribute particularistic goods during campaigns is to buy votes, turnout, or abstention *directly*. Consequently, electoral clientelism is portrayed as a campaign strategy aimed to influence electoral results at the margins, contributing to victory only in tight races. According to this approach, scholars maintain, politicians distribute selective incentives close to or on election day, as this, along with other strategies, helps them decrease the likelihood of commitment problems. In brief, scholars continue to assume that the only effects of electoral clientelism are its direct effects.

In contrast to extant approaches, my theory highlights the unfolding dynamics of the campaign itself and stresses the *indirect* effects of early investments in electoral clientelism on electoral choices. I contend that clientelistic strategies used during campaigns generate and transmit valuable information that is utilized by strategic actors

to make electoral decisions. Electoral clientelism shapes who becomes a viable candidate—the "supply" among which voters then choose the most desirable one. By influencing competition and the dynamics of the race, electoral clientelism affects vote choices. From this perspective, electoral clientelism is not, by any means, just a marginal vote-getting tool.

I argue that politicians may engage in clientelism not once they have a viable political machine but *because* they lack one. They may distribute gifts during elections in order to attract voters' attention and influence unattached voters while campaigning. Electoral clientelism thus affects vote choices through two mechanisms. First, clientelism during campaigns is crucial for establishing candidates' electoral viability. From early stages of the race onward, politicians induce voters, often mostly poor voters, to show up at rallies and other campaign events by offering them rewards. Moreover, the distribution of material rewards allows candidates' campaign teams to make an impression, convey information, and signal the general public that they are *electorally viable candidates*. Actors' beliefs about candidates' prospects of winning are based, among other factors, on the perceived level of public support. By turning out large numbers of people at rallies, candidates establish and demonstrate their electoral prospects to the media, donors, benefit-seeking activists, and voters. In this way, politicians induce more and more voters to support them strategically.

Second, electoral clientelism can influence voters while campaigning. Politicians buy voters' participation in order to get their attention. The distribution of goods buys participation at campaign events but not necessarily support from voters. Indeed, without stable political attachments, most voters are opportunistic. Therefore, politicians need to work hard to transform participants' temporary attention into an electoral commitment. With that aim, during campaign events politicians particularize their messages and

promise particular benefits to specific constituencies. These events also constitute privileged opportunities for interacting with poor voters and conveying the candidate's personal traits. Politicians can also expect to influence voters' choices by generating a positive "buzz" in the audience. In short, by providing citizens with valuable information at campaign events politicians help clients, often mostly poor voters, make their political choices.

My informational theory is well-suited to explain electoral clientelism in loosely organized polities. Informational deficits are particularly acute in countries with weakly institutionalized parties (Moser 2001). Moreover, in contexts where political parties are not well organized and voters do not have lasting political attachments, elections are highly contested and there is more electoral uncertainty among politicians about their prospects of winning than in organized settings. As has been documented elsewhere (Bartels 1988), in races in which there is less information, substantive predispositions matter less to define vote choices because voters give more weight to candidates' electoral chances.

Moreover, within loosely organized polities, the informational value of electoral clientelism can also vary for different types of elections. Presidential elections usually have more information than legislative and local elections. For presidential elections, candidates need to have substantial name recognition in order to run successful campaigns. Likewise, national media and citizens are also commonly more attentive to presidential races. In addition, opinion polls tend to be conducted more frequently in presidential elections; this is particularly true in developing countries. For these reasons, the informational approach works better to explain the effects of electoral clientelism on candidates' trajectories in legislative and local elections than in presidential ones.

Finally, where party systems are institutionalized, the levels of information and the associated electoral uncertainty can also differ substantially between primaries and general elections. Therefore, the indirect effects of electoral clientelism on vote choices also function differently in each type of election: while signaling viability may matter more for defining primary races, influencing undecided voters may be more important during general elections. Thus, as I will show in the concluding chapter, my theory can also inform our understanding of electoral clientelism in more organized political settings.

A Novel Focus on Campaigns

This dissertation makes, first, several theoretical contributions to the study of electoral clientelism. To begin with, my informational theory does not assume that political organization is a prerequisite for electoral clientelism. In contrast to prevailing approaches, the informational approach portrays electoral clientelism as a complex game that takes place *throughout* the campaign and not just on or near election day. That is, electoral clientelism can in fact be also understood as a campaigning tool. Once campaigning is taken into account it becomes clear why electoral clientelism can actually persist in contexts of low political organization. Distributing resources is a rational solution to the challenges of campaigning without parties because it helps politicians improvise political organizations, influence indifferent clients, and signal their electoral viability to strategic actors. In other words, electoral clientelism can be an appealing campaign strategy precisely *because of* the absence of stable political organizations since it generates valuable information for strategic competition.

In addition, this approach also takes competition in campaigns seriously by not assuming that a single incumbent buys votes or studying only cases in which machines

are dominant and competition is negligible. According to the informational theory, most candidates, and not just powerful incumbents, can distribute minor consumer goods or cash during campaigns using private resources: candidates compete through electoral clientelism. Electoral clientelism can thus be associated both with political dominance and volatile electoral contexts. Moreover, while analyzing the tactics of elites, the informational approach also emphasizes the strategic logic of clients during campaigns. In making electoral choices, clients consider the changing electoral prospects of contending candidates in addition to their preferences. In contrast, most studies of vote buying assume that clients vote sincerely. Citizens are particularly opportunistic when they do not identify with a particular party and are not linked on a permanent basis to a patron or broker. Long-term clientelistic relationships reduce voter opportunism and credibility problems as citizens develop bonds of trust (Roniger 1990) or acquire moral debts (Schaffer and Schedler 2007: 21).

Second, instead of engaging in an increasingly narrow discussion among specialists, my approach opens up a broader dialogue with other strands of the party literature and sheds new light on existing debates by integrating important insights about political competition and strategic behavior. The informational theory takes as its core idea that information about the electoral prospects of different candidates influences voters and elites to behave strategically in reaction to electoral incentives (Cox 1997). Sustained campaign turnout buying is therefore important because it helps to generate this valuable information, which will be used by strategic donors, activists, and voters.

This approach also highlights and explains why old-style politics did not fade away with the advent of mass media and widespread polling, as many scholars expected. As in the past, when candidates had to mobilize partisans and sympathizers to the plazas to demonstrate electoral strength, my dissertation confirms that visibly mobilizing

numbers still matters. Through campaign turnout buying, political marketing meets street politics. In low-organization settings, characterized by high uncertainty and electoral volatility, head counting is still a powerful cue to assess appeal and electoral viability.

Finally, my dissertation has normative implications. If electoral clientelism works as the informational theory predicts, it may be less problematic for democratic accountability than some scholars have suggested (e.g., Fox 1994; Stokes 2005, 2007b). Poor citizens do sell their participation in campaign events, but not necessarily their votes. Poor citizens decide whether to support the buyer with their vote according to their tactical preferences: candidates must convince clients of their electoral desirability. Hence, these pragmatic voters are not passive citizens subject to perverse accountability (Stokes 2005) nor diminished citizens who do not evaluate their governments and engage in public deliberation (Stokes 2007b). Nevertheless, turnout buying at campaign events still raises some normative concerns. Voters can be misled when public perceptions of electoral viability are manipulated by politicians. Moreover, in the absence of long-lasting clientelistic relations, electoral clientelism can result in the entrenchment of exploitative corruption that reinforces inequality. These issues will be further developed in the concluding chapter.

CONCEPTS

I broadly define electoral clientelism as a strategy of electoral mobilization that involves a politician offering private benefits (e.g., money, goods, or services) to individuals or families during electoral campaigns conditional on their electoral support (their vote, their public manifestation of political support, their participation at political rallies, their work as electoral monitors, etc.). What constitutes the core or defining property of clientelism is the contingent nature of this exchange. Clientelism involves the

discretionary allocation of goods or services to individuals; benefits are not distributed according to universal criteria and are thus potentially excludable. Electoral clientelism thus should be differentiated from other strategies in which politicians use material resources to garner political support but that do not entail the same degree of contingency (Stokes et al. 2011). For instance, "pork barrel politics" is not as discretionary as electoral clientelism. In this type of strategy, politicians deliver "local public goods"; that is, goods that have some degree of jointness of supply, but that are limited or targeted to a small residentially or geographically defined community (Magaloni 2006; Hawkins and Rosas 2006; Díaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and Estévez, 2007). In contrast to private goods, local public goods generate non-excludable and, often, irreversible benefits (Díaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and Estévez, 2007). In other words, citizens external to the group boundaries can be excluded from the enjoyment of such benefits, but none inside the boundary can be (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 11).[7] Thus, the hope underlying the delivery of this type of goods is probabilistic and not conditional: they hope for unilateral gratitude, not reciprocal exchange. In other words, politicians expect that at least a certain number of grateful people will vote for them.

Following other authors (Nichter 2010; Kitschelt 2011), I also distinguish electoral clientelism from a more durable type of political clientelism, "relational clientelism," which involves an extended relational exchange that goes beyond election season. These ongoing relations usually involve networks of problem solving (Auyero 2001) or the procurement of more "expensive" and long-lasting benefits such as public jobs (Oliveros 2012). Relational clientelism corresponds to the conventional meaning of machine politics, whereas electoral clientelism can flourish in the absence of firm

[7] Kitschelt and Wilkinson use the term "club goods".

organizations.[8] Although occasionally electoral clientelism is combined with forms of relational clientelism that involve more frequent interactions beyond a single campaign season, it is worth analytically distinguishing between them (Nichter 2010: 23).

Like other scholars (Heckelman 1998; Nichter 2008, 2010), I distinguish between "vote buying" (strategies in which politicians offer selective benefits in exchange for votes) and "turnout buying" (strategies in which politicians offer selective benefits in exchange for turnout). As pointed out by Nichter (2008, 2010), the literature often conflates these strategies of electoral clientelism, counting them generically as events of "vote buying."

My conceptual approach differs from existing studies in two respects, however. First, I do not confine "turnout buying" to election day (paying citizens for showing up *at the polls*), as Heckelman and Nichter do. Politicians can buy participation at different types of political events and at different points in time. Buying turnout at rallies and other campaign events are clientelistic practices employed throughout the campaign (Auyero 2001; Szwarcberg 2009; Banégas 2011: 40; Vommaro and Quirós 2011: 74). In order to understand the logic of electoral clientelism, attention must be given to the different strategies used to mobilize voters during a longer span of time over the course of the electoral campaign. And, as we will see, they are consequential for influencing vote choices. Second, I do not define "turnout buying" as a strategy designed to mobilize only loyalist voters as opposed to indifferent ones (Nichter 2008, 2010). Whether politicians buy loyal voters or indifferent ones may vary empirically and should not be defined a

[8] Machines are "political territorial organizations that provide voters with solutions to everyday problems in exchange for political support." (Szwarcberg 2009: 6) Similarly, for Wolfinger (1972) "'machine politics' is the manipulation of certain incentives to partisan political participation: favoritism based on political criteria in personnel decisions, contracting, and administration of the laws. A 'political machine' is an organization that practices machine politics."

priori. For example, in contexts where political loyalties are in flux and most voters are indifferent, such as Peru, these distinctions do not make much sense.

RESEARCH DESIGN

This project uses a case-study research design with theory-building and testing purposes. Peru is a deviant case for the conventional understanding of clientelism: it is a country in which electoral clientelism thrives without organized parties. Conventional studies of electoral clientelism in Latin America have focused on cases with strong local partisan organization, such as Argentina (Brusco et al. 2004; Stokes 2005, 2007; Nichter 2008, 2010; Szwarcberg 2009; Weitz-Shapiro 2008) and Mexico (Magaloni, Díaz-Cayeros, and Estévez 2007, Díaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and Estévez, 2007, Lawson and Greene 2011). Consequently, their conclusions are biased in favor of the prevailing approaches. As a deviant case, studying Peru can be helpful in refining theory. Even if Peru may be a deviant case in theoretical terms, it does represent an ongoing trend in party and party system deinstitutionalization in Latin America (Gutiérrez Sanín 2007; Seawright 2006; Sánchez 2009; Dargent and Muñoz 2011; Morgan 2011). In terms of this weakness of its party system, Peru may more typical of Latin America than either Argentina or Mexico. Thus, it is crucial that electoral clientelism be studied in countries such as Peru.

Peru is a country in which politicians actively invest in electoral clientelism during campaigns. As in other Latin American countries, relational clientelism was important in Peru in the past (Guasti 1977; Alberti and Fuenzalida 1969; Fuenzalida 1971; Cotler 1967, 1969; Coronel, Degregori, and Del Pino 1998). Long-lasting clientelistic relations, however, eroded progressively from the 1950s onward. Moreover, amidst profound economic and political crises, the Peruvian party system collapsed in the

early 1990s and party-building efforts have been unsuccessful since then. Indeed, Peru's political system in the 2000s has been characterized as being a case of "democracy without parties" (Levitsky and Cameron 2003, Tanaka 2005); its party system under-institutionalization has even inspired the new concept of "party non-systems" (Sánchez 2009). Moreover, no state apparatus-based machine substitutes for the absence of decentralized party organizations, as was the case during the 1990s under President Fujimori. The Peruvian case, therefore, offers a unique opportunity to examine electoral clientelism in the absence of organized political parties.

This study utilizes a mixed-methods research strategy in order to capture the dynamics of clientelism during Peruvian elections (2010-2011). First, nationally representative surveys allow me to obtain national-level estimates of the prevalence of different types of behaviors and attitudes. Second, qualitative data is crucial for understanding the political context in which electoral clientelism takes place and examining the causal mechanisms behind these transactions. Finally, experimental data generated through a survey experiment tests one of the causal mechanisms postulated by my theory: that electors decide their votes by taking into account the number of people candidates mobilize during campaigns.[9]

I use several survey datasets to increase the number of observations (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994) and provide evidence of behaviors and attitudes that can be generalizable at the national level. In particular, these quantitative data allows me to test some of the conventional approaches' implications. If the conventional wisdom holds even under these very unfavorable contextual conditions, Peru would stand as a crucial test for reassuring us about its leverage. To conduct such an analysis, I designed a set of

[9] The experiment was included as part of the Political Representation and Social Conflict Survey, conducted by the *Instituto de Opinión Pública* (IOP) – *Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú* (PUCP) in October 2012. For more details, see chapter four.

questions that were included in two surveys with nationally representative and multistage random samples.[10] To lessen the possibility that social stigma associated with clientelism would distort answers (González Ocantos, Kiewiet de Jonge, and Nickerson 2011), I work with questions that ask respondents about their attitudes towards electoral clientelism, rather than their actual experiences.[11]

I use different types of qualitative data with theory-testing purposes, in particular for examining the causal mechanisms implied by the theories. Though Peruvian parties are weak in a comparative perspective, variation in levels of party organization does exist inside the country, both across political groupings and across electoral districts. Consequently, I rely on a process-tracing research design through which I compare the clientelistic strategies displayed during electoral campaigns in two regions of Peru (Cusco and Piura) that differ in many respects, including their levels of political organization. Cusco is a predominantly poor and indigenous region in the Southern highlands of Peru. During the 20th century, Cusco developed a very strong leftist tradition. After the demise of *Izquierda Unida* in the late 1980s, Cusco has struggled to maintain organized parties and stable clientelistic machines. Piura, in contrast, is a coastal region with a much more diversified economy that is better integrated to the market. It is one of the strongholds of APRA, the best organized party in Peru with a regional machine in place, and has experienced other relatively successful efforts of building local party organization.

---

[10] I work with a nationally representative survey conducted by Ipsos APOYO in 2010 for the Peruvian Electoral Tribunal (*Jurado Nacional de Elecciones*) and a post-electoral survey conducted by IOP in June 2011).

[11] "If a candidate or party official offered YOU or your family a benefit for YOUR vote, would you: a) Take the benefit and vote for him/her, b) Take the benefit and vote for the candidate of your choice, c) Refuse the benefit and vote for a candidate of your choice, d) Unsure." Categories a) and b) distinguish dispositions about committing versus defecting from a vote buying deal. A second version of this question asks the respondents what they would do if offered cash.

To collect causal process observations, I engaged in participant observation in both sites, following campaigns activities that were part of the 2010 local elections. I visited each region before the campaign started, during the campaign, and after the results were known. I also conducted 185 semi-structured interviews with politicians (candidates, activists, and political brokers), journalists, civil society actors, and academics. This number also includes interviews conducted in Lima and Puno regions. These additional interviews helped me compare and contrast observations gathered in the two case studies and see how generalizable my findings are to other regions.[12] Finally, based on initial findings, in 2011 I also conducted 18 focus groups with poor citizens from Cusco and Piura to inquire about their perceptions of clientelistic strategies that candidates used during campaigns. This in-depth information on Cusco and Piura is complemented with data from secondary sources from newspaper archives.

While holding constant electoral rules that are expected to affect clientelistic strategies and electoral behavior (Müller 2007; Hicken 2007), this subnational focus allows me to uncover the political logic of actual clientelistic electoral strategies. On the one hand, participant observation, media sources, and semi-structured interviews help me reconstruct the political logic that politicians follow when they engage in clientelistic mobilization during campaigns. On the other hand, participant observation, interviews, and focus groups allow me to reconstruct the perceptions and political calculations of poor citizens—the most likely clients—during campaigns.

Finally, the survey experiment conducted in 2012 allowed me to gather additional observations and provide systematic evidence to test a crucial part of the informational

[12] The city of Lima is closest to Piura in terms of political and demographic indicators. Moreover, as the nation's capital and home to a third of its electorate, Lima is the center of power in Peru. Interviewing Lima's political and social actors is, therefore, necessary to understand Peruvian politics. Puno, on the other hand, has a similar sociopolitical trajectory to Cusco and is currently the most fragmented and fluid electoral district in Peru (Muñoz and García 2011; Zavaleta 2012).

theory's causal claim. Given that this experiment was included in a nationally representative survey, it also provides the basis for external validity and the generalization of its results at the national level.

A final note about the value of this research design and its implications for studying clientelism is in order. As will be shown in the empirical chapters, utilizing various qualitative techniques of data-gathering was crucial for studying an elusive phenomenon such as electoral clientelism. The political logic behind these types of clientelistic exchanges can only be fully grasped with an in-depth knowledge of the political context. Moreover, a proper understanding of the phenomenon requires paying attention to the point of view of both sides of the exchange: patrons and clients. Thus, this dissertation reaffirms what other authors have pointed out: comprehending the complexities involved in clientelistic transactions would be difficult, if not impossible, relying on survey or experimental data only.

PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION

The dissertation will proceed as follows. Chapter two provides a more comprehensive discussion about the limitations of existing theories of electoral clientelism. I show how all existing approaches assume that electoral clientelism requires an extensive local organization or long-lasting relations between patrons and clients. Recent theoretical refinements that have tried to address some of the shortcomings of prevailing thought fall short of fully theorizing the puzzle of clientelism without machines. After this discussion, I present the main thrust of the informational theory and discuss in depth its two causal mechanisms: signaling electoral viability and influence—persuading rally participants about the candidate's electoral desirability. I conclude the chapter by articulating my expectations and summarizing the chapter's main points.

Chapter three provides an introduction to Peru's democracy without parties and tests the empirical implications of conventional approaches in the context of this loosely organized polity. This chapter begins with a brief overview of the way in which clientelistic linkages have been organized in Peru since 1980. Subsequently, I show that currently most clientelistic networks are not very extensive (in terms of organizational reach). I also discuss how electoral clientelism takes place during campaigns. Then, I use survey data to evaluate conventional approaches at the individual level, particularly the monitoring hypothesis. I complement these findings with qualitative data and conclude that vote buying and turnout buying at the polls are not viable electoral strategies in Peru.

Chapter four tests the informational theory's first causal mechanism. I demonstrate how the distribution of particularistic goods during campaigns allows Peruvian politicians to buy electoral participation of indifferent voters, to access crucial campaign fields, and to boost turnout at campaign events. In uncertain and volatile electoral settings, high turnout at rallies affects the dynamics of the race by establishing name recognition, maintaining electoral reputation, narrowing the field of viable contenders, and attracting strategic voters in the final rush. Media horserace coverage, in turn, amplifies the effects of high turnout at campaign events. The chapter presents qualitative data and survey results to support these findings. In addition, the survey experiment confirms that Peruvians do take into account turnout figures at campaign events in deciding their vote choices. In sum, this chapter shows that distributing goods during campaigns is a rational solution for campaigning without parties.

Chapter five provides qualitative and quantitative evidence supporting the second causal mechanism of the informational theory: influencing clients at campaign events. In a context of low partisan identification, candidates need to do something beyond demonstrating their electoral strength to retain voters' attention and gain their support.

Personalized communication at campaign events provides candidates with the best opportunity to convince voters of their electoral desirability. Through campaign turnout buying, candidates can target promises to particular constituencies and convey crucial information about their personal traits and manners. In addition, peer effects experienced during these rallies can further help clients rank viable candidates and make their electoral choices. As I will show, personalized communication at campaign events is particularly important to the clients.

Chapter six concludes this dissertation. I begin by presenting a summary of my findings. Subsequently, I elaborate on the broader theoretical implications of the informational theory and how it informs current debates in comparative politics. Finally, I include a comparative section in which I derive and test some empirical implications of my informational theory for organized political contexts, using Argentina as a case.

Chapter Two: An Informational Theory of Electoral Clientelism

During recent years there has been a renewed interest among political scientists in studying political clientelism and other types of distributive political exchanges. Scholars have written and debated about conceptual issues (Stokes 2007; Stokes et al. 2011; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Schaffer and Schedler 2007; Nichter 2010; Hicken 2011), the conditions that shape the likelihood of different types of non-programmatic distributive exchanges (Shefter 1994; Kitschelt 2000; Piattoni 2001; Brusco et al. 2004; Chandra 2004; Chhibber and Nooruddin 2004; Kitschelt and Wilkinson eds. 2007; Schaffer ed. 2007; Díaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and Estévez 2007; Szwarcberg 2009), the foundations and logic of clientelistic relations (Auyero 2001; Brusco et al. 2004; Stokes 2005, 2007; Nichter 2010; Dunnning and Stokes 2008; Finan and Schechter 2009; Díaz-Cayeros et al. forthcoming; Lawson and Greene 2011; Zarazaga 2011; Stokes et al. 2011), and their consequences for democracy and its institutions (Kitschelt 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes 2005, 2007b; Desposato 2007).

While clientelism has been intensively studied in comparative politics from very different theoretical perspectives and angles, the existing literature is not able to explain why we see electoral clientelism during campaigns even in settings without well-organized political machines. In this chapter I show that current theories have exaggerated the importance of organized networks and long-term relations for sustaining electoral clientelism. Approaches focused on monitoring or reciprocity, as well as those emphasizing the conditional loyalty of clients, conceive electoral clientelism as an iterated relation backed up by political organization. In other words, all these approaches focus on the long-term. For these academics, then, it is difficult to imagine electoral clientelism as taking place within a fluid, unorganized political setting where both

patrons and clients are extremely opportunistic and focused on the short term. Nevertheless, empirical data show that the distribution of gifts during campaigns also proliferates in loosely organized political contexts.

In contrast to existing approaches, I develop a theory that places electoral campaigns, competition, and the dynamics of the race at the center of analysis. Moving beyond more recent theoretical improvements that try to address the literature's shortcomings, I provide a full-fledged informational theory that emphasizes the *indirect* effects that turnout buying at campaign events—an often ignored subtype of electoral clientelism—has on electoral choices. Politicians buy turnout at campaign events to attract attention to their candidacies and convince voters to support them. Thus, my theory can explain how short-term-oriented actors engage in electoral clientelism despite not having stable political organizations and attachments. Once the informational role of campaign clientelism is taken into account, the puzzle of electoral clientelism without machines vanishes and clientelism becomes a richer phenomenon to study.

This chapter is organized in the following way: First, I review existing theoretical perspectives about electoral clientelism and show how all of them assume that electoral clientelism requires dense organizational networks or long-term commitments in order to work. These perspectives cannot explain clientelism without machines. Second, I present new approaches to electoral clientelism that try to address some of the shortcomings of prevailing theories and that point to some indirect effects of clientelism. I briefly discuss how these new approaches also fall short of solving the paradox of electoral clientelism without machines. Third, I develop my informational theory's main argument and causal mechanisms. I conclude the chapter by laying out the empirical implications of the conventional wisdom and this informational theory. These implications will be empirically tested in subsequent chapters.

ELECTORAL CLIENTELISM REVISITED

Why do politicians invest in clientelism during electoral campaigns? In particular, why would they do so when they lack the appropriate organizational apparatus to guarantee the payoff of those efforts? While political clientelism has been intensively studied in comparative politics from very different theoretical perspectives, the literature to date is not able to account for this puzzle.

Many influential studies of political clientelism have sought to explain the persistence of clientelistic linkages during long periods of time—that is, of relational clientelism. These include scholars working within socioeconomic modernization theory (Powell 1970; Scott 1969; Scott 1972; Lemarchand and Legg 1972; Graziano 1973), historical institutionalism (Shefter 1994; Piattoni 2001), as well as political economy approaches (Chubb 1981; Kitschelt 2000; Kitschelt 2007; Lyne 2007). These different approaches have, without doubt, significantly contributed to our understanding of the conditions that affect the maintenance and demise of party-citizen clientelistic linkages. Nevertheless, because they are concerned with explaining long-term processes of change, these studies do not pay attention to *how* clientelism works during electoral campaigns. Moreover, because these scholars are interested in clientelistic linkages that go beyond one election season, they do not address the question of how and why politicians would invest in electoral clientelism in contexts where there are no long-lasting clientelistic relations and organizations in place.

In contrast, many contemporary researchers focus on the study of the mechanisms that sustain clientelism, paying more attention to its electoral rationale (Auyero 2001b; Brusco et al. 2004; Stokes 2005; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Schaffer 2007 ed.; Díaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and Estévez, 2007; Finan and Schechter 2009; Lawson and Greene 2011; among others). These academics are particularly interested in analyzing the micro-

foundations of clientelistic exchanges and in making predictions about the type of citizens whom clientelistic parties should target with material inducements (Brusco et al. 2004; Stokes 2005; Díaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and Estévez, 2007; Cox 2007; Dunning and Stokes 2007; Nichter 2008; Nichter 2010; Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter 2009; Finan and Schechter 2009; Lawson and Greene 2011; Zarazaga 2011; Stokes et al. 2011).[13]

Although these scholars disagree on the specific mechanisms that sustain the clientelistic exchange and their models make different predictions about the type of voters clientelistic parties target, they all assume either that electoral clientelism requires an extensive local organization—the machine—to work or that it entails an enduring relationship.[14] In other words, they consider that electoral clientelism can only work in a long term perspective. Accordingly, electoral clientelism cannot be sustainable in an organizationally fluid political context in which actors are extremely opportunistic and focused on the short term.

Taking into consideration the causal mechanism the authors propose for explaining clients' commitment to the clientelistic bargain, existing theories of electoral clientelism can be grouped into three broad categories. A first group of scholars proposes that clientelistic transactions are *externally* enforced by local brokers who monitor

[13] These scholars developed their models by extending and/or criticizing the insights developed by formal theorists interested in distributive politics such as Cox and McCubbins (1986), Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), and Dixit and Londregan (1996).

[14] In this literature, a hierarchical political machine is the organizational foundation of electoral clientelism. Machines are headed by political bosses who command various levels of brokers (locally embedded agents) organized in pyramidal fashion. In turn, brokers are local patrons: voters organized by each machine's broker receive benefits from him on a regular basis. The literature commonly portrays these machines as being partisan (e.g., Stokes 2005). However, machines can also be candidate-based, as is the case in Japan, where most Liberal Democratic Party national politicians maintain personal support organizations (Scheiner 2007: 279). Note that, even in this case, what are crucial for the literature are the iterated interactions that constitute the machines (Auyero 2001; Stokes 2005: 318; Kitschelt and Kselman 2011: 4, 6; Hicken 2011: 292-293).

clients' behavior and threaten punishment for noncompliance. The second and third groups of academics stress instead the *self-enforced* character of clientelistic relations. The second group is composed of rationalist scholars focused on the long term. They argue that patrons and clients' long-term interests are aligned and, consequently, clients are loyal supporters. This third group proposes the norm of reciprocity as the causal mechanism sustaining electoral clientelism. Scholars working within the reciprocity framework contend that clients honor their part of the bargain because they feel obligated to reciprocate a favor or benefits they have already received. While rationalists who focus on the long term emphasize clients' future expectations, scholars working within the reciprocity approach focus mostly on clients' retrospective evaluations. In the rest of this section I will discuss each of these approaches and their limited usefulness for understanding short-term clientelistic transactions in loosely organized and fluid political contexts.

First, two versions of the monitoring hypothesis can be distinguished. A "hard" version is represented by scholars who argue that politicians enforce the clientelistic exchange by monitoring actual vote choices (Brusco et al. 2004; Chandra 2004, 2007; Stokes 2005, 2007; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). From this perspective, clientelistic machines keep voters from reneging on the clientelistic bargain by threatening and monitoring individuals' votes, rewarding them for their support and punishing them for defection (Stokes 2005: 317-318). To monitor individual voters, parties can use a variety of practices and techniques for violating the secrecy of the ballot on election day or at least giving the impression to voters that they can do so (Stokes 2005; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Chandra 2007: 90). Analysts also argue that machines can use their deep insertion into voters' social networks to infer with a high level of certainty how voters actually voted (Stokes 2005, 2007; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). From this perspective,

therefore, voters comply only if vote buying is externally enforced by a network of political operatives that monitors voters' actions and credibly threatens to sanction them if they fail to comply. Thus, these scholars assume that clientelism *requires* dense organizational networks to work (Brusco et al. 2004; Stokes 2005; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007).

The possibility of effectively monitoring individual voting behavior when the ballot is secret, however, has been questioned as being unrealistic (Krishna 2007; Nichter 2008; Kramon 2011; Zarazaga 2011). Consequently, in recent years scholars have backed off from this stringent assumption in favor of "softer" versions of how patrons keep track of clients. For instance, some academics have pointed out that monitoring groups of voters by analyzing disaggregated voting results and opinion polls is more efficient and less costly than monitoring and rewarding individual voters (Chandra 2004, 2007; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Scheiner 2007). Similarly, Kitschelt and his collaborators in the Political Accountability in Democratic Party Competition and Economic Governance Project focus on how different types of local organizations and monitoring methods affect the *effectiveness* of electoral clientelism (Kitschelt and Kselman 2011; Kitschelt and Rozenas 2011). So, although these academics no longer see organizations as necessary for clientelistic exchanges, in their framework, electoral clientelism is still externally enforced by local brokers who guarantee the electoral effectiveness of clientelistic investments.

Other scholars working from this "softer" viewpoint, instead, argue that monitoring turnout at the polls—that is, monitoring *whether* individuals who had received clientelistic benefits showed up to vote—was more feasible and thus should be considered as a more rational clientelistic strategy when the secret ballot is used

(Heckelman 1998; Nichter 2008, 2010; Schaffer and Schedler 2007: 25).[15] Addressing this observation, scholars have further developed formal models in which a machine chooses to distribute rewards to voters who differ along two dimensions: their propensity to vote or abstain, and their electoral preferences (Dunning and Stokes 2007; Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter 2009; Nichter 2010; Stokes et al. 2011).[16] While incorporating important caveats, however, all of these new models still rely on some sort of monitoring assumption—i.e., that the political behavior of interest is either observable or at least partially observable. In other words, they still assume that politicians need a dense network of local operatives in order for electoral clientelism to work.

In sum, scholars working within softer versions of the monitoring thesis still assume that politicians *require* a grassroots organizational infrastructure in order to sustain electoral clientelism and to make sure it is electorally efficient. Clientelism without organization remains a paradox.

A second group of academics develop a long-term rationalist explanation that resembles Hirschman's (1970) theory of loyalty. The key factor emphasized by these scholars is that machine clients are loyal voters who have no incentives to defect as long as they continue receiving benefits: voting for the machine's candidate is in their own interest (Magaloni, Díaz-Cayeros, and Estévez 2007; Díaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and

---

15 Nichter (2008) develops a formal model of turnout buying.

16 Dunning and Stokes' (2008) model predicts two strategies: "persuasion" (buying the votes of swing and opposition voters) and "mobilization" (buying turnout among loyalists). Gans-Morse, Nichter, and Mazzuca (2010) and Nichter (2010) contend that political machines frequently combine several of the following plausible strategies: "vote buying" (reward opposing or indifferent voters for switching their vote choices), "turnout buying" (reward immobilized supporters in exchange for showing up at the polls), "double persuasion" (reward indifferent or opposing nonvoters), "negative turnout buying" (reward indifferent or opposing individuals for not voting), and "rewarding loyalists" (rewards to supporters who would vote for them anyway). Stokes et al. (2011) further extend previous work to provide a model of broker-mediated distribution.

Estévez, 2007; Calvo and Murillo 2008; Zarazaga 2011; Zarazaga 2012).[17] However, for this perspective, clients' loyalty is *conditional* on future expectations. Patrons "risk eroding or even losing the loyalty of their core supporters when they attempt to build broader coalitions by delivering transfers to other social groups" (Díaz-Cayeros Magaloni, and Estévez, 2007:11). Consequently, it is rational for them to continue targeting these loyal voters. In this approach, networks of local brokers work principally as selection mechanisms, to precisely identify voters' preferences and the lowest level of benefits needed to secure their votes (Díaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and Estévez, 2007: 112-113; Calvo and Murillo 2008: 8; Zarazaga 2011: 3). So, although these rationalist scholars eschew the monitoring thesis, they still assume that electoral clientelism requires dense organizational networks to function.

Finally, bringing back insights from older generations (Gouldner 1960; Powell 1970; Lemarchand and Legg 1972; Scott 1969, 1972; Graziano 1973), another group of scholars posits that voters comply with the vote-buying exchanges due to feelings of personal obligation and gratitude generated by the receipt of material benefits or services. Clients, unable to reciprocate in kind, vote for their political patrons. Thus, this internalized norm of reciprocity assures clients' compliance (Wang and Kurzman 2007; Schaffer 2007a; Finan and Schechter 2009, Lawson and Greene 2011). For some academics working within this approach, networks of local brokers provide parties with perfect information about voters' preferences and levels of reciprocity (Finan and Schechter 2009: 6).[18] Alternatively, other scholars who are close to the reciprocity

17 This approach is analogous to studies that stress that the incumbent's electoral success relies on public employees' self-interests (Robinson and Verdier 2003; Calvo and Murillo 2004; Oliveros 2012).

18 Lawson and Greene do not make such a strong statement. Although they mention the importance of local networks in clientelistic relations, they do not explicitly argue that networks are necessary for vote buying to take place. However, they do not specify any alternative mechanism by which politicians can get information about individual levels of reciprocity.

framework stress more the long-lasting character of the clientelistic relation as a problem-solving network for the poor (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984; Auyero 2001b; Vommaro and Quirós 2011). In sum, this group of scholars also sees electoral clientelism developing in the long term, as a "network of reciprocities" (Lemarchand and Legg 1972: 153). For these scholars, clientelism without organization and reciprocal exchanges that take place over time would also be a surprise.

In conclusion, conventional approaches, in all their forms, cannot account for the puzzle of having a widespread distribution of benefits during campaigns in politically unorganized, inchoate settings. Scholars have theorized electoral clientelism based on the experience of cases with strong local partisan organization, such as Mexico and Argentina.[19] In contexts with solid political organization one can find relational as well as electoral clientelism. As a result, the conclusions are biased in favor of conventional approaches that associate distribution to organizational density. Nevertheless, in practice, electoral clientelism proliferates in many developing democracies, not just in Peru, without the support of organized political machines (Van de Walle 2007; Krishna 2007; Kramon 2011). As I will show later, my informational theory can solve this apparent paradox and explain how and why clientelistic transactions will work in "machine-free" contexts populated by short-term-oriented actors.

NEW APPROACHES TO ELECTORAL CLIENTELISM

In the last few years scholars have begun exploring new avenues of research in order to deal with the shortcomings exhibited by conventional approaches. For instance, Kramon develops a novel explanation that contends that candidates build credibility

[19] For example, Magaloni et al. (2007) Díaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and Estévez (2007), and Lawson and Greene (2009) work on Mexico. Brusco et al (2004), Stokes (2005), Weitz-Shapiro (2008), Nichter (2008, 2010), and Szwarcberg (2009), in turn, study clientelism in Argentina.

while distributing material benefits (Kramon 2011). Kramon argues that in Kenya's institutional context, candidates for congress hand out material goods as part of a campaign strategy designed to build credibility as potential patrons. A good patron is one that collects resources and is willing to share them. Distributing material resources during the campaign thus conveys information to voters about a candidate's *credibility* in these areas. The expectation is that politicians who distribute goods during campaigns are evaluated more favorably by poor voters than are otherwise identical candidates not observed distributing handouts. From this perspective, then, vote buying is a self-enforced exchange.

Kramon's insights and experimental evidence are without doubt an important contribution to the clientelism literature. Certainly, he pays more attention to campaigns than other scholars do and he shows that distribution itself can inform voters. Nevertheless, the author does not fully develop the theoretical potential of his findings. For instance, he does not distinguish between vote buying and turnout buying at rallies, even though his evidence shows that many people receive cash or food at political rallies (Kramon 2011: 10). Furthermore, Kramon does not pay much attention to the potential *indirect* effects that electoral clientelism can have on vote choices by signaling candidates' electoral strength. In particular, he does not theorize how voters choose among candidates who do distribute clientelistic goods during campaigns. As will be discussed later, electoral clientelism has broader informational effects besides signaling candidates' credibility as potential patrons.

Similarly, in a recent contribution Szwarcberg (2012) focuses on the informational value that buying turnout at rallies has. Expanding her previous research (Szwarcberg 2009; Szwarcberg 2011), Szwarcberg argues that rallies continue to be important in the mass and social media era because they provide information to different

members within and outside the partisan machine. First, rallies offer party bosses information to monitor brokers' capacity to mobilize voters. Second, they grant party brokers with opportunities to show their patrons their ability to mobilize voters and, thus, get promoted within the party. Third, by turning out at rallies, machine clients have an opportunity to show their willingness to fulfill their part of the clientelistic agreement. Finally, building upon research on dominant parties and competitive authoritarianism, Szwarcberg contends that turnout at rallies provides the opposition with information about the electoral strength or weakness of the incumbent's power by publicly displaying its capacity to mobilize voters. In this way, rallies contribute to strategic coordination.

Szwarcberg's new piece significantly advances our understanding about the informational value that rallies have for political competition. As I will discuss later, my theory expands her contribution by looking at the importance of informational effects of turnout buying at rallies. However, her theoretical model still considers only the informational value of clientelistic mobilization in contexts with organized partisan machines. Thus, she does not fully theorize the indirect effects of campaign turnout buying. My theory, in contrast, illuminates these indirect effects of electoral clientelism in unorganized settings. In the conclusion, I also discuss the effects in organized settings.

Going beyond these theoretical refinements, I develop a full-fledged informational theory that is able to explain electoral clientelism in unorganized settings. In the next section I thoroughly discuss my theory's main argument, the causal mechanisms I propose, and the advantages this theory has over existing approaches.

AN INFORMATIONAL THEORY OF ELECTORAL CLIENTELISM

I develop a theory that stresses the indirect effects that investments in electoral clientelism have on vote choices. Rather than assuming that the effect of distributing

material benefits on electoral choices is principally a direct one, as prevailing approaches do, my theory emphasizes, instead, the indirect effects that material investments during campaigns produce. I contend that electoral clientelism generates valuable *information* that strategic voters use to form their preferences and make electoral decisions. By informing various types of observers about candidates' relative electoral viability and desirability, electoral clientelism *indirectly* affects electoral preferences and thus the outcome of elections.

My informational theory places electoral campaigns, competition, and the dynamics of the race at the center of analysis. It does so, first, by highlighting the importance of electoral clientelism as a *campaigning tool* and highlighting a frequently overlooked form of electoral clientelism: campaign turnout buying. By distributing minor consumer goods and favors, politicians buy the *participation* of poor voters at rallies and other sorts of campaign events. This subtype of electoral clientelism, "campaign clientelism," does not require having a consolidated political organization on the ground or monitoring voter behavior. Quite the opposite, campaign turnout buying is easy to carry out even in contexts with low political organization. In fact, it is crucial for establishing viability precisely in unorganized settings.

In contrast, most scholars apply a very narrow definition of electoral clientelism—"vote buying"—that implies a treatment of campaigns as one-shot deals (e.g., Stokes 2005; Schaffer and Schedler 2007). Most definitions of vote buying emphasize that those clientelistic exchanges "are not only ex ante in that benefits are distributed prior to voting, but also that exchanges occur on or soon before Election Day" (Nichter 2010: 25). Thus, scholars often interpret any data about the distribution of material benefits during campaigns as efforts at vote buying. This includes cases in which candidates are evidently buying turnout at rallies (e.g., Kramon 2011).

Moreover, even when intending to focus on electoral participation more broadly and distinguishing different subtypes of electoral clientelism, scholars do not consider clientelistic strategies used *throughout* the campaign. For instance, "turnout buying" is defined as a special case of electoral clientelism in which payments are made to voters to turn out at the polls (Cox and Kousser 1981; Heckelman 1998; Nichter 2008, 2010).[20] In sum, most scholars are limiting the empirical referent of their theories only to what happens close to election day. In this way, they miss a broader picture and the electoral rationale of clientelistic strategies, especially in countries without organized machines such as Peru.

Second, my informational theory distinguishes itself from existing approaches in that it locates competition under uncertainty as its core. While competition and uncertainty are essential for any democracy, they are particularly accentuated in contexts that lack organized political affiliations. When voters do not have stable partisan attachments, it is much more difficult for them to coordinate and vote together. To be certain, informational deficits—and, thus, uncertainty—are particularly acute in countries with weakly institutionalized parties (Moser 2001, Moser and Scheiner 2009).[21] Moreover, without institutionalized parties or machines, the number of competitors entering the race tends to be greater. Thus, competition is very intense and unpredictable.

As I have already shown, existing approaches cannot account for short-term clientelistic transactions in fluid, unorganized political settings. However, most scholars have not only left short-term strategic clientelistic interactions untheorized; they also ignore electoral competition.[22] Most studies of electoral clientelism either assume that

[20] Important exceptions are Auyero (2001), Szwarcberg (2009, 2011, 2012) Vommaro and Quirós (2011) who do explicitly analyze turnout buying at rallies.
[21] Or in elections such as primaries, in which partisan identification is not a decisive predictor of choices.
[22] Finan and Schechter (2009) and Zarazaga (2011) are important exceptions.

only the incumbent's machine buys votes (Stokes 2005, 2007; Dunning and Stokes 2007; Stokes et al. 2011; Nichter 2008, 2010; Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter 2009) or concern themselves only with cases in which clientelistic machines are consolidated and inter-party competition is limited (Auyero 2001; Wang and Kurzman 2007; Szwarcberg 2009; Szwarcberg 2012; Vommaro and Quirós 2011). In some theories, machines may react to competition, in the sense that they diversify their strategies (Magaloni, Díaz-Cayeros, and Estévez 2007). But, overall, electoral clientelism is seen as a suitable strategy for machine incumbents and not for competitors. To a great extent, this has to do with a prevalent assumption: that, today, electoral clientelism is mostly carried out with public resources. Although resources are used to finance the distribution of handouts during campaigns, private donations finance an important share of this distribution in several contexts.[23]

My informational theory also differs from existing approaches in a third way: it incorporates campaign dynamics (time) to a much greater extent. Where partisan cues and organizations are weak, campaigns are more decisive than in established democracies (Lawson and McCann 2005, Baker, Ames, and Renno 2006). By emphasizing competition under uncertainty, my theory grants much more importance to campaigns themselves. I do so by emphasizing that voters will be affected by information about what other voters are doing during campaigns (Popkin 1991: 11). For my theoretical approach, information cues received *during campaigns* will be crucial for electoral choices.

Buying turnout at campaign events, I argue, allows candidates to pass two fundamental hurdles to election. First, campaign clientelism permits candidates to draw

[23] See, for instance, Vicente 2007; 2012.

attention to themselves in two ways: getting people to physically show up at their campaign events and demonstrating their mobilization capability. By assuring crowded campaign rallies by buying turnout, candidates demonstrate their electoral viability to the broader audience who learn about these rallies through other means, such as word of mouth and radio, television, or newspaper reports. Second, campaign clientelism is crucial for convincing clients about candidates' electoral "desirability." By directly communicating with turnout clients at campaign events, candidates try to turn voters' temporary attention into a more permanent commitment that will carry through to election day. In other words, while attending campaign events indifferent clients access information that helps them make their electoral choices. Together, changes in viability and desirability throughout the campaign shape candidates' electoral fortunes.

In the following sections, I further develop the logic of the informational theory by unpacking the two main causal mechanisms by which campaign clientelism indirectly influences electoral choices. I conclude this section by explaining how the two mechanisms relate to shape the dynamics of the race.

Signaling Electoral Viability

Information on the relative support of competing candidates is a precondition for voters and elites to behave strategically in reaction to electoral incentives (Cox 1997: 79). During elections elites seek to avoid wasting resources and effort and thus tend to concentrate them on candidates who are expected to fare better (Cox 1997, Boix 1999). In the same way, strategic voters are unwilling to waste their ballots on hopeless candidates. Thus, they frequently end up voting for candidates who are ranked second or lower in their preference ordering but who are better positioned in the polls (Cox 1997).

Actors' beliefs about the electoral prospects of candidates are based, among other factors, on the perceived level of public support. Partisan affiliation is thought to be one of the best cues as to candidates' competitiveness (Moser and Scheiner 2009). Voters can employ the electoral history heuristic—whether parties have previously gained seats in a given district—in order to form their expectations (Lago 2008). Strategic actors also take cues from other sources of easily observable data, such as poll results and interest group endorsements (McKelvey and Ordeshook 1985).

Frequently overlooked is the valuable information campaign clientelism produces for partisan competition. This is especially important in fluid political settings where political organizations are weak and voters unattached. The distribution of material rewards plays a big role in campaigns, I argue, because it allows candidates' campaign teams to convey information and signal that they are electorally viable candidates. Aggregate turnout at electoral events serves as a source of electoral information because it is easily observable. The number of people a candidate is able to mobilize is used as a proxy of his or her popularity among voters.[24] As Kitschelt and Wilkinson contend, "public pledges, or the display of badges, party colors or signs" are more valuable to politicians than private promises of support (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 15). Buying attendance at campaign events is therefore electorally appealing for politicians.

Moreover, campaign clientelism has advantages compared to other subtypes of electoral clientelism. First, it is relatively cheap. Candidates buy attendance at campaign acts by offering minor consumer goods and other selective incentives to poor voters. In

24 In authoritarian contexts, turnout at rallies is informative about the incumbent's power (Cox 2009: 12-13) and diffuses a public image of invincibility that diminishes bandwagon effects in favor of the opposition candidates (Magaloni 2006: 9). The size of protest demonstrations has also been considered as an informational cue signaling the lack of public support of oppressive regimes. See, for instance, Lohmann (1994).

addition, candidates promise future benefits to activists who help organize those events. By contrast, vote buying can be quite expensive in certain contexts.[25] Second, in contrast to other subtypes of electoral clientelism, attendance at rallies cannot be reneged on: "Even when voters can decide not to support the candidate whose rallies they have attended, they, nevertheless, contribute to make these events a success simply by turning out." (Szwarberg 2009: 14) Thus, monitoring individual compliance is not necessarily an issue: politicians do not need to invest time and resources in monitoring individuals in order to assure the turnout of large numbers of voters at rallies.

In contexts with loosely organized political machines, campaign clientelism acquires special significance: it serves both to mobilize and convince voters, activists, and campaign financers to support the most promising candidates. By establishing candidates' electoral viability, campaign clientelism indirectly affects vote choices.

How do bought turnout numbers affect electoral choices? Elites and voters contrast the information gathered by observing turnout at campaign events with the information assessed by reviewing recent electoral history, observing the spread of street propaganda, and assessing candidates' appearance in the media, which is in turn influenced by turnout. As scholars have noted, the media tends to focus more on candidates who have momentum (Bartels 1988: 32-35). High turnout at electoral events provides cues about this electoral potential. The media thus transmits and amplifies the importance of high attendance at campaign events.[26]

---

[25] For instance, estimates indicate that a typical legislative candidate in an urban area of Taiwan distributes up to US$3 million in cash and that candidates gave out a total of US$460 million in cash to voters in the 2001 legislative elections in Thailand (Schaffer 2007b: 4).

[26] In countries without institutionalized parties, the media could also directly substitute for partisan organizations during electoral processes (Hale 2006). In such cases, competition may take place directly within the media. Thus, access to media coverage through other means, such as ownership or media corruption, may be more important than demonstrating mobilization strength by turning out numbers.

In weakly organized polities, politicians frequently engage in campaign clientelism from the initial stages of the campaign onward in order to attract attention to their candidacy and take advantage of bandwagon effects. Campaign teams work intensively to ensure their campaign events are perceived as being successful. The goal is to maximize attendance. The more well-attended the campaign events, the more the candidates' reputations as viable contenders will increase. As a result, it will be easier for candidates to convince strategic donors and benefit-seeking activists to support them.

Indeed, the increasing distribution of goods throughout the campaign enables the broader audience of voters to update their beliefs about the electoral chances of the candidates. In contexts in which financial endorsements are not publicly made, the amount and quality of goods being distributed convey information about candidates' ability to gather resources. Particularly at later stages of the campaign, the distribution of goods (as well as the display of propaganda) signals to the general public which candidates are in the lead and thus have more chances of being elected. In this way, a narrower set of viable candidates is identified. Other things being equal, these candidates increase their chances of convincing strategic actors of their electoral viability. In contexts in which elites fail to coordinate candidates' entry into electoral competition, this dynamic helps reduce the number of viable contenders, although not as much as in a complete information setting.[27]

Influencing Clients

Political parties have long been considered important institutions that organize popular demands and socialize citizens into politics (Duverger 1954; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Sartori 1976, among many others). Moreover, partisan identification has been

[27] Of course, electoral rules will influence the ease of strategic coordination. One advantage of conducting a case study of a unitary country is that it allows the impact of electoral rules to be held constant.

recognized as a common information shortcut that helps voters make their electoral choices less cognitively demanding (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Downs 1957). The literature on electoral behavior has extensively discussed that voters do not fully inform themselves about policy positions before making electoral choices (e.g., Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Downs 1957; Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964; Popkin 1991; Lupia and McCubbins 1998). According to this literature, most voters do not follow politics closely nor think much about it on a regular basis. Thus, their political belief systems tend to be scarcely developed in terms of their scope, range of issues covered, and their organization (Luskin 1987). In the absence of stable partisan organization, voters lack the partisan attachments that make it easier to inform themselves about politics. Thus, in these contexts voters may have even less motivation to acquire political information and less support to process it than is usually found in institutionalized democracies. In fluid political settings, therefore, politicians will need to make bigger efforts to attract and retain voters' attention.

Campaign clientelism has the frequently overlooked benefit of allowing politicians to mobilize indifferent voters– especially poorer voters—who may otherwise not inform themselves about the available electoral options. In contexts with low levels of political organization, campaign events provide candidates with *unique* opportunities to capture poor voters' attention. Once politicians buy poor voters' participation, they can try to convince them about their desirability in three complementary ways: promising local public goods, conveying personal traits, and generating a positive buzz that will outlast the event. Overall, then, by assuring poor voters' participation at rallies, campaign clientelism increases the chances candidates have to gain the support of this large electoral constituency.

Unlike regular advertisements or debates, rallies and other campaign events allow politicians to enter in personal contact with citizens. Face-to-face interactions between candidates and voters can be important in several ways. First, personal communication during campaigns has proven to be important to increase electoral turnout (Shaw 2006; Green and Gerber 2008) and persuade voters (Popkin 1991; Fenno 1996; Mahler 2011; Nielsen 2012). Second, personal traits are easier to convey and evaluate during face-to-face interaction than through the media and virtual networks. Finally, in contexts without stable partisan attachments, closer interactions between voters and candidates can help lessen problems of credibility and distrust. In particular, interpersonal interaction can help resource-rich or well-connected candidates to bridge the social distance with poor voters that turnout buying makes explicit. The need of campaign turnout buying requires and exacerbates the social distance between better-off candidates and less well-off clients. On the one hand, buying voters' turnout at rallies requires access to enough resources to finance distribution throughout the campaign. Thus, candidates must be well-off themselves or can get connections with businessmen during the campaign. On the other hand, differences in individuals' income levels will affect the likelihood to accept participating in campaign events in exchange for a handout: poor voters will value more highly handouts than wealthier ones.[28] Thus, turnout clients will most likely be poor voters. Through face-to-face interaction, candidates can attempt to "level" with poor voters and guarantee them representation despite their social distance. In short, by allowing for interpersonal interaction, campaign events constitute crucial opportunities candidates have to make a more lasting impression on participants.

[28] Budget constraints limit the type of benefits that candidates can distribute.

During these public gatherings, candidates can influence poor voters through complementary means. First, given the spatial nature and small scale of campaign events such as rallies and candidates visits, politicians can particularize their message and promise local public goods to districts or neighborhoods. Just by making these proposals and promises available and salient to clients, turnout buying can actually increase the clients' likelihood to vote for the buyer candidate,—a priming effect similar to that gained from advertisements (Gerber et al. 2011). Moreover, politicians will also have more time to explain details of certain policy proposals that may be relevant to the particular constituency's interest. Voters can thus learn more about the candidates' proposals. In certain types of campaign events, such as candidate visits to local associations and neighborhoods, candidates and citizens may even have the chance to negotiate the terms of their political agreements.

Second, and most important, campaign events constitute the most effective way to convey and evaluate the candidates' personal traits. In unorganized political contexts, personalistic voting may be more important for deciding elections than in contexts with institutionalized programmatic or clientelistic linkages. As Fenno contends, "personal campaigning may be most appropriate in locating and securing a solid primary constituency." (Fenno 1996: 155) Specifically, personally connecting with poor voters on the campaign trail should be a priority for candidates in loosely organized settings. Because most voters are able to process information and form opinions about candidates' personalities rather easily (Popkin 1991; Fenno 1996), political sophistication affects candidate-centered voting (Peterson 2005; Lavine and Gschwend 2006; Slosar 2011). Through social interaction and socialization, individuals learn to interpret other people's actions and gestures (Mead 1947; Goffman 1959; Berger and Luckmann 1967). Consequently, all voters,

> regardless of their political sophistication, have well-developed and accessible "personality schemata"—knowledge gained from a lifetime of experience interacting with, observing, and evaluating those around them—that facilitate the reception and use of information related to others' personalities. (Slosar 2011: 22)

In contrast, policy and performance evaluations are more cognitively demanding than making judgments about personal character. Political sophistication, however, tends also to be inversely related with socioeconomic status. Therefore, we should expect to see many turnout clients, especially poor and generally less sophisticated voters, give more weight to the evaluation of candidates' personal characteristics in deciding how to cast their votes.

By allowing for interpersonal interaction, campaign events such as rallies and personal visits constitute excellent opportunities for the public presentation of the candidate. Analogous to what happens in our everyday interaction with others (Goffman 1959), during their public performances candidates present their "selves" to voters (Mahler 2011). This is why campaign teams invest plenty of time, energy, and resources planning campaign events and worrying about the public perceptions they generate (Mahler 2011). According to Fenno (1996), on the campaign trail there are three candidate-centered attributes linked with success: authenticity, consistency, and good character. Authenticity has to do to with the transparency of the political persona: the candidate must be "believable"; voters should not perceive him or her as "faking." (Fenno 1996: 324-325) Second, the presentation of self to citizens is expected to be consistent over time (Fenno 1996: 325). Finally, a candidate must have "good character," that is, desirable personal traits for an elected authority. Among others, he or she should be honest, humble and unselfish to "connect" with the popular masses.

During these public gatherings clients can observe closely the candidate's manners (the way they talk, the way they treat poor people, the way they handle competitors' accusations, etc.). Despite the intensive planning that goes into these events, they provide more room for spontaneity; unlike advertisements or news reports, campaign events are not edited. Therefore, citizens have better chances to assess the candidate's skills and reactions. Participants can also learn about the candidates' personal trajectories and get to know who the candidates' allies are.

Finally, campaign events potentially generate a positive buzz for candidates. Participants at campaign events can also examine both the viability and desirability of candidates by observing their peers' reactions to them. In general, the more enthusiastic the public mood at campaign events, the better it will be for influence purposes. Indeed, the goal of influence is not only to make a good impression on participants but also to get them to talk about the candidate in a positive way. Attendees at these rallies will often comment afterwards on the candidates and their proposals so that good attendance and mass enthusiasm at these rallies becomes crucial for establishing "buzz" or positive word of mouth.

In summary, campaign events provide candidates with ideal circumstances for convincing voters about their electoral desirability: by attending political meetings after being offered certain selective incentives, citizens—especially poor and generally less politically sophisticated voters—get valuable information *in situ* that help them make their electoral choices.

Relations Between Mechanisms

Signaling electoral viability and persuading clients of electoral desirability are both jointly necessary components of a successful electoral trajectory.[29] Although it may be theoretically plausible that a successful strategy using just one mechanism could get a candidate elected, this possibility seems unlikely empirically. Any appealing candidacy needs to pass a viability threshold in order to succeed in the polls. Similarly, a candidate with good initial prospects needs to maintain momentum throughout the campaign. In this sense, neither electoral viability nor desirability may on their own be sufficient to explain successful electoral trajectories. But, how do these causal mechanisms relate to each other?

Demonstrating electoral viability is a first step any candidate must take in order to be elected. Considering all candidates competing for office, signaling viability works as a first-stage *selection* mechanism: this competitive dynamic helps reduce the viable number of contenders. Lacking alternative reliable shortcuts to assess candidates' electoral strength, such as partisan identification, strategic voters will concentrate further information-gathering efforts on a few candidates who are expected to fare well. Thus, demonstrating mobilization capability during the campaign is a way of attracting the attention of the broader electoral audience.

However, frontrunner candidates still need to convince rally participants of their desirability. Campaign clientelism buys poor voters' presence, but not necessarily

29 A clarification is in order. Influence is not incompatible with strategic voting. Scholars interested in strategic voting assume that citizens already have a set of fixed partisan preferences (strict and ordered preferences). This theory does not predict that citizens will always vote for the frontrunner candidate but that they may end up choosing their second or third preferred option if their first one does not have good enough electoral prospects. The identified mechanism of influence is thus a process by which indifferent clients can assess the "desirability" of different candidates and form their political preferences (or weakly identified clients change theirs). After gathering information about candidates' electoral chances and forming their preferences, clients can engage in strategic voting.

electoral support. Therefore, politicians need to create a link that, although it may not outlast the campaign, will at least endure through election day. Candidates can thus influence participants through particularistic promises or by achieving a personal connection with them. In particular, final rallies and other events taking place near the end of the campaign may therefore be crucial for cementing the vote of poor participants.

In other words, my informational theory does not imply a simple bidding process in which the candidate who offers more private benefits gets more electoral support, like the model that Finan and Schechter (2009) develop for reciprocal voters does. Voters do not necessarily vote for the candidate who distributes more benefits. The amount of goods being distributed may signal electoral viability and, if it helps ensure crowded campaign events, would thereby indirectly influence electoral decisions since voters consider electoral viability in making electoral choices. But, as emphasized, candidates' likability affects vote choice as well. Thus, a blatant distribution of goods could actually enrage poor voters and impede candidates' ability to establish an emotional connection with rally participants. An exaggerated distribution can widen the social distance between the candidate and campaign clients, causing the candidate to be perceived as insensitive and arrogant. As discussed, clients evaluate candidates' manners and social skills during their presentations at campaign events. Therefore, the way benefits are distributed (Auyero 2001)—that is, how distribution is personalized—may be as important as what or how much is distributed.

In sum, both electoral viability and desirability are necessary for a successful electoral strategy. An examination of the strategies candidates use and how viability and desirability combine should explain voting patterns and make sense of electoral trajectories.

EXPECTATIONS

Before concluding, this section briefly presents my theory's predictions. The informational approach expects to find considerable clientelistic efforts during elections even in the absence of strong partisan organizations. In particular, this approach predicts that a significant amount of material benefits is distributed from the beginning of the campaign and throughout at campaign events. It expects clients to be predominantly poor and often opportunistic, people who turn out at campaign events to obtain handouts. Moreover, for my theory several candidates and not just incumbents engage in campaign clientelism. In other words, to a great extent, campaign clientelism is carried out with private resources. Candidates may rely on local brokers to distribute goods but they need not be part of an established vertical clientelistic network. Table 2.1 summarizes my theory's empirical implications and contrasts them to those of conventional approaches.

Table 2.1: Empirical Implications of Theoretical Approaches to Electoral Clientelism

Dimension	**Conventional Approaches**	**Informational**
Most frequently used type of electoral clientelism	Vote buying and turnout buying at polls	Turnout buying at campaign events
Timing of benefits distribution	Distribution on election day or very close to it	Distribution starts well before election day
Settings of benefits distribution	Distribution through established clientelistic networks of brokers	Distribution at campaign events
Most likely clients	Citizens who are part of clientelistic networks or who believe in the plausibility of monitoring	Citizens who are available to participate in campaign events

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have shown how existing theories have exaggerated the importance of organized networks and long-term relations for sustaining electoral clientelism. Conventional approaches disagree on the particular causal mechanism they posit to explain why clients honor the clientelistic bargain. However, all of these approaches conceive of electoral clientelism as an iterated relation that is commonly accompanied by a political organization: a network of local brokers. Focusing on the long term, scholars do not expect electoral clientelism to take place in unorganized settings where actors are opportunistic and focused on the short term.

My theory incorporates some recent theoretical refinements that contemplate either the possibility of having clientelistic transactions without established networks or the informational value of clientelistic tactics. However, I move beyond these new developments by providing a *full-fledged* theory that, first, emphasizes the information produced by buying turnout at campaign events and, second, is able to explain how electoral clientelism takes place in unorganized political contexts.

Politicians engage in campaign clientelism because of the payoffs it can indirectly produce: raising contributions, recruiting benefit-seeking activists, attracting strategic voters, and influencing clients. Campaign clientelism affects electoral choices through two causal mechanisms: by signaling candidates' electoral viability to the broader electoral audience and by providing politicians with good opportunities to influence poor rally participants, convincing them of their desirability. Politicians distribute selective incentives in order to buy poor voters' participation at campaign events. This bought turnout allows them to attract clients' attention and further demonstrate their electoral strength to the general public. During campaign events, however, candidates need to make sure that they convince clients to support them at the polls. They can do so through

three complementary means. First, candidates can particularize their message and promise local public goods to crucial constituencies. Second, because campaign events involve face-to-face interactions between politicians and voters, they constitute the best way to convey and evaluate the candidate's personal traits. Finally, campaign events can help candidates generate a positive buzz that can amplify their efforts at influence.

Having discussed the existing literature, explained my own theory, and contrasted the expectations of my theory and others, in the next chapter I provide an introduction to how politics works within Peru, a democracy without parties, and subsequently test the empirical implications of conventional theories in this loosely organized polity. After showing the limitations of these approaches, I proceed to demonstrate the soundness of my informational theory in chapters four and five.

Chapter Three: Clientelistic Linkages in Peru and the Limits of Conventional Explanations

As discussed in Chapter Two, conventional approaches to the study of electoral clientelism would not expect to find much distribution of material benefits during elections in places, such as Peru, which lack consolidated political organizations. Although they emphasize different purposes for networks and differ in their explanations for voter compliance with clientelistic deals, these scholars generally assume that electoral clientelism *requires* extensive and stable networks of brokers at the local level. In addition, most of the existing literature focuses only on direct vote-getting strategies, such as vote buying and turnout buying at the polls. These scholars conceive these vote-getting deals as single-shot transactions that take place close to election day.

The informational theory, by contrast, would expect to observe an intensive distribution of material goods during the whole duration of campaigns in contexts with low political organization. Rather than focusing on the direct effects of clientelistic investments, the informational theory instead emphasizes the indirect effects of these investments on vote choices. From this perspective, electoral clientelism affects electoral choices by shaping the dynamics of the race. This theory would expect politicians to invest in clientelism while campaigning, buying participation at campaign events in hopes of shaping the dynamics of the race in ways that translate into votes on election day.

This chapter has two goals. First, it intends to provide basic information to understand the political context under study and to describe scores of my dependent variable. Second, the chapter tests whether conventional approaches can explain how electoral clientelism takes place in Peru. In order to do so, I proceed in the following way. I begin by showing that Peru has a very low level of political organization. In fact,

scholars have not exaggerated the degree of political disorganization and fluidity in Peru. I present a brief historical account of the gradual erosion of relational clientelism over several decades and then I characterize the current state of political organization. I provide evidence confirming that political parties or purely clientelistic machines rarely are organized and stable in Peru. Next, I discuss the types of distributive strategies that politicians use in this context of low organization. I contend that, instead of building lasting clientelistic organizations, Peruvian politicians engage mostly in exploitative corruption. Incumbents combine corruption with investments in pork barrel politics and an intense distribution of material inducements during campaigns. Finally, I use quantitative and qualitative data to test implications derived from prevailing theories. I do so by providing a description of how gifts are actually distributed during campaigns. I consider mostly the timing and setting of distribution. I also contemplate the possibility that politicians have come up with some type of monitoring system despite not having stable networks of local brokers. I conclude by summarizing my main findings: conventional approaches cannot explain the type of electoral clientelism found in Peru. In the subsequent chapters I show how the informational theory can account for these empirical observations.

THE DEMISE OF RELATIONAL CLIENTELISM IN PERU

The literature on clientelism has distinguished between traditional forms of relational clientelism and more modern forms based on partisan brokerage networks. Traditional clientelism differs from political machines because it is based primarily on face-to-face relations and bonds of traditional deference that tie clients and patrons together (Scott 1969). This type of clientelism is seen as being more encompassing in its

scope, in the sense that it covers virtually every aspect of people's economic, social and political life and not just electoral politics (Archer 1990).

Peru had traditional clientelism before it democratized in 1980. This took the form of a clientelistic social system in which a few families concentrated political power due to their social and economic wealth and, especially, their ownership of land (Bourricaud 1966, Alberti and Fuenzalida 1969, Fuenzalida 1971; Cotler 1967; Guasti 1977). Society was organized in layers of hierarchical mediations with a high concentration of power at the apex (Alberti and Fuenzalida 1969: 67-68; Cotler 1978). This vertical societal structure also reproduced racial discrimination. Particularly in Andean areas, the clientelistic system worked as an "ethnic administration" in which indigenous peasants were tied to landowners through a system of traditional authorities (*varayoc*) (Coronel, Degregori, and Del Pino 1998). The "oligarchic" system eroded progressively with socioeconomic modernization and was politically challenged during the 1950s and 1960s. However, it only came to a definitive end with the agrarian reform launched in 1969 by the reformist military government (Lowenthal ed. 1975; López 1997).

During the 1980s, with the return to democracy, some political parties used clientelism as a long-term strategy to develop political support. Relational clientelism primarily took the form of providing jobs as patronage for partisans. While in power (1985-1990), the *Partido Aprista Peruano* (APRA) went beyond other parties, building a clientelistic machine that utilized social programs targeted to the urban poor, such as PAD (*Programa de Apoyo Directo*) and PAIT (*Programa de Apoyo de Ingreso Temporal)* (Parodi Trece 2000: 236-238; see also Blondet 2004: 42 about PAD). Party favoritism was pervasive particularly in PAIT's implementation (Graham 1991, 1992). However, clientelistic behavior during campaigns had yet to reach its fullest extent. Although parties made political use of food aid, electoral mobilization in the 1980s was

increasingly programmatic. The failure of military corporatist rule spurred the rise of urban social movements that promoted an ethics of rights and egalitarianism (Stokes 1995). The result was the emergence of a rift in political culture between clientelistic and radical/leftist mentalities among the urban poor in the 1980s.

Clientelistic linkages radically changed during the tenure of political outsider Alberto Fuijimori (1990-2000), who unexpectedly won the presidency in 1990. The authoritarian reconstruction of the state after the 1980s crisis made both pork barrel and clientelistic strategies feasible for Fujimori. Fujimori constructed a corrupt competitive authoritarian regime (Cotler and Grompone 2000; Marcus-Delgado and Tanaka 2001; Levitsky and Way 2002; Carrión 2006; Murakami 2007), and engaged in a state-building process that allowed him to regain control over the national territory (Wise 2002; Burt 2007). He also recentralized administrative power and resources in the executive branch (Planas 1998; Contreras, Carlos 2002; Zas Fris 2005), while simultaneously weakening regional and provincial politicians and strengthening district municipalities (Tanaka 2002a), particularly rural ones (Muñoz 2005).

Lacking a partisan organization, Fujimori used the state apparatus to distribute pork extensively, thus increasing his chances of being reelected (Roberts 1995; Weyland 1998; Graham and Kane 1998; Roberts and Arce 1998; Schady 2000). Because Fujimori did not have a party backing him, job patronage was not as extensive as in the 1980s. This time it was selective and linked to the construction of a state-based machine. Fujimori used this state-based machine to expand and institutionalize clientelistic ties to the poor through social programs such as PRONAA (*Programa Nacional de Asistencia Alimentaria*) (Boesten 2010; Rousseau 2009). Additionally, electoral clientelism grew considerably given that Fujimori made up for his lack of party organization by using

public resources to buy turnout at rallies and campaign events (Conaghan 2005: 164-166).

The construction of this authoritarian state-machine took place simultaneously with the definitive collapse of the traditional party system. The control of the state apparatus allowed Fujimori to deliver goods and services that extremely weak political parties were no longer able to provide, either at the national or subnational level.[30] Moreover, Fujimori got rid of many partisan cadres working in the state by implementing a very radical version of market reforms (Gonzales de Olarte 1998; Weyland 2002). Among other measures, these reforms included an aggressive program to privatize public enterprises (formerly used as a source of patronage) as well as the dismissal of a large number of state employees. Figure 3.1, for example, illustrates a substantial decrease in spending on salaries as a proportion of central government non-financial expenditures beginning in the 1990s.

However, Fujimori did not engage in party building while in power (Tanaka 2001, 2002; Levitsky and Cameron 2003; Roberts 2006; Murakami 2007). Organizationally, Fujimori's "parties" "were empty vessels that served at the whim of their autocratic founder" (Roberts 2006: 139). Therefore, the technical structure of the state was free of partisan patronage.[31] To mobilize poor voters at the government rallies and during campaigns, Fujimori's government relied on a network of paid political brokers. This network was organized by a former *aprista* and expert in political mobilization, Absalón Vásquez who served first as Minister of Agriculture (1992-1996) and, then, as a presidential advisor. Most of these brokers were former cadres from the left and APRA

[30] Fujimori replaced elected regional assemblies with appointed executive authorities and modified subnational transfers to benefit district over provincial municipalities, where most partisan strongholds were organized.

[31] Personal interview with Pierina Polarollo, technocrat and expert in public employment. Lima, September 30, 2009.

Figure 3.1. Salaries and Capital Investment 1970-2011



Source: CEPAL

(Grompone 2000: 138). In Cusco, for example, the government hired former cadres from leftist parties such as *Vanguardia Revolucionaria*, *Partido Comunista del Perú -Patria Roja*, and the Maoist *Partido Comunista del Perú - Puka Llacta*.[32] Former leftist politicians interviewed in Piura and Cusco also acknowledged that left political cadres, including themselves, worked for Fujimori's government.[33]

Apristas also recognized that they lost cadres to *Fujimorismo*. For instance, Carlos Armas, APRA militant and former congressman, confirmed that several APRA militants left the party and joined Fujimori's government. According to him these were cadres without much power and leadership within the party.[34] Alberto Chumacero,

32 Personal interview with Washington Román, union leader and journalist (May 17, 2010), Adolfo Mamani, former Puka Llacta partisan (Cusco, August 31, 2010), and Carlos Paredes, former member of Vanguardia in Cusco (Lima, November 7, 2009).
33 Personal interview with anonymous political operators in Piura (November 15, 2010) and Cusco (August 2, 2010).
34 Personal interview, Lima, August 3, 2010.

APRA's secretary of organization in Piura, agrees. He explains that Vásquez took with him many middle-ranked political cadres as well as local brokers.[35] These and other politicians explained this shift of allegiances mostly with economic incentives: during very bad economic times, these cadres did not have a stable income to support their families.[36] According to one of Vásquez's closer associates and fellow ex-*aprista*, in 1994 they recruited approximately 70% of APRA's former network of local brokers in Lima in order to assure Fujimori's first reelection in 1995. [37] He also explained in detail how they used certain programs such as PRONAA and PRONAMCH (*Programa Nacional de Manejo de Cuencas Hidrográficas y Conservación de Suelos*) to build this network of political support and mobilization for Fujimori.

After democracy reemerged in 2001, however, institutional factors and political competition made the consolidation of a state-based machine unlikely. Institutional constraints (technocratic controls, transparency procedures, and the decentralization of social programs) and increasing social awareness (created by media and civil society organizations) have limited the executive's latitude to use state resources for clientelistic ends.[38] In addition, despite the creation of regional governments, subnational incumbents do not have as much leeway as they do in other countries to engage in clientelism.

---

[35] Personal interview, Piura, November 24, 2010.

[36] Politicians also point out that Fujimori's government threatened many radical leftist cadres with prosecution for terrorism charges. The government offered to drop charges on the condition that they agreed to work for the Fujimori administration. (Personal interview with Adolfo Mamani, Cusco, August 31, 2010).

[37] Personal interview with anonymous political operator, Lima, February 17, 2010.

[38] Personal interviews with Guido Lucioni (Fujimorismo), Lima, February 5, 2010; Carlos Roca (APRA), Lima, April 6, 2010; Fritz Du Bois (former chief advisor for the Ministry of Economy and Finance and current Director of the newspaper *Perú21*), Lima, August 13, 2009; Javier Abugattás (former Viceminister of Economy and Finance), Lima, September 18, 2009; Víctor Caballero (former Chief of PRONAA), Lima, October 23, 2009; Cecilia Blondet (Minister for the Advancement of Women and Human Development and current president of the NGO PROETICA), Lima, November 6, 2009; Lorena Alcázar (Research Director and Senior Researcher at the Group for the Analysis of Development – GRADE), Lima, June 9, 2010. For more details about the power of technocrats in Peru, see Dargent 2012.

National regulations play an important role in a still-centralized unitary body and constrain subnational incumbents. The three levels of subnational government also lack any legal authority or financial control over each other (Muñoz 2005; Muñoz 2007), impeding the construction of political machines with territorial reach.

In summary, relational clientelism has diminished considerably in Peru. Traditional clientelism based on the *hacienda* system was replaced by partisan clientelism in the 1980s, which depended largely on the distribution of patronage (public jobs) to activists. With the collapse of the party system and the consolidation of a competitive authoritarian regime, however, partisan clientelistic linkages significantly eroded. Without a party, during the 1990s Fujimori used the state apparatus as a machine substitute to mobilize poor voters using public resources. Since 2001, this road to clientelism has been closed. Under democracy, a series of institutional constraints impede the kind of use Fujimori made of the central state as a clientelistic machine.

Today, relational clientelism, both in its partisan and state-based versions, is difficult to sustain in Peru. As the next section will demonstrate, most political parties have not reorganized since democratization and state-based machines have not consolidated either. As I will elaborate, the structure of political competition without stable partisan affiliations affects politicians' distributive strategies in ways that make the consolidation of clientelistic networks even less likely. Politicians with extremely short time horizons engage principally in corruption and pork barrel politics when holding office, instead of building clientelistic networks.

POLITICS WITH LOW POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

Scholars have characterized present-day Peru as a "democracy without parties" (Levitsky and Cameron 2003; Tanaka 2005; Levitsky forthcoming). With the exception

of APRA (Cyr 2012), parties are weakly organized at the subnational level in Peru; they have few established committees and linkages with local brokers. Most registered national parties are in fact legal artifacts that do not even have much to offer promising local candidates (De Gramont 2010, Zavaleta 2012, Levitsky forthcoming).

The main point I make here is not that there are few political cadres at the local level but that these cadres are not linked within or across electoral districts in a permanent way; they change allegiances to political labels continuously. Indeed, "parties" are created anew for each electoral campaign in Peru. Office-seeking politicians either create their own personalistic vehicles or renegotiate their "partisan" affiliation close to the launch of electoral campaigns. The result is the multiplication of coalitions of independent candidates who band together at each election and dissolve after it (Zavaleta 2012).

Without political parties to restrain and channel politicians' personal ambition, politics becomes extremely short-sighted (Levitsky forthcoming). Short-term and improvised electoral alliances make politics unpredictable, producing a very fluid political system. Because elections are highly volatile, politicians have a hard time securing reelection.[39] In fact, this absence of parties has resulted in the end of political careers and the spread of amateur and semi-professional politicians (Levitsky forthcoming: 23-24). As an experienced political operator notes, inexperience and improvisation are so pronounced in Peruvian politics that in many cases the printing house is the one selecting the slogan for fliers and posters, rather than the campaign

[39] Indeed, reelection rates in Peru are comparatively very low. For instance, between 1995 and 2008 Peru's legislative reelection rate of 20 percent pales compared to those achieved in other Latin American countries such as Brazil (51 percent), Argentina (52 percent), and Chile (63 percent) (Tanaka and Barrenechea 2011). Percentages calculated by *Legislatina. Observatorio del Poder Legislativo en América Latina*: http://americo.usal.es/oir/legislatina/reeleccion.htm#Reelecci%C3%B3n_Legislativa_en_Sistemas_Unicamerales_%28promedio_porcentual_1995-2008%29

team.[40] Consequently, candidates end up communicating a confusing mix of ideas and slogans during an election, he explains.

In the absence of stable political organization, national candidates' alliances with local candidates become crucial to effective campaigning that takes advantage of reverse coattail effects.[41] Improvised electoral groupings look for local personalities with some type of public reputation—colloquially called "*candidateables*"—to occupy candidacies for congress, mayor, and councilors.[42] Media outlets also play an important role in campaigning, in some cases substituting for the lack of organizational infrastructure. Thus, it is not rare to see, for example, television and radio journalists getting elected as authorities, as happened with former regional presidents Hernán Fuentes in Puno (Muñoz 2007; Zavaleta 2012) and Carlos Cuaresma in Cusco (De Gramont 2010; Zavaleta 2012).

Finally, candidates increasingly hire political entrepreneurs—known as "political operators" (*operadores políticos*)—to help them carry out their campaigns. Operators are semi-professional politicians who perform roles and tasks usually taken on by partisan structures in other contexts.[43] They specialize in political strategy, electoral law, media politics, and mass mobilization. Operators are not, however, local brokers—at least most of them. In fact, they are in charge of contacting and ideally recruiting local brokers for

[40] Personal interview with Adolfo Mamani, Cusco, August 31, 2010

[41] Presidential elections are concurrent with congressional elections. And, since 2002 (when regional elected bodies were created), regional elections are concurrent with municipal elections.

[42] Often, these potential candidates begin marketing themselves as promising candidates many months or even years before the election. For instance posters and graffiti appeared in the streets of Cusco city several months before the 2010 local election began, advertising just the name of a candidate. The same was observed in Puno in July 2010.

[43] Some of these political operators used to be partisan local cadres—mainly from the left and APRA. Many others started participating in politics in the 1990s or the 2000s without partisan affiliation and learned the arts of politics by trial and error.

the campaign. With the exception of those who work for APRA, operators are not really partisan loyalists but "free" agents who switch affiliation at each election.[44]

ESTIMATING POLITICAL NETWORKS IN PERU

The application of a new survey methodology to estimate the size and structure of political networks (Calvo and Murillo 2008) provides additional support for the claim that, with the exception of APRA, present day Peru in fact lacks organized parties. This survey methodology relies on interviews consisting of a series of count questions of the general type "How many X's do you know?" Using these count questions as input, Calvo and Murillo's method allows for the indirect measurement of political networks through the simultaneous estimation of each respondent's personal network and his or her predisposition to establish ties with particular political groups.[45]

The survey conducted in Peru included a battery of questions intended to measure the size of each individual's personal network (questions about voters' common names and vital statistics; that is, population frequencies known through census data), as well as items to estimate the networks of interest (questions about the number of militants and candidates of different political groupings as well as questions about the number of public employees of different sorts each survey respondent personally knows). To maximize the chances of getting a reliable estimate, the questionnaire included only questions about political parties that, by 2010, were represented in Congress *and* had won the national executive office after 1980. Only four political parties met these requirements: *Acción Popular*, APRA, Fujimorismo, and *Perú Posible*. In addition, the survey included a generic question about the

[44] Extensive evidence supporting this claim will be provided in Chapter Four.

[45] Calvo and Murillo's method relies on recent developments in network analysis to estimate hard-to-count populations and uncover network structures from individual-level data (McCarthy et al. 2001, Zheng, Salganik, and Gelman 2006). For more details, see the appendix. For the estimation procedure used, see Calvo and Murillo (2008).

number of candidates and collaborators from regional or local movements the respondent personally knows. This was intended to provide a rough estimate to capture the countless numbers of regional and local groupings that have competed in elections since the collapse of Peru's party system.

The results of this method confirm, first, that APRA still is, by far, the largest party in Peru. As described in Table 3.1, the network of APRA militants is the biggest political network in Peru, with a prevalence of 0.611%. This network of militants is almost three times that of Perú Posible (0.220%), more than double that of Acción Popular (0.270%), and almost double that of Fujimorismo (0.353%).

Table 3.1: Size of Political Networks

(Share of Respondent's Personal Network)

Candidate with Acción Popular	0.093
Candidate with Perú Posible	0.106
Candidate with Fujimorismo	0.123
Candidate with regional or local movement	0.159
Candidate with APRA	0.176
Militant with Perú Posible	0.220
Militant with Acción Popular	0.270
Militant with Fujimorismo	0.353
Collaborator with regional or local movement	0.372
Militant with APRA	0.611

Source: Ipsos APOYO/JNE 2010

The second largest political network after APRA is that of collaborators with regional and local movements (0.372%). This indicator captures the myriad political

operators who help carry out subnational campaigns. Fujimorismo militants (0.353%) closely follow this grouping of regional and local political operators. The fact that one of the most important national parties, which almost won the last national election (2011), ranks third *after* this unarticulated group of political operators is symptomatic of the high level of political disarticulation in Peru.

Calvo and Murillo's survey method provides us not only with a way to estimate the size of political networks but also with procedures that allow us to say something about the structuring principle of political networks at the system level (Calvo and Murillo 2008). Figure 3.1, for example, illustrates the relation and hierarchy among the different political clusters. The figure shows that political networks in Peru are clustered horizontally (across political groupings) more than vertically (within political parties). This means that knowing a militant makes it more likely that you will know another party's militant, instead of making it more likely that you know the same party's candidate. In the first political cluster, for example, knowing a candidate from APRA is correlated with knowing a candidate from Fujimorismo. In turn, respondents who know a candidate from APRA or Fujimorismo are also more likely to know a candidate from Perú Posible. This whole cluster is closely related to Acción Popular's candidates and militants, the only intra-party cluster. In the second big political cluster, respondents who know more APRA militants also know more Fujimorismo militants. Overall, these respondents also know more Perú Posible militants and, to a lesser extent, more politicians from regional and local movements. Finally, respondents who know more collaborators of regional and local movements tend also to be closer to candidates who run for these types of political movements. Nonetheless, as I have mentioned, the estimates for "regional and local movements" include quite diverse political groupings. In sum, Figure 3.1 shows the lack of a clear structuring principle among political networks, indicating

the fluidity of the Peruvian political system. If anything, the two big political clusters distinguish themselves by grouping, on the one hand, mostly candidates and, on the other hand, political operators and local brokers. Thus, the lack of partisan structuring in Figure 3.1 reflects the fact that Peruvian politicians frequently change allegiance among "parties".

This lack of political differentiation across groupings can also be seen in Figure 3.2, which graphs inter-group correlations. Darker squares indicate a stronger correlation between networks. Partisan patterns of integration should appear as series of dark small triangles with vertices in the militant and candidate categories for each party.[46] As can be noticed, no clear dark pattern emerges in the center-left side of the figure that corresponds to the political networks of interest. Instead of various small dark triangles, only a big light-colored triangle—starting in the vertex of Acción Popular candidates and ending in the vertex of candidates for regional or local movements—appears. Within this big triangle, the only black square corresponds to the correlation between APRA and Fujimorismo militants.[47] One can contrast this lack of partisan clustering with the dark triangle visualized in the lower-left section of the figure, which graphs the inter-correlation of personal networks.

In sum, Calvo and Murillo's method shows that there are in fact plenty of political cadres in Peru but that most political networks do not relate to each other in a consistent way. In other words, it demonstrates the fluidity of Peruvian politics, reflected in the absence of a clear pattern of partisan articulation: politicians switch affiliations across groups constantly. Not even APRA, the largest political party, shows a pattern of vertical

[46] For instance, in Calvo and Murillo (2008), see Figure 5 that plots Argentine's structure of political networks.

[47] This strong correlation between APRA and Fujimorismo militants would appear to corroborate the account given in the previous section of Fujimori's government buying APRA militants to build a clientelistic network and secure his reelection, perhaps explaining this otherwise unexpected finding.

integration—that is, a strong intra-party correlation between networks of militants and candidates. In fact, the only party that appears integrated is Acción Popular, a traditional party that has not been able to recuperate after the 1990s (the party did not even run its own slate in the last national election). These survey results thus confirm that the qualitative characterizations of Peru's political system as rather fluid and unarticulated are, in fact, not exaggerated.

Figure 3.1: Dendogram describing the Structure of Networks in Peru



Figure 3.2: Plot of Inter-Group Correlations in Peru



Up to this point, I have shown that present-day Peru does not have organized political parties. But, as I will demonstrate in the rest of this section, Peruvian politicians rarely build political machines while governing either.

As noted previously, since the collapse of Fujimori's authoritarian regime, the national state apparatus is no longer used as a substitute for a machine. Neither Perú Posible (2001-2006) nor APRA (2006-2011) governments were able to successfully use the national state to foster clientelistic linkages with the poor.[48] Indeed, despite achieving outstanding macroeconomic outcomes, neither of these parties presented a presidential candidate in the following election. In particular, APRA's poor electoral performance in the 2011 election illustrates the difficulties of building organized clientelism using the national state in present-day Peru. APRA is currently the only national party with the organizational resources necessary for becoming a successful clientelistic machine. In fact, APRA has been the closest to a partisan machine in Peru's recent history. However, while governing (2006-2011) APRA was not able to systematically manipulate the national executive branch to solidify clientelistic linkages with the poor. Transparency procedures, administrative systems in place such as SIAF (*Sistema Integrado de Administración Financiera*), and the decentralization of crucial programs such as PRONAA made it difficult. In addition, given APRA's previous conduct in office in the 1980s, the media was particularly attentive to signs of politicization of the state and corruption during its government. Moreover, with very few subnational governments (2 out of 25 regional governments and 16 out of 194 provincial municipalities), the APRA government was not able to assure territorial control. Thus, instead of systematically engaging in machine clientelism, APRA's government invested heavily in pork and manipulated transfers to subnational governments in order to buy off mayors and regional presidents.[49] However, APRA's strategy failed miserably. After an apparently successful

[48] Interviews with politicians, technocrats and researchers referred to before confirm this claim.
[49] The government also distributed patronage jobs to APRA's militants in the national state structure. However, most of these militants were not patrons of territorially based machines reaching the poor.

term that exhibited high growth rates and investment in infrastructure, the party barely passed the electoral threshold and won only four seats in the legislature. Not even Carlos Arana, national secretary of organization and García's main political operator, was able to get elected to Congress despite having directed important infrastructure programs such as *Agua para Todos* and FONCODES.

APRA's pork barrel strategy was, therefore, not enough to activate the goodwill of Peruvian voters. According to experienced political operators, this was due to the escalation of corruption during the construction of public works.[50] As Absalón Vásquez puts it, "corruption was notorious in the public works they delivered, people realized it … Corruption has gone way up … Politicians lose their mind, they get blind by ambition and disconnect from the people."

Moreover, the existence of organized machines at the subnational level in Peru is the exception rather than the rule. In the literature, "the notion [of a machine] connotes the reliability and repeatability of control that a political party or group exercises within its jurisdiction" (Menéndez-Carrión 1985: 18). Thus, machine consolidation is expected to result in stable local party systems and lower levels of electoral volatility (Szwarcberg 2009: 29, Chapter 3). Peru, however, has few consolidated machines which have been able to maintain control of government. In fact, subnational politics is characterized by high levels of political fragmentation (with an average number of effective parties of 5.5 in the three last elections) and electoral volatility (a median of 40.5% for the 2002-2010 period) (Muñoz and García 2011; Vera 2010). The absence of consolidated machines is also reflected in the comparatively low reelection rates at subnational offices. Only 33% of incumbent provincial mayors and 27% of incumbent district mayors who ran as

[50] Personal interview with an anonymous political operator from Fujimorismo (Lima, February 17, 2010) and with Absalón Vásquez (Lima, December 12, 2012).

candidates in 2010 were able to secure reelection (Córdova and Incio 2012). Indeed, in contrast to what frequently happens in other contexts, municipal incumbency in Peru constitutes a *disadvantage* (rather than an advantage) when running for reelection (Córdova and Incio 2012). Contrast the Peruvian case with, for example, Argentina. Since democratization in 1983, the Peronist Party (Partido Justicialista, or PJ) in Argentina, a widely known partisan machine, has won 207 out of 247 (84%) elections for mayor in the Conurbano Bonaerense (its stronghold) and currently governs 30 of its 33 municipalities (Zarazaga 2012).

By contrast, what do we usually observe in Peru at the subnational level? First, clientelistic networks are not as extensive as implied by the machine model. Subnational clientelistic networks in Peru have limited territorial reach. Most subnational incumbents distribute patronage jobs only to restricted cliques of close collaborators. For instance, an experienced political operator contends that, usually, very few local brokers manage to get a job in the municipality after campaigns.[51] Nepotism—hiring the elected officials' family members—is, in contrast, much more common. Given that the law penalizes nepotism, in some places politicians have even come up with exchange systems: one mayor hires the other mayor's parents and vice versa.[52] As economic technocrat Fritz Du Bois explains, the "coalition of opportunists" who governs is usually small, "a coalition of close friends and relatives."[53] Moreover, even when patronage jobs go to political activists who helped candidates campaign, these beneficiaries do not regularly build their own clientelistic followings at the local level. That is why, as we will see, local brokers are criticized when they get a job in the municipality.

---

[51] Personal interview with Wilfredo Verano, political operator, Santiago, Cusco, September 7, 2010.
[52] Personal interview with Víctor Salcedo, journalist, newspaper *La República Gran Sur*, Cusco, September 1, 2010.
[53] Personal interview. August 13, 2009.

In Peru leaders of local associations, known as *dirigentes sociales*, are what the literature would consider local-level brokers (Tanaka 1999, 1999b; Ansión, Diez, and Mujica 2000). In contrast to what happens in countries with consolidated clientelistic machines, where local brokers are appointed by politicians rather than elected by the people, dirigentes are elected community leaders. Their role as mediators with the state is thus delegated by the people and not granted by political officials. This means that dirigentes are primarily accountable to their association members and not to a political boss. Indeed, despite being elected, they are commonly highly criticized by their bases (Ansión, Diez, and Mujica 2000). Usually, if they accept a public job in the municipality or regional government, they are expected to quit their dirigente position.[54] Otherwise, they are accused of taking advantage of their association and pressed to resign. As a dirigente from Cusco explains,

> The dirigente who gets a job in the municipality discredits himself with the people because local authorities do not allow them to be autonomous… When the dirigente colludes with the mayor, he surrenders his power and people get angry (Ricardo Pezo, President of the Defense Front of Huancaro, Cusco, September 2, 2010)

A political operator from the same municipality agrees with this local broker. He explains that,

> There have been dirigentes who have used their position to get a job with the elected mayor. But they have ended up branded as traitors, as being a "twisted" dirigente. Being steadfast and consistent is important for people's opinion about dirigentes. In this case, the dirigente has utilized the organization [to get a job]. (Wilfredo Verano, Santiago, Cusco, September 7, 2010)

[54] Many dirigentes interviewed pointed this out.

Moreover, dirigentes are not professional politicians in the sense that they do not make a living from politics. Dirigentes usually have a non-political occupation and spend their free time on brokering functions. Some of them have a formal job such as construction worker or teacher, but many others work independently as street sellers or bus drivers, for example. Some dirigentes are hired by local authorities to work for the incumbent's campaign but usually just a few months before the campaign begins.[55] Many more receive "a tip" for allowing candidates to campaign in their neighborhoods and helping them organize campaign events.[56] As a former councilman complains, "Dirigentes sell themselves to the highest bidder. They rent themselves. They are mercenaries."[57] Thus, although dirigentes' busiest time is during campaign season, their role as activists is mostly *temporary*.

Another important characteristic distinguishes dirigentes from machine-affiliated brokers. Dirigentes perform brokering functions but they are not local patrons. Dirigentes mobilize their external contacts to attract benefits for their communities or organizations. Particularly, brokering public works helps dirigentes build a reputation and legitimize themselves in the eyes of their bases (Ansión, Dierz, and Mujica 2000: 14). However, most dirigentes have no access to a source of private benefits they can distribute on a regular basis to their organization members in exchange for political support. The only exception might be the dirigentes who administer the Glass of Milk program at the

[55] Personal interview with Marco Antonio Huamán, President of the Northeast Defense Front of Cusco (Cusco, September 7, 2010); Carlos Moscoso, candidate running for mayor of Cusco city (Cusco, December 18, 2010); Elizabeth Rodríguez, political operator (Piura, July 24, 2010).
[56] Personal interview with Edmundo Gatica, Fujimorismo political operator (Cusco, Septmeber 6, 2010); Rolando Rozas, political operator, Partido Nacionalista (Cusco, September 3, 2010); Víctor Villa, political operator (August 31, 2010); Elizabeth Rodríguez, political operator (Piura, July 6, 2011); Rodrigo Urbina, political operator (Piura, July 8, 2011).
[57] Personal interview with Julio Gutiérrez, former councilman of Santiago district, Cusco, May 24, 2010.

neighborhood level.[58] Glass of Milk provides milk or other products that the dirigentes distribute to the registered beneficiaries for free on a daily basis.[59]

A second characteristic differentiates Peru's local level politics from consolidated machines. Even when political networks are organized and they reach more into the grassroots, in most of the cases, these networks do not get institutionalized. Most dirigentes do not have a stable partisan affiliation and may switch allegiances from campaign to campaign—sometimes even within the same campaign. Indeed, as we will further discuss in the next chapter, dirigentes commonly fool political brokers and politicians during campaigns, working for more than one at the same time. It is not without cause that Peruvian politicians complain so much about dirigentes. For instance, former Congresswoman Carmen Losada (Fujimorismo) denounces most dirigentes as *"pseudo-dirigentes"* who believe that they are representative when in fact they are not. According to her, most of these dirigentes "sell themselves" and "prostitute politics." Losada says, "They fill their headquarters with pictures. But the next day or in two hours they post the pictures of another candidate."[60]

In summary, Peru lacks not only organized parties but also consolidated machines. With the partial exception of APRA, candidates switch electoral affiliations often or form their own personalistic vehicles in order to be able to compete in elections. These politicians do not have lasting links with local brokers but look for them only when campaigning. Moreover, while governing most incumbents do not build lasting clientelistic networks using public resources. Within this extremely fluid political

---

[58] The Glass of Milk is a food assistance program for pregnant and lactating mothers and children up to six years old. It is funded by the national government and administered by municipalities. See Suárez Bustamante (2003), Alcázar, López, and Wachtenheim (2003), and Alcázar (2007).

[59] Despite the potential clientelistic character of this program, the Glass of Milk beneficiaries are not necessarily vote-selling clients, a point that will be further demonstrated and explained in the next section.

[60] Personal interview with Carmen Losada, Lima, April 8, 2010.

context, what type of distributive electoral strategies do politicians use? The following section addresses this central question.

POLITICIANS' TIME HORIZONS AND DISTRIBUTIVE STRATEGIES

> "When you act without thinking about the future, it doesn't work." (Adolfo Mamani, political operator, Cusco, August 31, 2010)[61]

So far I have emphasized the fluidity of Peruvian politics and the lack of organized machines. Despite this unstable political context, however, politicians actively distribute material benefits during campaigns. Why do they do so considering that, according to conventional theories, this would be contrary to their interests? Before directly addressing this paradox, I will first explain how the lack of enduring organizations affects politicians' distributive strategies.

Peru's fluid organizational context affects politicians' distributive strategies by shortening politicians' time horizons. Generally, Peruvian politicians are extremely short-sighted and opportunistic because the deficit of lasting political parties limits their time horizons (Levitsky forthcoming). As collective organizations, institutionalized parties constrain individual politicians' self-interest and enlarge their time horizons: parties must serve the needs of their different members across districts and electoral cycles. Personalist vehicles, in contrast, are created to pursue individual goals in the short term. Consequently, they spur individualism and undermine coordination among politicians: "parties created for individual politicians to seek office in this election cycle are unlikely to coordinate around strategies focused on collective or future benefits" (Levitsky forthcoming: 22). Most amateur and semi-professional politicians do not enter politics aiming to pursue a political career. In a context in which politics is highly discredited,

[61] The Spanish wording is "Cuando no actúas pensando en el futuro, no funciona."

gaining status is not a common incentive either. With obvious (but few) exceptions, then, the main motivation behind political competition is not political survival but the maximization of personal wealth.[62]

In this context, politics is seen as a fast way of acquiring money and establishing business connections. According to Levitsky, "amateur legislators with no prospect for reelection are often tempted to 'get what they can' during their period in office." (Levitsky forthcoming: 26) A widespread view is that politicians "think about serving themselves rather than serving the people."[63] As a former mayor of the province of Anta (Cusco) notes, "[When they gain office] politicians think they have won the lottery. It's an opportunity to seize the booty."[64] One experienced political operator explains: "Politicians are not interested [in building organizations]. They just want to spend some time there. They will be in office only four years."[65]

The greater availability of resources both at the national and subnational level in this loosely organized setting leads principally to corruption—the seizure of public resources for private ends. The majority of politicians who gain executive office prefer to engage in corruption rather than to invest in building up clientelistic machines. In other words, they divert public resources to enrich themselves rather than reinvesting these funds in party-building purposes.[66] As a former APRA militant who is promoting the organization of a regional movement composed by dirigentes in Cusco complains, "after

[62] All politicians interviewed agree that this is an increasing trend, although most of them exclude themselves from it.
[63] Personal interview with Rosario Peralta, activist of the Humanist Party, Cusco, May 17, 2010.
[64] Personal interview with Wilber Rozas, Cusco, May 24, 2010.
[65] Personal interview with Adolfo Mamani, Cusco, August 31, 2010.
[66] Something similar happens with congressmen. Most congressmen do not invest in building political followings once in office. They invest heavily in passing laws pushed by lobbies in exchange for resources for private gain. Since legislators know that their chances for getting reelected are very low, few of them develop durable linkages with their constituencies.

attaining power, politicians steal and forget to build organizations. They have money but no organization. Power is disarticulated."[67]

We should keep in mind that while relational clientelism and corruption seem to be empirically related (Persson et al. 2003; Keefer 2007; Singer 2009), analytically, they are different phenomena:

> Whereas non-machine corruption often has a random and sporadic character or aims only at the consolidation of narrow elites who control wealth or armed forces, the machine must remain popular to survive and must consequently meet the demands of a broad stratum (Scott 1969: 1154).

In other words, corruption should not spiral out of control or be blatant enough as to impede the reelection of a machine's candidate. As Scott contends, "Not all corruption is machine politics and not all machine politics is corrupt."[68] There is a trade-off between spending public resources on machines (distribution) or on corruption (self-enrichment). Indeed, if a machine fosters corruption, it has to do it so carefully in order to continue maximizing electoral returns (Scott 1969: 1144).

While centralized corruption certainly reached a peak during Fujimori's rule, corruption remains pervasive in Peru. However, instead of being managed from the apex of power, as was the case during the 1990s, corruption is now diffused throughout the different levels of the state apparatus (Tanaka 2005c). The existence of the informal institution of *diezmo* reveals the widespread practice of corruption in Peru. The term diezmo was originally used to refer to a mandatory tax (10%) collected by the Catholic Church in Spanish colonies. Currently, the word diezmo is used colloquially to refer to a specific type of graft: a 10% commission a contractor pays to a politician or functionary

[67] Personal interview with Víctor Villa, Cusco, May 25, 2010.
[68] For a further elaboration of different strategies of state capture beyond clientelism, see Grzymala-Busse (2008).

after gaining a public contract. The practice of diezmo is ubiquitous, particularly at subnational offices.[69] All politicians interviewed for this study agree with this claim.

Rather than relational clientelism, politicians' preferred distributive strategy in Peru is pork barrel; that is, to deliver "local public goods" to crucial constituencies (Magaloni 2006; Magaloni et al. 2007, Hawkins and Rosas 2006). Indeed, the distribution of local public works, *obras* in Spanish, is the perfect complement to corruption. Obras provide incumbents with several opportunities for extracting resources, both during the bidding process and the implementation phase. During the bidding process incumbents offer to grant companies a public contract in exchange for graft. Similarly, overvaluation of construction materials and other budgetary manipulations can provide incumbents with additional sources of income during the construction stage. As a very experienced political operator from Cusco explains,

> The mayor makes a deal with any milling company… Millers, businesses, office supply stores, and councilmen finance campaigns. (…) All local authorities make secret deals (*tratos por lo bajo*). Hardware sellers, for example, give up to 20% to the mayor. In the case of Glass of Milk suppliers, they give 10%. The mayor also gets tons of money from construction projects. That is why everybody "plants cement"; they build cement works because this is where they get the money from (Alfredo Mamani, Cusco, August 31, 2010).

Furthermore, a good "balance" between obras and corruption can help incumbents build reputations based on their performance in office. An incumbent who is effective in delivering obras demanded by the population becomes popular even if suspected of engaging in corrupt acts. The popular saying *roba pero hace obra* ("he steals but gets

[69] During the last decade regional and municipal governments have increased considerably their budgets (Pro Descentralización 2006; Grupo Propuesta Ciudadana 2007; Arellano 2008; Asamblea Nacional de Gobiernos Regionales 2012). This monetary expansion is driven, principally, by an exponential increase in mining revenues thanks to the mineral price boom. This flow of resources to subnational governments is so impressive that has led some scholars to warn about the economic and political consequences of the emergence of a "subnational resource curse" (Arellano 2008).

things done") expresses well such a case. This mentality is so rooted in many voters that former mayor of Arequipa Luis Cáceres Velásquez did not hesitate to recognize in an interview that he earned commissions from public works while governing. According to him, this is normal in Peru. "Who does not steal in this life? (...) They used to say 'He steals but delivers' and that filled me with love. You have to steal with decency."[70] In contrast, those incumbents who are not capable of delivering projects in good shape or enough projects are often punished severely at the polls. In some of these cases, corruption gets out of control to the point of affecting obras. Some obras are never finished in practice, even when "on paper" they appear as being already delivered to their beneficiaries; or obras are delivered but in bad shape because too many resources were extracted in the corruption chain.

This Peruvian combination of corruption and obras should be clearly distinguished from the clientelistic machine model. The reproduction of corruption and pork does not require the extent of organizational infrastructure that relational clientelism does. A clientelistic machine needs to be fed regularly, during non-electoral times, in order to stay in place. Thus, it is a comparatively expensive form of political organization (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 9).[71]

Therefore, despite the lack of organized machines, short-term clientelistic investments during campaigns are widespread. Although Peruvian incumbents do not regularly invest in delivering clientelistic goods and services during non-electoral times, they start doing so when a campaign approaches. As a citizen puts it:

---

[70] In Spanish: "¿Quién no roba en esta vida? (…) A mí me decían 'Roba pero hace' y a mí eso me llenaba de cariño. Hay que robar con decencia." *La República-Gran Sur*, January 31, 2010.

[71] Obras can also provide the incumbent with job patronage to distribute. However, obras alone cannot permanently sustain an extensive machine due to the transitory character of the jobs they generate.

> Politicians only give stuff away during campaigns. Only during campaigns, every week or each time they go out (Focus Group, Females, Sucsu Auccayle Community, Cusco).

A few months before the campaign begins, incumbents begin distributing material benefits. In addition, as soon as the campaign initiates, opposition candidates also start distributing gifts to the poor. These sporadic investments in selective inducements make politicians look very opportunistic. As several poor citizens point out, politicians "remember" the needy only when an election approaches. The following focus group discussions illustrate this point well:

> P1: Politicians give us T-shirts, cups, to campaign for them and once they get elected they forget us. …
> P2: In my opinion, all politicians are liars. They never accomplish what they promise… What we have achieved we have achieved protesting. (Focus Group, Females, AAHH Los Polvorines, Piura)
> I: You have told me that politicians give away gifts during campaigns. Once they get elected, do they remember you? Do they continue supporting you?
> Everybody: No! [Laughs]
> P1: He does not remember us anymore…
> P2: They forget us [More laughs]
> I: Do they continue bringing presents?
> Everybody: No!
> P3: They forget everything. Once the campaign is over, everything is over, forgotten …
> P4: If a congressman comes to visit, he no longer recognizes you. On the contrary, he expects you to greet him. He barely looks at you. They are already gaining money in Congress. At the municipality they are sitting, securely gaining money for four years. (Focus Group, Males, Occoruro Community, Cusco)

As people commonly say, politicians are just "migrating birds."[72]

Even though incumbents make use of public resources for investing in electoral clientelism, the most important source for financing this electoral strategy in Peru are

[72] The Spanish phrase is "aves de paso."

private resources.[73] Highly competitive elections and low reelection rates make the private sponsorship of electoral clientelism increasingly important. In the context of a booming economy, private donors provide candidates with the resources necessary for distributing minor goods during campaigns. That is why, as noted by various interviewees, elected authorities "compensate" their generous donors with public contracts once in office, closing corruption's vicious circle.

Empirical evidence confirms that the distribution of material benefits during campaigns is "normal politics" in Peru. Throughout the last subnational and national elections, for instance, journalists in different parts of the country highlighted how candidates were actively distributing bags of food, mugs, pans and other house supplies, natural gas containers, construction materials, and even cash to voters.[74] More precisely, estimates from a survey list experiment conducted after the 2010 local elections indicate that around 24.5% of voters were offered a benefit for their vote during the campaign (González-Ocantos et al. 2012). Conventional survey studies, which probably underrepresent the prevalence of electoral clientelism, indicate that at least 12% of Peruvian voters are regularly offered goods during campaigns in exchange for electoral support (Table 3.2 and Table 3.3).

In short, Peruvian politicians do distribute gifts while campaigning despite the absence of established political organizations. This fact stands in contradiction to the conventional wisdom. Conventional approaches would not expect to find clientelistic

[73] As pointed out previously, in post-Fujimori Peru it is more difficult to divert public resources openly. Media attention and institutional controls make it harder to abuse incumbency resource advantages. Obviously, incumbents still do it but must be very cautious. It is easier to divert public resources, for example, in rural areas with low media access.

[74] For example, "Candidato APP a región Ayacucho hace su campaña regalando dinero" in *La República*, May 31, 2010; "Keiko Fujimori reparte comida entre los pobres a cambio de votos" in http://www.elmundo.es/america/2011/05/06/noticias/1304691775.html

Table 3.2: Clientelistic Offers During Electoral Campaigns

In recent years and thinking about election campaigns, has a candidate or someone from a political party offered you something like a favor, food, or any other benefit or thing in exchange of your vote or support?

Response	Number of Responses	Percent of Total
Often	44	2.99
Sometimes	131	8.91
Never	1,295	88.1
Total	**1,470**	**100**

Source: LAPOP 2010

Table 3.3: Clientelistic Offers During the 2010 Campaign

During the last campaign, has a candidate or someone from a political party offered you something like a favor, food, or any other benefit or thing in return for your vote or support?

Response	Number of Responses	Percent of Total
Many times	47	3.34
Few times	123	8.74
Never	1,237	87.92
Total	**1,407**	**100**

Source: IOP – PUCP 2011

distribution without extensive and relatively stable networks of brokers. So, *how* do Peruvian politicians manage to distribute material benefits? Can politicians, for example, rely on existing local brokers to *select* voters who will be more responsive to accomplish clientelistic bargains? Alternatively, despite the fluidity of this political system, can candidates rely on local brokers to *monitor* voters' electoral choices? The next section addresses these questions.

TESTING CONVENTIONAL APPROACHES

Given the sporadic character of distribution in Peru it is unlikely that perspectives emphasizing *prospective* orientations can account for electoral clientelism. These perspectives take citizens' commitment to the vote-buying deal as a given, as long as the party continues delivering benefits. That is, they focus on conditional loyalty. Without a regular and consistent distribution, however, poor citizens are much more opportunistic than these approaches expect them to be. Moreover, as will be further explained in chapter five, politicians' promises of future support lack credibility and poor voters highly distrust them. Thus, only the very small cliques of candidates' close friends and extended family may be expected to act according to prospective orientations.

But what about the other approaches? Can they account for the way in which electoral clientelism is employed during campaigns in Peru? Maybe politicians have found some sort of system that allows them to gather relevant information at the local level or to closely follow their clients' behavior. This section provides evidence to explore these possibilities before discarding the conventional wisdom as an explanation for what is observed in Peru.

Then, how does clientelistic distribution take place in Peru? Do empirical observations about the way goods are distributed confirm any version of the conventional

wisdom? First, against conventional expectations, monitoring vote choices in Peru is in most cases impossible. To begin with, the secrecy of the vote impedes monitoring individual vote choices. Candidates, political operators as well as local brokers, all agree on this point. For instance, a candidate explains this difficulty in the following way:

> The dirigente is the nexus between the state and the people. Dirigentes paint propaganda in the neighborhood. They motivate, persuade voters, and are in charge of the logistics. They open the doors to the candidates, so we can campaign. … They prepare the setting for you. But they cannot guarantee the vote. (Sergio Sullca, candidate for mayor, Santiago, Cusco. May 25, 2010)

Similarly, an APRA militant and local broker confesses she does not know who most people voted for in her neighborhood. "The vote is secret," she explains.[75]

More importantly, poor citizens do not fear any reprisal from politicians because they are sure that their choice is secret. For example, these focus group participants made it clear that they do not believe that politicians can find out their vote choices:

> P1: If I have decided to accept the gift, he [the candidate] is not going to see my vote.
> P2: Because it is already a gift, it's done. He comes and says 'Here is a little gift but give me your vote. …' 'Alright,' we say. But as she says, it is a personal decision.
> I: Nobody can tell who you vote for?
> Everybody: No! Nobody!
> P2: I can say I am going to vote for you but at the end only I know who I'm voting for. (Focus Group, Females, AAHH El Indio, Piura)

Survey analysis confirms the limitations of applying conventional monitoring/vote-buying approaches to the Peruvian case. As Table 3.3 indicates, there is

[75] Personal interview with Francisca Chasquero, General Secretary, Base Ciudad del Niño, Castilla. Piura, November 25, 2010.

no significant statistical association between the belief that politicians can violate the secret vote and how citizens would react if offered a vote-buying deal. [76]

Moreover, as Table 3.4 indicates, voters who are threatened by politicians are not more likely to honor the vote-buying deal either. To the contrary, voters who are threatened are actually significantly more likely to *defect* from the vote-buying deal (that is, take the benefit and vote for the candidate of their choice).

Table 3.4: Attitudes Towards Vote Buying by Belief in the Secrecy of the Vote

What would you do if a candidate offered you a benefit in exchange for your vote?	**Do you believe that politicians violate the secrete vote?**	
	Yes	**No**
Honor	12.37% (81)	16.22% (170)
Defect	16.49% (108)	15.17% (159)
Reject the offer	65.04% (426)	64.22% (673)
Don't know	4.39% (46)	6.11% (46)
Total	100% (655)	100% (1048)

Source: Ipsos APOYO/JNE, 2010 Pearson chi2(3) = 6.9066 Pr = 0.075.

[76] Regression analyses not reported confirm these bivariate findings.

Table 3.5: Attitudes Towards Vote Buying by Experience of Threat

What would you do if a candidate offered you a benefit in exchange for your vote?	Respondent Threatened by a Politician	
	Yes	No
Honor	15.38% (20)	12.05% (161)
Defect	41.54% (54)	22.16% (296)
Reject the offer	38.46% (50)	61.53% (822)
Don't know	4.62% (6)	4.27% (57)
Total	100% (130)	100% (1336)

Source: IOP 2011 Pearson chi2(3) = 30.34 Pr=0.00

Monitoring individual behavior in general is difficult in Peru, given that in many cases politicians and operators do not know the clients. In fact, 48% of respondents who reported having been offered a clientelistic deal during the 2010 and 2011 campaigns specified that it was the first time that they saw the person who offered them the benefit.[77] In some cases, however, politicians do know the clients and have some leverage over them. Incumbents, for example, sometimes ask the beneficiaries of social programs to support them and threaten to take away their social benefits if they do not. This occurs often, for example, with poor women enrolled in Glass of Milk. Nonetheless, interviews and focus groups show that even in these cases, given the belief that the vote is secret, citizens turn out at campaign events but vote for their preferred candidate anyway. According to one regional movement activist in Piura:

[77] IOP 2011.

> Mónica [the mayor] went to the Glass of Milk local committee to demand support; if not, she threatened to take away the milk. ... She confused people; people felt under pressure. They said that they were going to Mónica's rallies but that they will vote for [another candidate]. (Nancy Tinoco, AAHH El Algarrobo, Piura, November 23, 2010)

Politicians not only lack the strong organizational resources required for monitoring individuals but also are unable to monitor how groups vote. Because voting precincts are not organized territorially, disaggregated electoral results are not available for politicians' examination. (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Chandra 2004; Scheiner 2007). Within each electoral district in Peru, the distribution of voters in polling precincts is organized according to the date the Identity Card was issued or revalidated. For this reason, voters living within the same house usually end up voting in different schools and within them, in different booths. This makes it impossible to know how different neighborhoods or communities voted within a district and thus to engage in group monitoring. As APRA's Secretary of Organization in Piura affirms, "to get the vote tally by neighborhood is impossible." Or, in the words of a local broker:

> It is not possible to know for sure how people vote in the neighborhood. Many residents have come from somewhere else, they have changed their address. There is only one school in the Southern zone of the city [where his shanty town is located], but many neighbors vote in other schools. They are dispersed. (Joel Pulache, APRA's General Secretary of AAHH Antonio Raymondi. Piura, October 2, 2010)

In other words, financial inducements and threats are effective mostly as a *campaigning* tool (to assure participation at campaign activities) but they are not so effective at changing vote preferences at the polls.

Second, the timing in goods distribution during campaigns does not match conventional expectations. As noted in the previous chapter, the conventional wisdom

assumes that the main clientelistic strategies associated with the distribution of material goods during elections are either vote-buying deals or turnout buying at the polls (Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes 2004; Stokes 2005; Cox 2007; Stokes 2007; Schaffer 2007 ed.; Nichter 2008; Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter 2009; Nichter 2010). Moreover, as noted by Nichter, in most studies of vote buying, benefits are expected to be delivered on or just before election day (Nichter 2010: 25). Similarly, those authors emphasizing the importance of mobilization define turnout buying as a subtype of electoral clientelism taking place *on* election day (Cox 2007; Nichter 2008; Nichter 2010).

Contrary to what the conventional wisdom expects, however, the distribution of material benefits in Peru takes place throughout the duration of the campaign. Respondents in interviews and focus groups mention the importance of this early distribution as part of *campaigning* efforts among poor sectors.[78] As a citizen explains during a focus group conversation,

> Candidates distribute presents during the campaign. When they start campaigning, whichever place they visit, they *have* to bring presents with them. During the whole campaign they have been giving away gifts (Focus Group, Mixed, Compone Community, Cusco).

Remember also a citizen's statement quoted in the previous section, indicating that politicians distribute presents only while campaigning, almost every week, and they do not do so during non-electoral times. Delivery certainly increases as election day approaches (particularly the last month), but it is by no means a one-time event. As a former candidate running for district mayor comments, candidates give away items

[78] Indeed, as I will further explain in the next chapter, voters receive gifts principally while attending campaign events.

during the whole campaign but "three days before the election day, madness intensifies."[79]

Finally, while working with local brokers, politicians are usually not very selective when distributing gifts during campaigns. Politicians do not have much reliable information about the electoral preferences of individual voters as most of these voters switch allegiances constantly and decide their vote close to election day.[80] Moreover, as will be shown in Chapter Four, Peruvian local brokers and poor voters are quite opportunistic during campaigns and fool candidates and political operators. As discussed, local brokers cannot be certain about voters' actual choices either.

In fact, discussions held in focus groups with poor voters portray the distribution of gifts during campaigns as being very indiscriminate and improvised. Candidates and their followers regularly distribute presents to as many voters as they can, without differentiating among them. As the following citizens explain:

> P1: During the last campaign the presidential candidates brought a lot of clothes: T-shirts, underwear, even brassieres. They distributed these presents to the people, organizing them in lines. Of course, everybody in the community lined up, so both sympathizers and non-sympathizers received the gifts.
> I: Does the same happen in other communities?
> P2: Politicians come to our assembly and the candidates themselves distribute the presents. But I have never seen that they organize people in lines to distribute gifts, only during the assemblies. (Focus Group, Males, Rural Cusco)

An experienced electoral observer has the same impression. He contends that, "generally, politicians give away presents by location: candidates go to a certain place and give away stuff to as many people as they can. There are no lists or an organized

[79] Personal interview with Sergio Sullca, Santiago, Cusco, May 25, 2010.
[80] For a more detailed explanation about this point, see chapter five.

system."[81] Indeed, references about how poor voters "pile up" trying to get a present during campaigns were quite frequent in interviews and focus groups.[82] Thus, it is highly unlikely that these improvising politicians are effective at gathering precise information or in targeting particular types of voters during campaigns.

In short, conventional expectations are not met in Peru. In general, vote buying is not a viable clientelistic strategy in Peru. With few exceptions, given low levels of partisan identification, scarce information about voters' preferences, turnout buying at the polls is virtually nonexistent. Moreover, because voting in Peru is mandatory and enforced, turnout buying at the polls is not even an appealing electoral strategy for politicians since politicians can assume that most citizens will vote anyway. So, why do politicians distribute goods profusely in Peru? Are they irrational? Or do they know something that we, political scientists, do not know? The next chapter will address these questions.

CONCLUSION

This chapter sought, first, to clarify my dependent variable and empirically show that Peru is a case in which both political parties and machines are not well organized or stable. Thus, I began the chapter with a brief historical introduction about the progressive demise of relational clientelism. I showed how relational clientelism changed over time (from traditional clientelism to partisan machines to a state-based machine) and finally significantly eroded.

Since the fall of Fujimori's authoritarian regime, politicians have not been able to extensively manipulate the state structure to organize clientelism. Moreover, as I demonstrated, political parties have not managed to recover since their practical demise

[81] Personal interview with Juan Aguilar, *Asociación Civil Transparencia*. Piura, July 19, 2010.
[82] The phrase people used to describe this situation in Spanish is "las personas se amontonan".

in the 1990s. With the partial exception of APRA, political parties in Peru are ephemeral personalistic vehicles created solely for electoral purposes. In fact, as the replication of Calvo and Murillo's method demonstrates, political networks are not articulated in a consistent way. While political cadres abound, most of them are new to politics and do not have stable political affiliations. This political fluidity is reproduced also at the local level, where most subnational incumbents do not invest in building clientelistic machines either. Local brokers in Peru are not, in fact, local patrons; while most dirigentes do perform brokering functions, they are only political part-timers who do not command the allegiance of regular followers.

After demonstrating this absence of stable political organizations, the chapter depicts the strategies politicians select while governing. I contend that this fluid organizational context shortens politicians' time horizons. Being short-sighted, most Peruvian politicians prefer to engage in plain corruption when gaining government, instead of investing time and effort in building parties or clientelistic structures. Incumbents' preferred distributive strategy is, in fact, pork, which is organizationally less demanding and provides plenty of opportunities for extracting resources for personal gain.

The chapter also demonstrates that, despite this extremely opportunistic and fluid political context, candidates invest heavily in electoral clientelism during campaigns. After providing data about how gifts are actually distributed during campaigns, I conclude that conventional explanations cannot account for electoral clientelism in Peru. First, prospective oriented explanations are discarded because of the absence of long-lasting clientelistic relations. As shown, Peruvian politicians engage in clientelism during electoral campaigns only. Most recipients of gifts do not continue to receive benefits after the electoral process is over. Second, after showing that the distribution of goods in Peru

is quite indiscriminate, I raise doubts about the capacity of politicians to make accurate guesses regarding voters' electoral preferences or targeting the right kind of voter. Finally, I present substantial empirical evidence showing that monitoring both individual and group electoral choices is in fact impossible in Peru. I conclude that direct vote-getting clientelistic strategies (vote buying and turnout buying at the polls) are, in fact, unviable clientelistic strategies in Peru. The next chapters will, in turn, empirically evaluate the ability of the informational theory to account for this theoretical puzzle.

Chapter Four: Convoking Voters and Establishing Electoral Viability

Political organization in Peru is weak. With the exception of APRA, present-day politics is populated by coalitions of independent politicians that form to compete for power and dissolve after elections are over (Zavaleta 2012). Such a situation means that Peru not only lacks organized parties but also political machines. The national state apparatus can no longer be extensively mobilized for clientelistic ends, as President Fujimori did in the 1990s. Furthermore, subnational clientelistic networks are typically not very dense or extensive; thus they cannot assure political territorial control to subnational incumbents.

Despite these low levels of political organization, candidates actively distribute material benefits during elections. This distribution of handouts does not follow the expectations of the conventional approaches. As mentioned, distribution takes place from the initial stages of the campaign onward and is often not very selective. Indeed, as shown in chapter three, vote buying and turnout buying at the polls do not seem viable strategies in this loosely organized context. In such an apparently unpropitious setting, why do politicians distribute goods during campaigns? This chapter addresses this question.

My informational theory explains electoral clientelism in Peru. In this chapter, I provide evidence supporting my first causal mechanism. I contend that Peruvian politicians distribute handouts in order to buy the electoral participation of poor voters as well as access crucial constituencies. Above all, campaign clientelism allows candidates to demonstrate their electoral potential to the broader electoral audience. By mobilizing large numbers of people at campaign events and rallies, a candidate can persuade strategic donors, activists, and voters that he has a good chance of winning an election.

These clientelistic strategies are especially important in Peru's political context. Short-term oriented and improvised alliances make electoral politics in this polity with low political organization highly uncertain. Many citizens are indifferent and decide their vote close to election day. In the absence of political organization, electoral clientelism is crucial to contact voters and establish a candidate's electoral viability.

This chapter is organized in the following way. First, I explain why electoral clientelism takes place during campaigns in Peru. I provide evidence about candidates buying *participation* and *access* to electorally decisive poor constituencies in quite diverse settings. The informal institution of the *portátil* –a group of "portable people"— precisely reveals the prevalence of this type of clientelistic strategy. Second, I demonstrate that politicians distribute handouts to bring out large numbers of people at rallies as they are well aware that turnout at campaign events is crucial to influence the public perception of their electoral viability. Third, I present the results of a survey experiment to provide evidence supporting the causal mechanism postulated by my theory. This experiment demonstrates how, other things being equal, Peruvians decide their votes by taking into account the number of people candidates mobilize during campaigns. Politicians are right to worry about turnout at rallies. Subsequently, I illustrate the ways in which campaign turnout buying shapes different stages of electoral races in Peru. The penultimate section briefly shows how, contrary to what is usually believed, media politics does not necessarily substitute but rather amplifies the effects of street politics and mobilization. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of the propositions advanced.

CAMPAIGNING WITHOUT PARTIES

Although Peruvian politicians cannot directly buy votes, they *do* distribute goods throughout the campaign. Why would they do so? My research indicates that in this context of low organization politicians hand out benefits *precisely because* they lack established local networks. Electoral clientelism is primarily a solution for campaigning without organized parties. First, Peruvian politicians use minor consumer goods to attract the poor and otherwise indifferent voters to *attend* campaign events and meet the candidate. Second, politicians distribute material benefits in order to *access* crucial constituencies such as poor neighborhoods and villages. Third and most important, Peruvian politicians distribute goods to *boost turnout* at campaign events and rallies and, thus, induce strategic behavior including strategic voting, strategic giving, and strategic withdraws from competition by rival politicians. Voters observe turnout at campaign events and use the magnitude of turnout (or reporting about it) as a proxy for perceived electoral viability. As a result, strategic actors find candidates that invest in campaign turnout buying more appealing. In other words, politicians expect large turnout to indirectly affect electoral choices.

In a context of low partisan identification, politicians use campaign clientelism in order to attract the attention of underprivileged people and expose them to the candidates. Poor voters tend to be indifferent and uninterested in politics. Politicians hand out goods at campaign activities because otherwise few people will attend. For example, according to IOP's last nationally-representative survey, during the last round of elections processes 35% of Peruvians attended campaign events in which politicians distributed presents to participants. As Table 4.1 shows, poorer respondents attended more events of this nature than wealthier ones. In fact, the chi squared statistic shows that having attended a

campaign event where candidates distributed material benefits is inversely associated with the respondents' socioeconomic stratum (SES) (Table 4.1).

Table 4.1 Campaign Clientelism by Respondent's SES[83]

As part of their campaigns, some candidates distribute presents to the participants of their campaign events, such as food aid, drinks, t-shirts, and even raffle prizes and bingos. During the last municipal and presidential campaigns, did you attend a campaign event such as a rally or the appearance of a candidate in your neighborhood, in which politicians distributed this type of presents?

	A	B	C	D	E	Total
Yes	11.90%	29.77%	36.26%	36.56%	41.18%	34.97%
	(5)	(64)	(132)	(155)	(63)	(419)
No	88.10	70.23	63.74	63.44	58.82	65.03
	(37)	(151)	(232)	(269)	(90)	(779)
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
	(42)	(215)	(364)	(424)	(153)	(1198)

Source: IOP 2012
Pearson chi2(2) = 9.7276 Pr = 0.008

Interestingly, as Table 4.2 indicates, poorer respondents also answered that they attended these events in order to receive the gifts. In addition, comparatively fewer respondents from the category E, the poorest constituency, answered that the reason they attended these campaign events was just to get to know the candidate and her proposals or to show their support for that candidate.

[83]The socio economic stratum indicator in Peru distinguishes among five groups, ranging from the richest (A) to poorest (E).

Table 4.2 Reasons of Attendance by SES[84]

For participants only: Why did you attend these campaign events? (Percentage)						
	A	B	C	D	E	Total
To receive what they were distributing	0.00 (0)	7.81 (5)	9.84 (12)	13.16 (20)	27.42 (17)	13.33 (54)
To get to know the candidate and her proposals	40.00 (2)	60.94 (39)	46.72 (57)	47.37 (72)	40.32 (25)	48.15 (195)
To receive what they were distributing and listen to the candidate's proposals	20.00 (1)	23.44 (15)	32.79 (40)	24.34 (37)	24.19 (15)	26.67 (108)
To show my support for that candidate	40.00 (2)	7.81 (5)	10.66 (13)	15.13 (23)	8.06 (5)	11.85 (48)
Total	100.00 (5)	100.00 (64)	100.00 (122)	100.00 (152)	100.00 (62)	100.00 (405)

Source: IOP 2012
Pearson chi2(12)= 24.5795 Pr=0.017

In short, receiving material incentives in exchange for electoral participation seems to be more important to survey respondents in the lower categories of the SES. As a focus group participant in Piura explained, providing goods in exchange for poor voters' participation at rallies makes sense because most of them, uninterested in politics, would not attend and listen to the candidates otherwise:

> When you ask if the politician distributes goods in order to attract people or to assure votes: definitively not to assure a vote. What happens is that bringing these [gifts] is the best option a candidate has, because this is the communication

[84]The socio economic stratum indicator in Peru distinguishes among five groups, ranging from the richest (A) to poorest (E).

> between the politician and the people. The politician wants to assure that the people listen to his message or project… He could do it in the media but not everybody listens. (Focus Group, Males, AAHH Los Polvorines, Piura)

Similarly, another participant at the focus group in Piura acknowledged:

> It is not a good way to campaign…But, what would have happened if you did not bring your sodas? [Everybody laughs] See, even you think in the same way, you realize… [More laughs] Because "a full stomach makes one a happy camper."[85] If you come to present a project here, nobody goes… And those who attend, 'I have already heard that…' and they go away. If you ask for more sandwiches and drinks, we can continue discussing [Laughs]. (Focus Group, Males, AAHH Los Polvorines, Piura)

Second, candidates distribute private goods as a sort of condition for being allowed to *access* regular meetings of local associations (such as peasant communities, shanty towns, soup kitchen organizations, etc.) in order to introduce themselves, talk to the participants, and try to win support.[86] As Washington Román, a union leader, journalist, and former candidate for Cusco's regional presidency points out, "Today people ask you 'What have you brought us?' If you haven't brought anything, they do not listen to you."[87] Providing these goods is the "price of admission": [88]

> People play the candidates. People ask the candidate 'what have you brought us?' 'Five pushcarts, tools, and three containers of beer.' 'Let them in,' and they greet him. They end up with their storehouse packed…They do not receive some candidates [at their assemblies], particularly if there is a councilman or a mayor who did not fulfill his promises. (Sergio Sullca, candidate for mayor of Santiago district. Cusco, May 25, 2010)

---

[85] Translation of the Spanish saying "barriga llena, corazón contento."

[86] These meetings usually take place over weekends so candidates plan ahead their visits.

[87] Personal interview. Cusco, May 17, 2010.

[88] In addition to distributing handouts to the participants in these meetings, candidates also promise and sign commitments to give collective benefits to communities or associations who support them, if elected. This point is further discussed in the next chapter.

Similarly a political operator working for a Congresswoman representing Piura explains that

> Nowadays, if you do not take something with you, people do not even receive you. The candidate arrives and they ask 'What have you brought us?' If you do not have something with you, they all invent an excuse and return home. (Ana Lilian Vilela, Lima, July 2, 2010)

Distributing goods during campaigns is a way for political movements without permanent organizations to reach voters. As a candidate in Piura explained, "Politicians do not have a permanent organizational structure to reach the citizenry…There are no alternative mechanisms to reach people than through these types of benefits and offers."[89] Politicians distribute goods to poor voters in quite diverse settings and at different types of campaign events. The specific modalities change but the goal is the same: to attract poor voters to campaign events or to access organizational constituencies. For instance, participants at a focus group address a form of campaign turnout buying that is spreading in Piura: the organization of bingos or raffles.

> I: What types of distribution of presents have you observed here?
> P1: One is that they give away bingo cards, house by house. They give you one or two bingo cards and they publicize the prizes to agglomerate people at the *plaza*.
> P2: …They do that, for example, when they are going to present their candidate, in order to attract people who, hoping to win the bingo, line up there. "All these people support me", they think; and people go because of the bingo… [Laughs] It's a hook and fish bite it.[90] (Focus Group Females, AAHH El Indio, Piura).

Politicians have to provide goods at campaign events in part because others do so and clients have come to expect it. In the words of an experienced politician, "It's a feast!

[89] Personal interview. Piura, July 7, 2011.
[90] Translation from the Spanish phrase "Es un anzuelo, prácticamente caen los pececitos."

The more rural the voters, the more profitable the campaign feast is... The voter has realized that it is the only time politicians come by."[91]

In addition, this competition triggers a reinforcing mechanism. As a candidate who claimed to be ideologically opposed to this practice confessed, "You cannot campaign otherwise… they wipe you out."[92] Given this competitive pressure, even the most organized political movements and parties are forced to distribute presents to attract non-affiliated poor voters to their campaign events. For instance, APRA's local brokers interviewed in Piura explained that they distribute donations (such as backpacks, school supplies, pans, fish, bananas, medicines, etc.) to the needy, both partisans and non-partisans.[93]As will be discussed in depth later, this competition also leads to an increasing use of goods in campaigns over time.

Attracting poor voters and accessing crucial constituencies is important for candidates. But the third, and most important, reason why politicians distribute goods at campaign events and rallies is to assure a large turnout. As one participant at a focus group in Piura explained,

> Definitively, these gifts have taken place only for assuring attendance; to assemble people for the picture…Goods were handed out as a hook, so everybody will get there. (Focus Group Males, AAHH Los Polvorines, Piura)

Politicians employ this strategy consciously; they are aware that they must assure large turnout at their political activities, and are willing to spend campaign resources to

---

[91] Personal interview with Rodrigo Urbina, political operator working then for APRA's regional government. Piura July 23, 2010.

[92] Interview, Piura, July 21, 2010.

[93] Personal interviews with Kelly Coronado (General Secretary of APRA's Los Olivos local committee and candidate to the Council. Piura, September 28, 2010), Joel Pulache (General Secretary of APRA's Antonio Raymondi local committee. Piura, October 2, 2010) and Jaime Bejarano (General Secretary of APRA's La Florida local committee. Piura, November 23, 2010).

do so. For instance, a political operator, currently a Congressman representing Cusco, notes that distributing presents is a form of "paternalism" that is part of the campaign's "sensationalism."[94] An NGO expert working for many years with local governments in rural areas of Piura agrees with this politician. In his words,

> Candidates organize their feast, they give away little things. It is not a tradition, it is a political strategy: people go to rallies because they can get something there, such as food (Manuel Albuquerque, CIPCA. Piura, July 21, 2010).

But why do politicians invest so many resources and efforts into buying the attendance of poor voters at campaign events? As the informational theory predicts, high levels of attendance at campaign activities are crucial for establishing and maintaining the public perception of candidate viability in Peru. Lacking stable partisan identifications, indifferent citizens are free to choose from a menu of improvised personalistic vehicles and often do so very close to election day. Peruvian electoral campaigns often go through dramatic swings as some candidates surge and others crash.[95] Politicians expect campaign clientelism to help create the public perception that they are strong candidates who are known and welcomed everywhere. The size of campaign rallies can affect strategic voting considerations by citizens: large turnout allows strategic voters to identify the frontrunner candidates. An experienced political operator explains the rationale in the following way:

> Vote choice is not informed but strategic…The distribution of food and cash, organizing feasts is becoming more common; it has increased. The candidate has to arrive with food and presents, and to party. He has to make donations… The voter sees how much support the candidate has, who mobilizes more people, which candidate is more promising." (Rodrigo Urbina, Piura, July 23, 2010).

---

[94] The Spanish word for sensationalism is *efectismo*. Personal interview with Rubén Coa. May 25, 2010.
[95] See, for instace, Levitsky's account of the 2011 presidential election.

Campaign turnout serves as an especially important signal of electoral viability to voters because the dearth of party organization means that there are few alternative sources of electoral information on the strength of candidates. As the following candidate clarifies, distribution of goods and turnout are related, and, together, they have an electoral impact:

> People always talk about the distribution of presents. It does happen. For example, the distribution of food, T-shirts, small gifts, toys and little things for the children... Why do they give things away? Everything is about your image, because you can mobilize these people to your rally.[96] When you organize caravans it is the same: people believe that the candidate who mobilizes more people in these caravans is the one who is doing better in vote intention [he laughs]. There are not many polls, not reliable ones. Consequently, what you convey matters a lot: to appear as if you are effectively supported. And, to transmit that image, you have to give things away and you have to look for money, and you have to commit with whoever can contribute and pay for this. (Candidate to regional vice president. Piura, July 20, 2010).

Results from IOP's survey confirm the intuitions of politicians. As shown in Table 4.3, voters mentioned the number of people mobilized at campaign events as one of the two main cues they take into account to assess candidates' electoral potential in municipal elections. Voters even take the amount of goods distributed at such rallies as an indicator of electoral viability. The only informational cue that trumps campaign mobilization is the candidate's appearance in the media. Media coverage, however, is partly dependent on large rallies. Notice also the relatively low number of respondents who depend on polls to assess electoral viability.

[96] The Spanish word he uses is "mediático".

Table 4.3 Cues to Evaluate Electoral Viability (First Mention)

How do you know that a candidate for a district municipality has good chances of winning the election? (First Choice)	**Freq.**	**%**
The candidate appears in the media	457	39.13
The number of people mobilized at campaign events	246	21.06
Lots of propaganda	132	11.30
Polls	155	13.27
The quantity of presents distributed	138	11.82
Other	40	3.42
Total	1168	100.00

Source: IOP 2012

While Table 4.3 reports the respondents' first answer to the question, Table 4.4 summarizes all respondents' answers (up to three mentions). In this new table, the number of people mobilized at campaign events is still the second most important cue to assess candidates' electoral prospects; but it is now tied with the amount of propaganda displayed.[97] Candidates' appearance in the media is still the favorite cue for electoral viability but the number of people mobilized at rallies follows close behind.[98] Together, the number of people mobilized and the amount of presents distributed add up to 35% of the responses. It is clear, then, that campaign clientelism can be an appealing strategy to manipulate public perceptions of electoral viability and, thus, influence the race.

[97] A difference in proportions test shows that they are not statistically different from each other.
[98] A difference in proportions test indicates that they are still statistically different from each other.

Table 4.4 Cues to Evaluate Electoral Viability (Three Mentions)

How do you know that a candidate for a district municipality has good chances of winning the election? (Three choices)	**Freq.**	**%**
The candidate appears in the media	858	26.29
The number of people mobilized at campaign events	709	21.73
Lots of propaganda	676	20.72
Polls	514	15.75
The quantity of presents distributed	445	13.64
Other	61	1.87
Total	3263	100.00

Source: IOP 2012

Candidates are quite aware that large attendance at rallies is important and are terrified that only a few people will show up. Indeed, nothing is worse for a politician's campaign than an ill-attended rally (*una plaza vacía*). As one former mayor explained to me:

> The rally was pretty important. I was terrified but it is a tradition: the entire town is expecting the best rally…You hand out gas vouchers to assure taxis and motorcycle taxies participate in your parade. How many vehicles you gather measures your candidate's 'success'. You organize a parade, a caravan with badges and crowd the plaza. You hire a band. I was able to gather a crowd 50 meters long and 200 meters wide. It was a total success… (Former mayor of Oxapampa-Junín, October 10, 2009)

Likewise, a party activist in Puno complained that "One has to pay 5 soles to tricycle drivers so they crowd the plaza. If not, it looks empty and we are going to be criticized." (Fujimorismo militant, Puno, June 10, 2010)

In most of the cases, the use of clientelistic tactics during campaigns is not controlled by the candidates themselves. Instead, *movilizadores,* political operators in

charge of organization and street propaganda activities, are usually the ones deciding when and how to use clientelistic strategies in campaigns. As a former Mayor and Council Member of Carabayllo district in Lima explains, "Operators get paid during campaigns: a certain amount for a rally, a certain amount for painting propaganda. They at least assure a market where you can sell your plan. They summon you an audience."[99] These movilizadores are crucial to the campaigns. As one journalist has written, "There's a key character in every campaign who is not the Presidential candidate: the movilizador. His job is a sort of 'mandatory political service' which consists in crowding plazas for speeches."[100]

Movilizadores master a series of techniques to literally count heads and thus measure the relative success of the event and compare it with those of the candidate's adversaries. For instance, movilizadores place four individuals per square meter. Next, they measure the square meters occupied by the rally and multiply it by four.[101] Similarly, these movilizadores divide the rally space by district of origin, so they can count how many persons each local base mobilized.[102] The movilizadores organize rally participants in such a manner as to assure that the media will capture images of a crowded meeting.

Peru under Fujimori's government exemplifies the most pragmatic and systematic enactment of turnout buying strategies targeted to a mass public. It was precisely during these years that the institution of the portátil—"the portable people"—came into being. In Peruvian political jargon, a portátil consists of a group of underprivileged people

[99] Personal interview with José Távara. Lima, March 2, 2010.
[100] "Los hombres de la portátil", in *La República*, April 2, 2006.
[101] Personal interview with political operator working for *Unidos Construyendo*. Piura July 23, 2010.
[102] This allows movilizadores to assess how well the candidate is doing in different neighborhoods or districts. It is thus a sort of political thermometer.

mobilized to show public support for a politician in exchange for material rewards. Portátiles emerged as one way to engage in politics without the use of organized parties.

One important political operator then working for Fujimori referred to the mobilization of these portátiles as part of the "psychosocial operatives" (*los psicosociales*) they conducted, which he deemed important to generate favorable public opinion trends during campaigns.[103] As an example, he described to me how they used portátiles in local markets during the municipal campaign of 1995.[104] They took 5 buses packed with (paid) women carrying bags and gave each of them 2 or 3 soles to buy something and thus appear like regular customers. These women were strategically located in hot spots in the market. When Jaime Yoshiyama, the Fujimorismo candidate, passed by, they cheered and threw confetti in each corridor of the market. Someone gave him flowers –the same bouquet which rotated from corridor to corridor. Frequent personal visits of the candidate to the shanty towns complemented these market operations; in personal visits the candidate was instructed to greet and kiss people, and eat with them. This movilizador contends that those strategies allowed Yoshiyama to reverse a poor start of 2% and rise in vote intention to almost 42%. Since this time, these organizational devices have risen in popularity and been utilized in a wide variety of campaigns.

Without partisan identification to guarantee loyalty and without patrons to monitor them, campaign clients are highly opportunistic. They go to multiple rallies and accept goods from different candidates.[105] As a political operator explains, "The

---

[103] Personal interview. Lima, February 17, 2010.

[104] In the 1993 municipal elections Fujimori had noticed that he could not translate his national level popularity into support for his municipal candidates.

[105] P1: People have become habituated to look for candidates' gifts. P2: Yes (…) and they go successively to different rallies to receive something..." (Focus Group, Females, rural Cusco).

portátiles mobilize [people] according to the candidates' budgets… During electoral times voters receive from all movements and decide their vote only after many mobilizations."[106] Certainly, people receive benefits but they do not commit to candidates. Politicians are pretty aware of this. "'Let them spend their money', the people say after they accept the goods", a political advisor explains.[107] Some clients even intentionally start "collecting" T-shirts and other supplies from different groupings.[108] "'A T-shirt, a T-shirt!' The T-shirt itself is a complete thesis…" a politician commented ironically.[109] What happens nowadays, a journalist remarks, is that "people are taking advantage of candidates and not the other way around."[110]

Politicians often complain about this opportunism because frequently the same dirigentes who help them organize the visit to the neighborhood do the same for other contenders. As one focus group participant in Cusco acknowledged:

> [The candidates] always come and we have to wear the T-shirt they give away and wait for them during the campaign. For example, San Román arrived to Chacabamba with journalists, so they gathered us there to amass a crowd and they made us cheer in groups "San Román! San Román!" Afterwards Coco Acurio came. Similarly, first we changed T-shirts, and we started cheering because he brought presents such as pencils, erasers and we also demanded modern irrigation and a health center. He answered "Yes, I will do it, this mill will become the leading one, I personally will be in charge of its implementation." He promised all this so we registered it in our record book. Given that they distributed many gifts we started cheering "Coco President! Coco President!", as we did with San Román, and they filmed us and the journalists interviewed us. (Focus Group with males, rural Cusco)

---

[106] Personal interview with political operator Edmundo Gatica (Fujimorismo). Cusco, September 6, 2010.
[107] Personal interview with political advisor Mario Martorell. Cusco, May 17, 2010.
[108] Focus group with males, rural Cusco; focus group with females, AAHH El Indio Piura. Also, personal interview with former candidate (Piura, July 7, 2011).
[109] Interview with Javier Barreda (APRA). Lima, September 6, 2012.
[110] Personal interview with journalist Rocío Farfán (Cutivalú Radio). Piura, July 22, 2010.

Some dirigentes even betray politicians who have been helping them for a while. For example, Carlos Moscoso, a lawyer who has been a candidate for mayor of Cusco three times, narrated how during the last campaign he sought out a group of dirigentas he had been advising for six years.[111] Three months before the election day, he explained, the provincial municipality hired these local brokers as promoters and they never again returned his calls: instead, they campaigned for the mayor's reelection.

Most dirigentes are, in fact, "political adventurers" who "are with one and another" candidate.[112] Some of them "vote crossways" (campaign for a political movement for mayor and a different one for regional president) but others even "play both cheeks"; that is, they work for two candidates at the same time.[113] I was able to uncover a "both-cheeks" case. Following a political operator's recommendation, I contacted and interviewed a dirigente who (supposedly) had been working with the *Obras+Obras* political movement in Piura. He received me in the shanty town's community hall that still had a hand-made banner hung on the wall. This banner read "Welcome Congressman Carrasco Távara."[114] While talking, the dirigente mentioned he used to be aprista. He had renounced this membership recently because there was too much corruption in the regional government, he added. Afterwards he said he was supporting Javier Atkins (Unidos Construyendo) for the regional government. He recalled that he pasted propaganda for Atkins and Óscar Miranda (Unidos Construyendo's candidate for mayor in Piura) in the neighborhood. However, later on he confessed that he was actually campaigning for Atkins and a candidate for mayor from

[111] Personal interview with candidate Carlos Moscoso. Cusco, December 18, 2010.
[112] Personal interview with APRA's political operator César Tume. Piura, November 26, 2010.
[113] The Spanish expression is "jugar a dos cachetes". Personal interview with *Unidos Construyendo*'s local broker Roberto García. Piura, November 23, 2010.
[114] Carrasco Távara was by then one of APRA's congressmen for Piura. APRA also had a candidate running for mayor.

another political movement (Wilmer Elera, from *Alianza Para el Progreso*). By that time he had completely forgotten that a political operator from the Obras+Obras movement had recommended him to me, which was also running another competitive candidate for mayor (Ruby Rodríguez de Aguilar).

Not even the most organized parties can really monitor local brokers during campaigns. In Piura, one of APRA's strongholds, the party could not distinguish between reliable and unreliable brokers during the last subnational election.[115] As the candidate for regional vice president explains,

> It is difficult to be sure if local brokers are working for you. We don't have a political culture. I distribute breakfast to poor people—a tradition in the party. But if tomorrow another candidate arrives with toys, several of the brokers that have been with me will be with the other candidate. 'Don't trouble yourself and accept! We have to take advantage!', they say. Many of these dirigentes are not apristas, they are not registered in the party (Luis Ortiz Granda, APRA's candidate for regional vice president. Piura, July 23, 2010)

Mandatory voting makes it even more tempting for politicians to buy attendance at rallies in order to try to influence uncommitted voters, since politicians can assume that most participants at the rallies will show up on election day. If the vote were voluntary, many of these indifferent constituents might, instead, abstain. However, the key issue for candidates is to assure a large turnout because it helps them signal their electoral potential. This reason explains why most candidates do not even try to monitor clients at rallies in Peru. At most, they count the approximate number of people coming from every sector or district to assess (however imprecisely) the candidate's popularity in different

[115] This inability to evaluate local brokers' reliability lies behind the difficulties the party had to assess its real electoral prospects of reelection.

areas.[116] Additionally, as will be discussed in depth in the next chapter, clients' attendance at campaign events also constitutes an opportunity to use influence.

In sum, politicians distribute material goods during campaigns to substitute for the absence of stable political organizations. Material benefits allow politicians to attract poor voters to their campaign events, voters who may not attend otherwise. Distribution of presents also allows politicians without local networks to access crucial constituencies. In exchange for these goods, local associations let these politicians introduce themselves and their projects during the groups' regular meetings. More importantly, the distribution of gifts allows politicians to gather crowds for their campaign events. Such mobilization of large numbers of people during campaigns is important because strategic voters use the size of turnout as a proxy for perceived electoral viability. The next section presents experimental evidence that supports this argument.

TESTING THE CAUSAL MECHANISM: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

This section presents the results of a survey experiment that provides further evidence for my claim: that turnout at campaign events actually influences voting behavior. This theoretical claim accounts for why politicians invest in campaign turnout buying despite a lack of established political organizations. This experiment was included as part of the Political Representation and Social Conflict Survey conducted by the IOP in October 2012. The survey utilized a multistage random probability sample that represented adults (18+) across the nation. This representative sample helps lessen concerns regarding the external validity of the experiment. The randomization of subjects into experimental groups provides the basis for causal inference and internal validity.

[116] Personal interview with political operator Gregoria Muro (Unidos Construyendo). Piura, July 23, 2010.

For the experiment, I designed a vignette with the portrayal of a candidate running for mayor. This profile was intended to "travel" well through different audiences. Former electoral poll results and my own knowledge of municipal campaigns helped me elaborate this "ideal" profile. For instance, taking into consideration Peruvians' anti-partisan predispositions and distrust for politicians, the candidate was presented as an outsider who formed a political movement recently. Similarly, I chose Peruvians' preferred profession (economist) for candidates (JNE 2011) and the predominant gender of actual mayors (male) (Muñoz and García 2011). I assigned the candidate one of the most common first-names for males in Peru, a name that does not connote any specific racial or socioeconomic origin. The candidate's proposals and personal traits were intended to attract both middle and lower class constituencies. He promised to deliver public works and deal with pressing problems, such as crime and education. But, the text also specified that during the campaign the candidate showed a real concern for the poor. The precise text is the following:

> Imagine that José were a candidate for mayor in your district for a political movement recently created. José is 45 years-old and is an economist. This is the first time he participates in politics but he has a renowned professional trajectory. There is no information about José having any legal record. During the campaign, he demonstrated social awareness and willingness to "dirty his shoes" while visiting humble people to present his proposals. His plan emphasized the need to develop people's quality of life by delivering public works in the district and to invest in road infrastructure. He also promised to coordinate with the Ministry of

> Education to improve the quality of education and with the police to assure citizen security.[117]

The descriptive survey results confirmed that José was in fact an appealing candidate for many audiences.

All respondents were exposed to the same candidate profile. After this sketch, I randomized three versions of the questions.[118] For the *control* group, the experimental question did not provide any additional text and asked the interviewee about the likelihood that he would vote for José for district mayor if the elections were held next Sunday.[119] In the *low turnout* treatment group, before asking this question, the interviewer read a prime that said "Members of the community say that José's campaign events did not attract many people. Neighbors comment that José's final rally had approximately 100 persons."[120] Finally, in the *high turnout* treatment group, before asking this question, the interviewer read a prime that said "Members of the community say that José's campaign events attracted a lot of people. Neighbors comment that José's

---

117 The Spanish wording is: **"**Imagine que José es candidato a alcalde de su distrito por un movimiento político de reciente creación. José tiene 45 años y es economista de profesión. Es la primera vez que participa en política pero tiene una trayectoria profesional reconocida. No se ha sabido que José tenga antecedentes judiciales. Asimismo, durante la campaña demostró tener sensibilidad social y vocación por 'ensuciarse los zapatos' visitando pueblos humildes para dar a conocer sus propuestas. Su plan de gobierno ha enfatizado que trabajará para sacar adelante obras importantes para mejorar la calidad de vida en el distrito y va a invertir en mejorar la infraestructura vial. También ha prometido trabajar en forma coordinada con el sector educación para mejorar la educación en el distrito y con la policía para mejorar la seguridad."

118 IOP provided the researcher the identification number of the questionnaires, including the ID numbers assigned to each interviewer. These ID numbers were randomly assigned into three groups corresponding to the three versions of questionnaires using a SPSS routine following a uniform probability distribution. The interviewers were instructed to conduct the survey respecting the order of versions assigned by this randomization. The Appendix B includes the ANOVA tests of the success of the treatment randomization. The F and chi square p-values suggest strong balance across the covariates.

119 The Spanish wording is: "Imagine que las elecciones municipales fueran el próximo domingo. ¿Qué tan probable sería que votara por un candidato como José para alcalde de su distrito? A) Muy probable B) Probable C) Poco probable D) Nada probable."

120 The Spanish wording is: "Los vecinos dicen que las actividades de José durante la campaña no reunían mucha gente. Los vecinos dicen que en su mitin de cierre José logró convocar alrededor de 100 personas."

final rally had approximately 1000 persons."[121] For all versions, the question was located at the end of the questionnaire.

Table 4.5 presents the cross-tabulations of vote intention for the imagined candidate and experimental groups. As the informational theory expects, those respondents in the low turnout treatment group were less likely to vote for the made-up candidate than respondents in the control group. In turn, respondents in the high turnout group were more likely to vote for the candidate than respondents in the control group. The chi-square statistic reveals statistical differences across groups. The movement was principally constrained within the intermediate two categories (likely and somewhat likely). This means that the voters who are most likely affected by campaign turnout are the more lukewarm or indifferent ones. The extremes—the voters who clearly liked or disliked the profile—are not as affected by campaign turnout as the indifferent ones. Nonetheless, the statistical differences across treatment groups are still significant when recoding the dependent variable as a dichotomous one, as shown in Table 4.6.

The positive relationship between the level of turnout at campaign mobilization and vote intention can be further appreciated graphically. Figure 4.1 graphs the average level of vote intention by experimental group. This graph illustrates how vote intention is in fact conditional on the public perception of campaign mobilization. Peruvian voters seem to be more willing to vote for a mayoral candidate when they are primed about his good performance at mobilizing large numbers of voters while campaigning. After hearing that the candidate was not able to attract many voters at rallies, respondents seem less likely to vote for him than when not informed about his mobilizational capacity.

[121] The Spanish wording is: "Los vecinos dicen que las actividades de José durante la campaña reunían mucha gente. Los vecinos dicen que en su mitin de cierre José logró convocar alrededor de 1000 personas."

Table 4.5 Probability of Voting for Candidate by Treatment

	Low Turnout	Control	High Turnout	Total
Very Likely	50	51	50	151
	12.95%	13.35%	12.85%	13.05%
Likely	144	165	185	494
	37.31%	43.19%	47.56%	42.70%
Somewhat likely	147	127	105	379
	38.08%	33.25%	26.99%	32.76%
Unlikely	45	39	49	133
	11.66%	10.21%	12.60%	11.50%
Total	386	382	389	1,157
	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Source: IOP 2012
Pearson chi2(6) = 13.1286 Pr = 0.041

Table 4.6 Probability of Voting for Candidate by Turnout (Dichotomous)

	Low Turnout	Control	High Turnout	Total
Likely	194	216	235	645
(Very likely/Likely)	50.26%	56.54%	60.41%	55.75%
Unlikely	192	166	154	512
(Somewhat likely/Unlikely)	49.74%	43.46%	39.59%	44.25%
Total	386	382	389	1,157
	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Source: IOP 2012 Pearson chi2(2) = 8.2414 Pr = 0.016

Figure 4.1 Average Vote Intention by Treatment



In sum, the experimental evidence provides additional support for the causal explanation identified by the informational theory of electoral clientelism. Peruvian voters do condition their electoral choices on the perceived level of turnout: all other things equal, they prefer to vote for a candidate who is able to mobilize larger numbers of voters at campaign events. Campaign clientelism can thus affect strategic voting considerations of all citizens. Politicians are aware of this strategic voting. This awareness explains why candidates invest in campaign clientelism despite a lack of established organizations. By influencing the public perception of electoral viability,

campaign clientelism *indirectly* affects vote intentions in Peru. As will be explained in the next section, high turnout at campaign events allows candidates to influence the dynamics of the race and bolster their possibilities of election.

TURNOUT BUYING AND THE DYNAMICS OF THE RACE

As the evidence has shown, politicians engage in campaign clientelism because they expect it will influence their electoral fortunes. By signaling electoral prospects, campaign turnout shapes the dynamics of the race: it establishes name recognition, marks one as a frontrunner, and attracts strategic actors in the final rush. These reasons exemplify the importance of maintaining clientelistic activities *throughout* the campaign and not just near election day, as emphasized by conventional approaches focusing on vote buying.

During the initial stages of the race crowded campaign events can be crucial in prompting surges in voter intentions. In Peru's fluid political system there is always room for outsiders to rise, gain momentum and, in many cases, win elections. Fujimori in 1990 and Toledo in 2000-01, for example, were both outsiders who emerged as serious contenders during the campaign and ultimately won the presidency. Similarly, another outsider, Ollanta Humala, also emerged as a competitive candidate during the campaign and almost won the presidency in 2006. Politicians are very aware of the volatility of electoral preferences and consciously use campaign clientelism in order to generate and influence electoral fluctuations. For example, one political operator interviewed in Piura explained to me how he achieved name recognition for his candidate, a young individual with no previous political experience. He did so through the organization of a bingo event with cash prizes during the candidate's first political rally. This political operator went house to house handing out bingo cards without telling individuals that the cards were

free. The card said that it cost two soles. When around 6000 people showed up at the first bingo/rally, many participants and political contenders were surprised as they assumed that attendees had actually bought their cards, showing the popularity of the candidate. This operator organized three other events with similar numbers and made this previously unknown candidate a widely recognized figure. He described these practices as an innovation in political marketing.[122]

Because individuals judge how well a candidate is doing in part by the attendance at campaign events, continued "investment" in campaign clientelism is crucial. If their campaign events draw only meager crowds, candidates risk abandonment by strategic donors, activists, and voters. In one focus group conducted in Piura, I asked why politicians distributed goods if they could not be sure that the recipients would vote for them. "They get a pay-off, psychologically," a female participant responded, "Because the psychology is where there are lots of people. Voters say: 'We have to vote for that candidate.' If they see more cars: 'Oh! She is going to win! Give your vote to her.'" (Focus Group, Females, AAHH El Indio, Piura).

As pointed out in the previous chapter, campaign clientelism in Peru is financed to a great extent with private resources. Therefore, gathering large turnout at rallies is also important to demonstrate viability to strategic donors: campaign contributors want to make sure that their investments yield returns, so they try to assess whom to support. Businesses are interested in financing viable candidates because this increases their chances of gaining public procurements later on.[123] Thus, as the campaign advances, local business will support the strongest candidates, usually betting on the front runners.[124]

---

[122] Personal interview with Mariano Huamanchumo, Piura, July 21, 2010.

[123] Strategic donation will later translate into corruption.

[124] Unfortunately, no systematic and reliable data about campaign donations is available in Peru, particularly at the subnational level.

Given the high electoral volatility and turnover rates in most electoral districts, donors commonly diversify their electoral investments. Consequently, local businesses "marry" the three leading candidates.[125] Once a candidate achieves momentum, donors "swarm like flies," as a candidate explained to me:

> The principle is: people are going to join whom they believe will win. Then this becomes a snowball. Even contributions are made following this principle. Contributors realize that it is going this way and they decide to provide more [funds to a front-running candidate]. (Unidos Construyendo's candidate, Piura, July 11, 2011)

In turn, voters judge the prospects of candidates partly by the amount of money they spend displaying propaganda and distributing goods (see Tables 4.3 and 4.4). As an APRA militant stressed, "When you give things away, you demonstrate power. People say 'this is not *any* candidate, he can win; he has power.' People recognize the candidate that comes with a big crowd, his people and his cars. Only after that, they start listening to you."[126] Another experienced political operator thinks similarly. For him "giving things away is a matter of marketing. If you don't do so, you are Mr. Nobody."[127]

The citizens' point of view on the issue is also relevant. At a focus group in Cusco, I asked participants what people said about candidates who do not distribute gifts:

> Participant 1: Everybody gives things away! At least a match box...
> Participant 2: People say that candidates who distribute fewer presents do not have enough budget, that they are not being supported. And about those candidates that give away a lot, [they say] that they have many persons who are financially supporting them. (Focus group, Females, Sucsu Auccaylle Community, Cusco)

---

[125] Personal interview with political operator Adolfo Mamani. Cusco, August, 31, 2010.
[126] Personal interview with Javier Barreda, APRA, September 6, 2012
[127] Personal interview with Rodrigo Urbina. Piura, August 7, 2011.

Similarly, in a focus group in Piura, a female participant argued that "The candidate who gets more money wins because she thrusts the campaign into voters' eyes everywhere: the radio, television, newspapers, houses…" (Focus Group Females, AAHH El Indio, Piura). Politicians are thus accurately anticipating citizens' perceptions and behavior.

Furthermore, campaign turnout also signals to benefit-seeking activists which candidates are in the lead. Activists, including hired brokers, will frequently abandon candidates who do not surge and instead offer their services to the leading candidates. Thus, during the last weeks of a campaign, candidates who are among the frontrunners begin receiving countless volunteers at their headquarters. For instance, the leading movement in Piura's regional elections had to improvise and open two additional centers of operations to be able to deal with this sudden burst of volunteers. "Older" activists viewed the newcomers with distrust and regarded them as opportunistic.[128] The candidate's close team, however, welcomed this sudden burst of interest in their project because it meant it was already perceived as a sure bid.

Campaign turnout of viable contenders typically comes to a crescendo towards the last days before the election. Final rallies are particularly important since they offer the last piece of information voters have to judge the viability of a candidate before deciding for whom to vote.[129] According to one political operator in Cusco:

> The election is decided, basically, during the last week. During the last two weeks people say "this one", "no, this one". What does that depend on? On the amount of masses you can mobilize. On the quantity of propaganda you can display…Not to organize a final rally would be the greatest political suicide ever because the

[128] Observation notes and personal interviews with Unidos Construyendo activists, October 2 and November 31, 2010.

[129] Until 2011, electoral laws prohibited the reporting of poll results during the last week of the campaign. In addition, electoral laws forbid any sort of political propaganda or rallies three days before election day. Thus, the final rally is the last legal campaign activity allowed.

> media would say "this party organized a rally with approximately 2,000 persons, this other one with 500, that with 200"…Whoever organizes the best final rally wins. (Adolfo Mamani, Cusco, August 31, 2010)

A female participant in a focus group in Cusco described the final rallies and their importance in similar terms:

> For the campaign finale each party organizes a party. They hire a band, the candidates walk around the plaza…they prepare grills, fried chicken, *chicha*, and arrive carrying the food and drinks as if it were a *cargo* feast. Then the bands play and people dance, they party, and they join the candidate who has more people thinking that he is going to win. (Focus Group, Females, Anta, Cusco)

Thus, more goods are distributed as the election day approaches. On election day candidates send trucks to pick up voters from peasant communities and villages, particularly in small rural towns with no media coverage. They openly distribute food, alcohol, and even cash (hidden inside of match boxes). But even in these apparently direct vote-buying attempts there are some very interesting bidding dynamics among front runners who are trying to signal electoral strength to voters. According to one female focus group participant in Cusco:

> Because there are a lot of vehicles, people are wandering around the cars. It is there where the *compañeros* ask them to climb on and give them a matchbox [with money inside]. Then, seeing this, a lot of people struggle to get into a car and as a lot of people gather, they start saying "this party is going to win". And, given that in other cars politicians do not distribute cash, only two or three persons climb in… (Focus group, females, rural provinces, Cusco)

Similarly, an APRA militant in Piura noted that:

> On election day there is a contest about who brings more people to turn out at the polls. The candidates arriving first have the best chance…When they arrive they take people to houses where there is food and alcohol. Where you find the best food the candidate is the strongest.

As the quotations make clear, voters do not seem to be selling their votes but looking for a candidate with high chances to win.

Indeed, the amount or quality of food, the number of cars (if candidates provide transportation), the occasional distribution of cash, along with the number of people mobilized on election day, are used as cues to assess which candidates are in the lead. For instance, a focus group participant in rural Piura describes how transportation on election day works:

> Each party delivers transportation for voters. During presidential elections, people go to vote alone but during municipal elections they expect candidates to bring a car to their doorstep. They give away more or less. There, they pay voters 30 soles, 40. It depends. They paid 50 soles per family…They do tell us who to vote for. Now we are the ones who decide the vote…There are candidates who do not offer [transportation]. Because they are low in vote intention, they do not arrange for transportation. (Focus Group Females, village Alamor, Lanconces, Sullana, Piura)

This anecdote reaffirms the informational theory: voters are not partisans being mobilized to the polls but opportunistic clients trying to guess who will win.

In sum, campaign clientelism helps politicians influence the dynamics of the race. By signaling electoral prospects, high turnout numbers at the early stages of the campaign can help candidates without organized parties establish name recognition. Moreover, mobilizing large numbers of people allows some candidates to distinguish themselves from the rest. In this way, a smaller number of candidates is marked as frontrunners and competes to attract strategic voters in the final rush. Making sure that voters receive information about turnout is, thus, decisive for increasing the chances of getting elected. The next section addresses this issue.

TRANSMITTING TURNOUT FIGURES

To maximize the chances of influencing vote choices, politicians need to guarantee that the cues transmitted by turnout at campaign events are effectively conveyed to different constituencies. Turnout is, certainly, highly visible (Szwarcberg 2009). In Peru candidates visit commercial areas, particularly markets and plazas, while campaigning. In these settings many people who do not participate at these campaign events can observe the candidate's mobilizational capability. Also, during campaigns candidates extensively visit poor neighborhoods and rural villages, particularly during weekends. These visits frequently end in rallies at public spots in which turnout buying is usually employed. People who attend these rallies or pass by when they are taking place have the chance to directly evaluate the candidates' performance at mobilizing numbers.

Furthermore, in urban centers caravans are effective means for conveying information. Candidates can reach significant areas of the city or town relatively fast and quickly engage voters' attention. Moreover, with caravans voters from different socioeconomic strata are able to directly observe the number of people and cars mobilized by candidates. Consequently, campaign teams also invest considerable time and resources dressing up vehicles with propaganda and, ideally, packing them with people that will cheer for the candidate. In most cases, candidates "buy" vehicles' participation, providing owners money for the fuel and a tip. The number of cars mobilized will afterwards serve as an informal indicator of the candidate's monetary power and potential electoral strength.

In addition, all the persons that observe the candidates' mobilizational strength will later function as informal information sources. A variety of informal social mechanisms such as political discussions on the job and chats at family gatherings or with neighbors serve as channels for transmitting information about candidates' turnout

at campaign events. Political information is transmitted through social interaction and constrained by voters' social context (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987). As a political operator explains, interpersonal communication is decisive during campaigns because "people tend to believe more in those who surround them day-to-day [than in radio reporters]: the good neighbor, the good merchant… They function as a transmission belt…The media are important but they do not define an election."[130] Politicians actually know that rumors about their mobilizational capacity will affect the public perception of their electoral strength. This is partly why they spend a considerable amount of time doing street campaigning and do not rely solely on the media.

Direct observation and rumors inform voters about candidates' mobilizational strength. However, the media also play an important role for conveying the electoral potential of candidates. Rather than substituting for traditional campaigning, media coverage *amplifies* the effects of mobilization at campaign events. As elsewhere, the media cover elections as if they were horse races, identifying which candidates are in the lead and giving more space and time to the frontrunners' events (Bartels 1988).

One piece of information that influences media reporting in Peruvian elections is how many people candidates are able to attract to campaign events. During national elections in Peru the media frequently use nationally representative poll results to evaluate the electoral potential of presidential candidates. In addition, the regional media regularly identify the frontrunners at the department level and inform citizens about the number of people candidates mobilize, particularly at final rallies. For example, *El Tiempo* of Piura included a picture of Obras+Obras' final rally on the front page of its September 29, 2010 edition. In the picture, the rally looked packed. While developing the

[130] Personal interview with Marco Torres Paz (Fujimorismo). Lima, February 5, 2010.

note, the reporter even specified that people occupied "an area that ranged from the stage at the Atrium of the Cathedral to Interbank's downtown branch." In fact, photographers usually wait for the rally's best moment before taking a picture.[131] This habit explains why political operators work intensively to display people in ways that suggest a crowded rally.

Given that polls are not very frequent (or credible) during subnational and congressional elections, media treatment follows local campaigns more closely to evaluate the candidates' electoral potential. While national and regional media (particularly TV and press) do not always cover in detail candidates' activities, local broadcasters and radio stations usually do. Most districts and provinces in Peru have at least one local radio or television station that keenly reports about the activities in the campaign. Moreover, many shanty towns and villages have their own communal stations that transmit propaganda and information about campaign activities organized in the area. At least one dweller, usually a dirigente, has a *radioparlante* (a megaphone). These radioparlantes are used to inform neighbors about local matters and call them for meetings. During campaigns, candidates convince (or tip) radioparlante owners to transmit propaganda and information about campaign events. All of these media outlets will report on the number of participants at campaign activities, particularly at rallies.

Of course, different media outlets affect the prevalence of campaign turnout buying. Specifically, if the television market is more developed, candidates campaign directly on TV stations more often than otherwise. They will, for example, spend more time attending popular shows, newsrooms, and televised debates. Investment in TV

[131] Interview with Luis Poma, archival chief of La República, October 25, 2012. This is the reason why it was difficult to find pictures of rallies at different points (with an empty plaza and a crowded one) in time for the experiment. Given this difficulty and the pressure of time, I decided to use just vignettes for the experiment.

advertisements will also be comparatively more important in the campaign expenditures. Nonetheless, even in contexts where candidates campaign directly on television, turnout buying at campaign events is an important strategy. Campaign clientelism is frequent in places such as Cusco or Puno, both of which have developed broadcasting companies. For instance, in Cusco city most candidates must work closely with journalists who labor as political operators and have a connection with the local media. As one of these media political operators explains, during campaigns he follows the movilizadores "who mobilize everything: the caravans, the portátil, graffiti."[132] During the political events he takes pictures and afterwards writes a press release to distribute to his contacts at the media.

Why does campaign turnout buying persist even when the media market is more developed? Politicians and political operators interviewed explain that to reach and campaign among poorer constituencies, street politics and traditional campaigning are still fundamental. For instance, a political operator campaigning in Piura for a regional movement contends that "95% of campaigning among popular sectors is 'traditional style' politics, a grassroots effort."[133] Candidates use the media primarily to reach middle and upper-class constituencies. Poor voters, in contrast, do not follow campaigns in the media consistently.[134] Indeed, in general, they tend to be less informed than middle sectors. Moreover, as will be further explained in the next chapter, for poor constituencies it is important to personally evaluate the candidates' traits. This necessity explains why many candidates invest considerable time visiting poor neighborhoods and villages.

---

[132] Personal interview with Oliver Delgado. September 1, 2010.

[133] Personal interview with Gamaniel Ventura. Piura, July 26, 2010

[134] According to LAPOP data (2010), the frequency of news consumption is directly related with the respondents' material wealth in Peru. LAPOP (2012) confirms a direct relationship between the frequency of news consumption and the interviewees' household income. Material wealth and interest in politics are also positively related in the 2010 Peru's database. See also chapter five.

In short, assuring diverse channels to transmit and amplify the effects of high turnout is important for candidates; it is essential to improving their electoral chances. Direct observation of turnout, rumors, and media coverage all help politicians in achieving this goal.

CONCLUSION

This chapter provided empirical evidence documenting the first causal mechanism of the informational theory. In Peru, candidates without organized parties buy participation at campaign events because, otherwise, few people would attend. During the campaign these candidates also distribute goods in order to access crucial constituencies with whom they do not have established relationships. More importantly, politicians distribute handouts to increase turnout numbers at rallies and, thus, influence the public perceptions of electoral viability. Politicians engage in campaign clientelism because they expect it will influence their electoral fortunes. High turnout at campaign activities indicates to strategic actors (donors, activists, and voters) which candidates are in the lead. In the absence of other credible information outlets concerning electoral viability, turnout helps strategic voters coordinate and vote for a smaller number of candidates. Consequently, politicians can distribute goods in a rational and strategic manner without having established political networks; mobilizing supporters during the campaign influences electoral choices.

In conclusion, my evidence shows that electoral clientelism is widespread in Peru not only in spite of the absence of political organization, but in many ways *because of* this absence. It is this lack of organization that allows for the tremendous fluidity and openness of electoral contests. This fluidity and openness enable candidates to rise through "bought" turnout; it also forces them to continue buying turnout in order to avoid

a downward spiral in popularity. Distributing resources is thus a rational solution to the challenges of campaigning without parties and machines because it helps politicians campaign and signal their electoral viability to strategic actors. This strategy is particularly helpful in races with few alternative sources of political information, such as credible polls. As a result, turnout buying at campaign events plays a bigger role in subnational and congressional elections.

The quantitative, qualitative, and experimental data discussed in this chapter complement each other to provide a more thorough empirical assessment of electoral clientelism in Peru. Quantitative data proved decisive to obtain national estimates of the prevalence of different types of behaviors and attitudes. In particular, it was indispensable in revealing the widespread utilization of the formerly understudied clientelistic strategy of turnout buying at rallies and voters' perceptions of electoral viability. Qualitative data were crucial for understanding the political logic of campaign clientelism in Peru and documenting the causal mechanisms at work. Politicians and voters' opinions and perceptions documented the rationale for distributing material benefits during campaigns in the absence of organized machines. Finally, the experiment empirically tested the causal mechanism implied by the informational theory linking turnout at campaign events to electoral choices. In this way, it provided systematic evidence sustaining part of the informational theory's causal claim. The following chapter will explore the second causal mechanism proposed: influence.

Chapter Five: Influence from the Citizens' Point of View

> Not everything [in campaigns] is about money. It's also about image. People are intelligent. (Absalón Vásquez, Fujimori's former political operator, Lima, December 12, 2012)

> Interviewer: What do people say about candidates who do not give gifts away?
> P1: Cheap! [Laughs]
> P2: Few people supported those candidates because you saw no people at their rallies. That's the truth. People go when they have an interest, when they receive something in exchange.
> P3: And to listen to the proposals. Let's see, one goes, gets the presents and also hears the proposals and what he [the candidate] has worked on, his experience, observing him, his ability. (Focus Group, Females, Bellavista, Piura)

The previous chapter showed that electoral clientelism is widespread in Peru because of the absence of political organization. Candidates distribute material benefits during elections in order to substitute for the lack of stable partisan linkages. Politicians improvise organizations during campaigns and visit poor neighborhoods and villages. They offer the people goods such as food or house supplies to be allowed to participate in their local associations' meetings. In addition, the politicians distribute material incentives to attract poor voters to their rallies. By bringing in large numbers of voters to their campaign events, candidates can further demonstrate their electoral viability to the broader public.

Turnout buying guarantees presence at campaign events, but not support at the polls. Thus, there is a crucial second step politicians must take in order to assure this support: they need to convince poor participants of their electoral *desirability*. Campaign events provide candidates with excellent opportunities to do so. In the IOP 2012 survey, those respondents who declared that during the last electoral processes in Peru they attended campaign events in which candidates distributed or raffled material benefits were also asked if it influenced their vote choice. Table 5.1 shows, 57.6 % of the

respondents said that what they heard and observed there influenced their choices; 40.9% answered they were persuaded to support that candidate and 16.7 % that they were convinced not to support him. On the other hand, 42.5% declared that what they heard and observed did not change their mind and they decided their vote choice afterwards.

Table 5.1 Influence at Campaign Events

During these campaign events, did something you heard or observed convince you to decide your vote choice?		
	Freq.	%
Yes, it convinced me to support that candidate	157	40.9
Yes, it convinced me not to support that candidate	64	16.7
No, it did not convince me. I decided my vote afterwards.	163	42.5
Total	384	100

Source: IOP, 2012

Hence, it is very likely that candidates are able to influence voters at campaign events. But what are the main mechanisms at work? In particular, how can candidates convince campaign clients to support them? I argue that two kinds of influence are crucial, namely influence via proposals and promises, and via personal performance and character. Candidates can take advantage of the localized character of campaign events to particularize their message to appeal to specific constituencies and promise them the delivery of local public goods once elected. By conveying information about his/her

personal traits and manners, a candidate can most effectively appeal to less politically sophisticated constituents. In addition, by presiding over enthusiastic rallies, candidates also hope that peer effects will persuade voters attending these events to support them.

This chapter presents empirical evidence to document the mechanism of influence. I organize it as follow. First, I describe the type of proposals and promises politicians make at campaign events. I discuss why this information is relevant for clients' electoral choices but also the limitations of relying just on electoral promises in order to influence voters. Second, I present an account of the additional kinds of information that candidates transmit during their presentations at campaign events. I explain why personal information matters from the clients' perspective. Third, I briefly describe the ways in which peer effects (the "buzz") can convince undecided voters to support a given candidate. I conclude by presenting a summary of the chapter's main contributions.

PARTICULARIZED PROPOSALS AND PROMISES

> Giving things away also involves talking. (Javier Barreda, APRA, Lima, September 9, 2012)

> All candidates give things away. I don't think people vote for the gift received. All candidates go to convince: If someone offers you something you accept but you vote for the candidate that suits you the most. (Oliver Delgado, media operator, Cusco, September 1, 2010)

Poor voters frequently attend campaign events where politicians hand out material benefits to those present. As shown in chapter four, many disadvantaged voters who participated in rallies during the last electoral contests in Peru claimed that they did so in order to receive what the politicians distributed or raffled off (see Table 4.2). These survey respondents declared not to be principally interested in listening to the candidates'

proposals or showing their support for the candidate. This fact may not be that surprising considering that poor Peruvian voters tend to be less interested in politics than wealthier

Table 5.2 Interest in Politics by SES

How Interested are you in Politics?						
	Socioeconomic Status[135]					
	A	B	C	D	E	Total
Uninterested	9.52	23	22.93	26.44	34.64	25.21
	(4)	(49)	(83)	(110)	(53)	(299)
Somewhat Interested	42.86	38.97	42.27	50.96	47.06	45.36
	(18)	(83)	(153)	(212)	(72)	(538)
Interested	30.95	27.7	26.8	18.51	14.38	22.6
	(13)	(59)	(97)	(77)	(22)	(268)
Very Interested	16.67	10.33	8.01	4.09	3.92	6.83
	(7)	(22)	(29)	(17)	(6)	(81)
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(42)	(213)	(362)	(416)	(153)	(1186)

Source: IOP 2012
Pearson chi2(12) = 47.8324 Pr ≤ 0

ones. Both politicians and poor citizens acknowledge this fact during interviews and focus groups. Moreover, poll results confirm that there is an inverse association between

[135]The socio economic stratum indicator in Peru distinguishes among five groups, ranging from the richest (A) to poorest (E).

how interested Peruvians are in politics and their socioeconomic status. As shown in Table 5.2, only 9.52% respondents from stratum A, the wealthiest one, are uninterested in politics. Meanwhile, 34.64% of the respondents in the poorest stratum (E) declare not to be interested in politics. Indeed, according to IOP's survey, many underprivileged participants at campaign events are voters who are uninterested in politics. By contrast, relatively few of these participants who are uninterested in politics come from the higher SES. This pattern can be observed in the distributions graphed in Figure 5.1.

Figure 5.1 Attendance at Turnout Buying Campaign Events and Interest in Politics



Source: IOP 2012

In short, poor voters in Peru do not always attend campaign events in order to listen to the candidate, as wealthier voters do. However, participants at these mass meetings nevertheless *do* get information about the candidate's proposals. As explained

in previous chapters, citizens receive material benefits when they participate in campaign events; therefore, during these occasions citizens are also exposed to the candidates' message. In addition, voters frequently receive print propaganda at these public gatherings. For instance, candidates often attend the assemblies and meetings of local associations and introduce themselves and their proposals to the attendees. As a political operator emphasizes:

> We do not buy consciences. We offer breakfast to get people involved. Moreover, we present our political project there, our ideas. (Gregoria Muro, Unidos Construyendo's political operator. Piura, July 23, 2010)

The account of this Quechua small farmer confirms this claim:

> Presidential elections take place every five years and regional and municipal every four. During those periods the politicians arrive and campaign [in the community], they campaign for three months prior to the election day. They tell us what party they are running for, why they are running as candidates. They make us listen to their program and they distribute propaganda. We observe. In this way we get to know if they are old or new [to politics], what their trajectory is, if they are part of old parties, and so on. We analyze what they say, what works they will do. Listening and analyzing such things we support whoever convinces us more. Consequently, on election day we are already decided and we enter (the booth) and vote for the candidate we like. (Focus Group, Males, Occoruro Community, Cusco)

An analogous script takes place at rallies. Besides other activities intended to entertain the public—such as music, singing and dance performances, raffles and the delivery of prizes or donations—rallies always reserve some time (or periodic intervals of time) for the candidates' presentations. This exposes the citizens attending the rally to the candidate's proposals, even those voters who are primarily motivated to participate so as to receive the politicians'gifts. This strategy is precisely what a woman participating at a focus group in Cusco explains:

> For example, they go to a rally saying 'Well, I will drink the O's punch, for Ollanta'. Or they go to Keiko's rally saying 'I will receive a bag', like me, and then shout 'Bag! Bag!' [Laughs] In this way, successively they go to different rallies to receive something. Well, they get to listen to the proposals anyway and maybe receive a gift. And, if they don't like him, they don't vote [for him]. That is what people do: they go to one and another; they go and listen to proposals. (Focus Group, Females, Comunidad Sucsu Auccaylle, Cusco)

Two women from Piura offer a similar explanation,

> P1: 'That candidate is good because he has given goods away' they say. …
> P2: Today *no es amor al chancho sino al chicharrón* [Laughs]. But one should always look at least for some proposals and also bid for the winner. (Focus Groups, Females, Bellavista, Piura)[136]

The following dirigente also provides an analogous description of what happens in his shanty town during campaigns,

> Candidates organize rallies in the shanty town's *plazuela* (its main square). Candidates use strategies to attract people there, such as organizing raffles of baskets with food, doors or windows. People go for that, not because they want to go. But to decide their vote they evaluate candidates' proposals. (Francisco Fuentes, dirigente, AAHH San Sebastián, Piura November 23, 2010)

All these accounts show that campaign clients are exposed to candidates' proposals at campaign events.

It is important not to underestimate the relevance of transmitting electoral information in this way. Middle and upper class voters may have better or more accurate sources of information. For many poor electors, however, it *can* make a difference in

[136] *No es amor al chancho sino al chicharrón* is a Peruvian saying. It means that someone is nice to you, treats you well or is interested in being close to you not necessarily because she likes you but because she is interested in what you can give her or in what you owe.

their choice of candidate. Indeed, many of these poor rally participants might not gain information about candidates' proposals otherwise. Poor and indifferent citizens inform themselves about candidates more sporadically than wealthier voters. As Figure 5.2 indicates, wealth is a significant determinant of the frequency of news consumption.

Figure 5.2 Frequency of News Consumption by Material Wealth (Linear Prediction)



In some ways, we could consider campaign turnout buying as an extended political advertisement. When politicians buy attendance at campaign events, they gain a captive audience that is exposed to the candidates' message for a longer time than with a conventional TV or radio advertisement. As a result, the chances that priming will work are greater than they are with media advertisements. In addition to being a more effective way to convey messages, this type of "ad" is considerably cheaper than most media advertisements. This advantage prevails even after calculating the cost of material goods

to be distributed. Indeed, many of the products distributed or raffled at rallies are donations that would be more difficult to collect in cash. It is simply easier to convince a fishery to donate seafood products to distribute at campaign events or a textile businessman to donate a number of t-shirts than to get them to contribute cash to the campaign.

But what types of proposals do politicians advance taking advantage of their investment in campaign clientelism? Rather than delivering general discourses about what they believe and would do once in office, candidates adjust their message to appeal to the targeted constituency. When candidates visit social organizations or when they give speeches at rallies in poor neighborhoods, they make sure to transmit proposals they believe are of interest to the attendees. With this end in mind, they try to present very specific or targeted proposals. Thus, candidates' speeches commonly entail a mixture of broad programmatic proposals and specific (group- or locale-oriented) promises. Specific promises often include the delivery of public local goods. In the following extract, a peasant describes how politicians offer specific promises to different groups while campaigning:

> In the communities there are associations such as the dairy products association, the crafts association, the small animals association. The candidates visit the different associations and they offer things. For example, to build sheds and bring improved breeding animals [for the small animals association]. In the case of dairy products, they offer to find a market niche to sell their products. In the case of the cattle owners, they say they will take the cattle directly to Lima [with no intermediaries] to find better prices for producers. (Focus Group, Rural Cusco, Females)

Often, promises of delivering public local goods work and politicians are able to convince turnout clients to support them. The following discussion among residents of a very poor shanty town in Piura illustrates a case of apparent success:

> I: Whom did you support for the presidency here in Los Polvorines?
> Keiko! [Everybody]
> P1: Keiko offered us many things she would do for us if she won. She came here! She walked! She walked through Los Polvorines [literarily "the dust"]! And she said 'If I get the presidency, you will have what you need'.
> P2: She offered us the basic services we need: water, electricity, and drainage. Those are the ones we need the most.
> P3: She also offered us titles to our properties. (Focus Group, Females, AAHH Los Polvorines, Piura)[137]

The more targeted the proposals, the greater are the chances that politicians may influence a particular constituency. Consequently, most of the time the campaign teams ascertain ahead of time the people's major demands or concerns, so they can adapt the candidate's message to the local audience's needs and expectations. This strategy was explained by Gregoria Muro, who worked as a political operator with Javier Atkins' campaign in Piura both in 2006 and 2010. In her words, throughout the campaign they "studied" each district.[138] Before each campaign event, she sent an advance logistical team to gather information about the localities and prepare for the candidate's arrival. During the campaign, they ended up visiting all 64 of Piura's districts plus many villages located near highways. Another political operator, who is much more experienced, explained to me that he keeps and updates a database with relevant information on many poor neighborhoods for the campaign: how many voters there are, what basic services

[137] Notice that an important element included in this account is the candidate's visit to their neighborhood. As will be further explained in the next section, during such visits candidates are able to transmit also other kinds of information related to their personal traits and capabilities that are valuable for voters.
[138] Personal interview with Gregoria Muro, political operator, Unidos Construyendo, Piura, July 23, 2010.

they lack, if they have property titles, etc. He was actually trying to create a geo-referenced database that would help him sell his services to politicians more easily.[139] A shanty town dweller from Piura also confirms that campaign teams do some basic research in advance of their campaign events;

> Generally, before going to a shanty town the candidate sends his team. They always look for the needs. 'Let's go and let's see what we can propose in Los Polvorines. Let's see what we will propose in La Molina, what people need.' The politicians carry out a study first. (Focus Group, Males, AAHH Los Polvorines, Piura)

Furthermore, campaign events usually turn into excellent opportunities for poor local communities to transmit their demands to politicians. This happens frequently, for example, when candidates visit associations in poor villages and shanty towns. On these occasions dirigentes present their affiliates' needs to the candidate and explain what they would expect from him after being elected. Usually, dirigentes ask for lasting investments such as local public goods (a school, water and sanitation projects, electricity, a mill, a communal hall, etc.), or the creation of jobs or income generating projects for their affiliates. As a focus group participant from rural Cusco explains:

> The candidates ask: '*Compañeros*, what can we do for you?' And we enthusiastically make our requests: 'We want tractors, a communal hall'. And the candidate says 'All right, for sure I will do it'. The candidate agrees to everything that the *comunero* asks for. (Focus Group, Males, Rural Cusco)

More importantly, through turnout buying poor voters get information about different candidates. Whether opportunistic or just curious, voters attend several campaign events. After listening to several candidates, citizens have the chance to

[139] Personal interview with Fujimorist political operator. Lima, February 17, 2010.

compare the proposals made and select the candidate who, in their eyes, is the most convincing. Thus, the information gathered through turnout buying helps poor voters to *form* their electoral preferences. Therefore, turnout clients should not be portrayed as avaricious or unthinking voters who mechanically react to the goods received and vote for the candidate without an evaluation. As a citizen ironically remarks, poor voters do think too, even if they receive material goods during campaigns. In her own words,

> P1: I receive the present anyway. Or will she know who I am going to vote for?
> …
> P2: The vote is secret …
> P1: The majority, at least in the city, we are conscious and we know who we will vote for … What do they think we are? … Do they believe we are not thinking and that we are going to switch our vote [in exchange for the gift]? (Focus Group, Females, Huancaro, Cusco)[140]

To think otherwise is to underestimate underprivileged electors: they may not be fully informed but they *do* make their own electoral choices.

Turnout clients are not passive political actors. A series of accounts delivered by poor voters in the focus groups reaffirm this contention. During campaign events, they pay attention to candidates' offers. These voters examine this information before deciding their vote choice. As a shanty town dweller from Piura explains:

> They compare all the candidates' proposals… Then, another candidate arrives, with a new proposal. We compare them, 'No, this one is better,' and we change our mind. Because, we support whoever supports our shanty town's improvement. (Focus Group, Males, AAHH EL Indio, Piura)

Furthermore, many times poor voters meet after the candidates' presentations and deliberate about the best electoral option for the community or the association. The

[140] Note about prejudices and stigma associated with this practice.

following focus group extracts illustrate such a case. The first account is from a female peasant:

> I have been able to see how in Salla community at Urcos, they receive all candidates. Afterwards, during an assembly, they analyze the proposals each candidate made and see which promises can be accomplished. They discuss among *comuneros* and they reach a unanimous decision and agree to vote for a certain candidate. This is what I saw in Salla: after receiving all the candidates, they analyzed each proposal. In Huaro community they proceeded in the same way. (Focus Group, Rural Cusco, Females)

An analogous description is given by a participant at a focus group conducted in a poor neighborhood of Cusco City:

> We analyze. Each candidate arrives… we analyze what she offers… they come here, to our assembly… They arrive with their program of work and they offer us a lot of things. When this finishes we analyze and ask 'Who should we support?' But, finally, democratically, we leave the final decision to each associate, so they can vote for the candidate they think can do best for us. (Focus Group, Mixed, APV Villa Primavera, Huancaro, Cusco)

Of course, the extent to which underprivileged voters will collectively deliver on their electoral choices will hinge upon the cohesiveness and strength of local social organizations. Given that communal organizations are historically stronger in Cusco, it is not a surprise that this type of comment comes from focus groups conducted in that region.

Like any other type of advertisement, the direct transmission of specific proposals and promises at campaign events is not an infallible method of persuading voters. Indeed, it confronts similar challenges as media-based advertisements. Voters strongly distrust politicians in Peru because electoral promises are frequently ignored once authorities are elected. Consequently, most voters do not believe in the candidates' words. "*Menos palabras, más obras*" (literarily, "fewer words and more public works") is a common

expression used by Peruvians to question politicians. "*Las palabras se las lleva el viento,"* which is similar to the English expression "actions speak louder than words," is another common phrase used in politics. Indeed, many elected officials in Peru intensively invest in public works in order to improve their political reputation.

During conversations held at focus groups poor voters frequently reiterate this lack of confidence in politicians and stress how they are tired of listening to promises over and over again. The examples abound. Just a couple of illustrations demonstrate this point. The first is a conversation in which peasants express their frustration with politicians' behavior after getting elected into office,

> P1: Once they win the elections, candidates do not recognize anybody despite the fact that our vote got them elected as mayor or councilman. They do not take us into account and they forget the promises they made during the campaign. …
> P2: What my associates say is true. During the campaign we are their equals, their brothers and sisters. But once in office they do not remember the proposals they presented. That is to say, they do not deliver the public works and support offered while campaigning. (Focus Group, Females, Rural Cusco)

The second quotation shows the negative perceptions towards politicians among poor voters. With the following unadorned statement, this resident of Piura tries to convey her frustration with politics:

> In my opinion, *all* politicians are liars. They never fulfill their promises… What we have accomplished, we have accomplished through protests. (Focus Group, Females, AAHH Los Polvorines, Piura)

Thus, it is clear that a credibility problem can undermine the effectiveness of directly communicating proposals at campaign events.

However, unlike media advertisements, personal contact with campaign teams allows poor voters to develop informal mechanisms that help them decrease the chances they will be deceived. For example, it is quite common to observe local communities asking candidates who visit them to sign written assurances specifying they will pursue the commitments made during the campaign after they win office. As a political operator recognizes,

> There are other requests [besides presents]: the memos. Everybody comes with their record book. People make the candidate sign. You *have* to sign. You have to sign and, if you win, they bring you a copy of the declaration. (Jorge Nuñez, political operator, Puno, June 12, 2010)

The same strategy is explained by a voter in a focus group conducted in Cusco,

> Candidates arrive in towns offering too many things. They promise so much that in the peasant communities, *comuneros* prefer to write in their record book the candidates' promises. Because during campaigns candidates promise many things but they forget them when they get elected. Then, comuneros visit the elected candidate taking with them their record book where the commitments were signed. They go to remind him of these offerings saying 'During the campaign you offered to build us these projects. We are coming to remind you about it so you can execute it right away'. (Focus Group, Males, Rural Cusco)

Moreover, poor voters make similar demands to several candidates during each campaign, and they ask for written commitments from all of them. These documents allow citizens to claim the fulfillment of the promises once the elected authority assumes office. Although these documents do not have legal validity, they can become the focal point around which to articulate collective action efforts, and even protests, at a later date. The following discussion held at a focus group in urban Cusco illustrates this process:

> P1: It's a way that dwellers try to take advantage. They know that a candidate is going to come so they prepare a request asking for a given project. They ask the candidate to support it and they assure him 'We will support you but sign this document.'
> P2: People in need take advantage. They ask everybody [to sign]! It is not just one candidate…
> P1: Whoever wins, they already get it…
> P3: Generally, if they are short-lived candidates [*de paso*], they will not accomplish their promises. But with the written request we can go and protest (Focus Group, Females, Huancaro, Cusco)

In addition, the personal presentation of proposals allows politicians to try to build up their credibility through other means. This concept will be explored in the following section.

In sum, after attracting participants through campaign turnout buying, candidates present specific proposals and promises directed to targeted constituencies. Conveying policy messages at campaign events works as an extended political advertisement and is much cheaper than buying media ads. Moreover, personal contact between candidates and voters helps improve politicians' credibility. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of personal communication does not rely only on transmitting particularized policy messages at campaign events. Conveying the candidate's personal traits during public gatherings is also crucial for persuading clients of the candidates' credibility and, thus, of their electoral desirability. This second informational channel is explored in the next section.

A GOOD CANDIDATE

> Politics is the art of gestures. (Roberto Romero, political operator, Cusco. December 17, 2010)

> I paint [political propaganda], that's my job. I have painted propaganda for many people. But if I support a candidate it is because he convinced me. I can paint for many, but if he convinces me, I support him. If not, I can work for him but it's

> different. It's another story… For example, if I am a member of a sports association and a candidate donates T-shirts for the team. He donated, but I will not feel pressured to vote for him. To vote for him, first he has to gain your trust. (Focus Group, Males, AAHH El Indio, Piura)
>
> This is my conclusion: an organization is not enough [to campaign successfully]. You need a good candidate. A good candidate replaces a good organization. There is no organization in Peru… The organization ends up being supplementary. (Abraham Parrilla, political operator, Piura. September 23, 2010)

Since the collapse of the party system during the 1990s, Peruvian politicians have come up with different ways to substitute for the absence of stable political organizations. Reliance on the media for campaigning and communicating with voters has been one path taken. But media politics has not displaced street campaigning. As explained in the previous chapter, the creation of portátiles and the investment in campaign clientelism are some of the strategies devised to deal with this lack of permanent organization. Unprepared candidates can easily improvise canvassing structures and public gatherings for their speeches.

According to one of the politicians quoted at the beginning of the section, a good candidate can substitute for a good political organization. In other words, having (a permanent) organization is not essential to running a successful campaign in Peru. A good, candidate, however, is much more difficult to do without. Why might this be the case? In a context such as Peru where most voters do not identify with a partisan label and dislike political parties and politicians, the candidate's ability to effectively *connect* with voters can be decisive. A good candidate can make up for many other shortcomings exhibited by a political grouping, such as its improvisation or inconsistency. In contrast, a bad candidate generally has fewer chances of getting elected even if he or she has a strong organization. This is true because a candidate's public trajectory, his skills as a

speaker, his personal charisma, and his ability to interact with voters of different socioeconomic backgrounds can be enhanced, but only up to a point. *Lo que natura no da, Salamanca no lo presta,* a Spanish proverb says. As this proverb points out, certain personal qualities are innate and cannot be learned; not even in a prestigious university such as Salamanca.

But what do a candidate's characteristics have to do with turnout buying at campaign events? How is electoral clientelism connected with personalism in politics? In this section I demonstrate that a candidate's participation at campaign events is probably the best way to convey personal traits to voters. By gathering an audience, turnout buying provides an ideal opportunity for public performance and personalized political communication. Moreover, given that turnout clients tend to be less politically sophisticated voters, the direct evaluation of a candidate's traits is more relevant for this group of voters. Consequently, the candidate's performance at campaign events can be crucial for giving a viable candidate electoral success. When candidates are perceived as viable *and* desirable, they have better chances of getting elected.

There are several reasons why campaign events, such as rallies and candidate visits, are better for transmitting personal information about candidates than are other types of events and propaganda. Campaign events provide opportunities for face-to-face interactions. During electoral events politicians interact directly with voters: candidates do not just rely on mediators but engage the citizens, either individually or as a group. Without a doubt, "speeches at rallies and candidate-voter interactions … are arguably the closest we can come to political communication without mediation." (Nielsen 2012:13). As a Peruvian political operator contends, "the vote is emotional. Thus, interpersonal communication is more important [than relying just on the media]. … 'I believe in what I

see, not in what they [the media] tell me,' people say."[141] According to a candidate for the regional vice-presidency in Piura, "people want to see the candidate and get to know him."[142] Many activities even provide opportunities for physical contact: people have the chance to personally greet the candidate, kiss, hug, and touch him. As the following quotation shows, voters are often interested in having such a personal or physical contact with politicians:

> Sometimes strangers come from other places or from Lima. They bring caps and other stuff. We go out of the house to meet them. We are interested in knowing if they are warm or cold people. We touch their hands so we can know if they are warm or cold. We then meet among us and decide whether they have been cold or warm; or short… In other words, we go out mostly to meet them, to find out how they are. (Focus Group, Males, Occoruro Community, Cusco)

Moreover, during campaign events candidates have numerous opportunities to interact spontaneously with citizens. Even in the best planned events, there is always room for spontaneity. Candidates may receive comments or be the subject of a joke they did not expect. Or something may not go as planned and candidates might be required to give explanations to the public or improvise a speech. Indeed, campaign events are not edited like advertisements and news coverage. Voters interacting with candidates will be attentive to the candidates' responses and reactions in such surprising situations, as they know these actions will reveal much about their personal character. The last Peruvian presidential elections provide us with a great example of how candidates are exposed to unexpected situations at campaign events. During one of Pedro Pablo Kuczynski's visits to a poor neighborhood in the port of Callao, a woman expressed her sympathy for him

[141] Marco Torres Paz, political operator from Fujimorismo and advisor in Congress. Lima, February 5, 2010.
[142] Personal interview. Piura, July 20, 2011.

by grabbing his genitals. Astonished, Kuczynski managed to smile and let her touch him. His reaction was good—he did not become aggressive—and it was funny. It captured the public's attention long after the incident had passed. The candidate's reaction was also unexpected. Already in his seventies, Kuczynski is a businessman and former Ministry of Finance and is seen as being more *gringo* than Peruvian (he lived in the US for many years). His reaction was very *criolla*, proper for a Peruvian who knows how to behave "in the street" rather than from a wealthy and serious businessman. Kuczynski's team saw an opportunity in this spontaneous event. They took pictures of the scene and then diffused them widely throughout the media and web. As a result, Kuczynski received invitations onto many TV programs and the scene was imitated by comedy shows.[143] Without a doubt, this unexpected event and the candidate's reaction to it helped him become more popular.[144]

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, campaign events are performances—they are theatrical acts. Analogous to what happens in any other interaction in everyday life (Goffman 1958) candidates present their "self" to voters during these events. That is, politicians try to manage the impressions voters receive while interacting with them. In this way, on the campaign trail the candidate displays and communicates a political persona (Fenno 1996: 324). Analyzing campaign events as performances means that *the way* in which candidates behave will be of vital importance in defining what their personal style and characteristics are from the voters' perspective. Indeed, during these public performances, candidates receive exceptional chances to personally *connect* with the participants. As Mahler (2011) points out, achieving this connection can be crucial for actually winning support from voters,

[143] For instance, see http://trome.pe/actualidad/717153/noticia-le-agarraron-bolonas-ppk
[144] It worked so well that some journalists suspected it was staged.

> … the practical challenge presented by the world of politics, at least from the perspective of politicians, is not simply that one must be-known-in-the-world-out-there in the guise of a celebrity or as someone who has simply been able to make a name for oneself by whatever means necessary. The challenge is just as much, if not more so, to connect with those-in-the-world-out-there –to be known as someone who is sympathetic with their causes and concerns, which is to say to be known as someone who knows and understands and is familiar with the-world-out-there. (Mahler 2011: 159)

In other words, the public presentation of the candidate at campaign events can be crucial for persuading voters of his electoral desirability (or undesirability).

Knowing the importance of electoral events, campaign teams deliberately plan that their candidate will be perceived by the public as a success. As already noted, a very important fact for considering a campaign event as successful is the number of people the candidate can mobilize. However, gathering large numbers of voters is not enough to make a rally effective in electoral terms. Politicians also need to make sure that the event generates a favorable impression, or better, widespread interest by the public. Two elements are crucial for attaining those goals.

First, campaign teams must set the stage for the political show. This step is the most "doable" phase of preparing a campaign event. It is the responsibility of the team, particularly of the movilizadores, to plan the logistics and assure everything will be ready on time. Setting the right stage requires expertise and resources. But it is something that can be learned (or even purchased).

Distributing material benefits during campaign events is an important part of this process of preparing the stage: it has to do with assuring a gratifying environment for attendees. Presents or prizes work as selective incentives to attract poor voters and give them a reason for attending the event. Moreover, as voters recognize, distributing

presents is also another way for the political group to approach people and get closer to them:

> On some occasions, the candidate himself gives away goods because it's a way to get closer to the people, to make yourself known. But there is also a committee of sympathizers who are distributing presents at the other side of the event or from different sides. (Focus Group, Mixed, Compone Community, Cusco)

However, setting the stage goes beyond distributing goods. The setting has to be attractive to people. A great deal of the team's work therefore goes into decoration and entertainment. The stage is usually filled with balloons and flags of the party's colors, banners, and pictures of the candidates. Sympathizers wear the party's T-shirts. Often, one person disguises himself in a costume that symbolizes the group's label–commonly an animal, a known character, or an object, such as a star. In addition, campaign teams usually organize dance performances and singing acts. They also take bands to play—hearing a popular band can be another incentive to attend a campaign event. During visits, politicians take megaphones with them to broadcast music and political slogans. The goal with all this showmanship is to create a positive mood in the crowd: the "*fiesta electoral*" (electoral party) should induce a party atmosphere that everybody enjoys. Politicians try to avoid boring the attendees while they all wait for the candidate to show up.

Organizing a campaign event, however, is not limited to preparing the physical setting. Second, and most significantly, advisors also work with the candidate to guarantee a strong public performance. There, everything matters: the candidate's outfit, his tone of voice and body language, use of words, his sense of humor, his ability to respond to questions and criticisms, and how closely he interacts with people. Political advisors consciously work on the candidates' image, trying to help them as much as

possible to change their negative characteristics and to fulfill voters' expectations. Even voters are aware that the public presentation of the candidate involves some investment in political marketing. As an illustration, note the precise reference the following dirigente makes during a focus group held in Piura:

> Today there are more people who have a lust for power. Therefore, they have to invest… And what is the way to invest in a campaign? To invest means to satisfy the voter. It also means to present yourself as generous, caring, and affectionate. I arrive with a gift, with a kiss. Candidates get transformed. Did you meet Javier Atkins before the campaign? Don Javier Atkins did not use a straw hat… Why did he begin using it? It was because people began to perceive him as the candidate who represented the rich. He uses the hat so that everybody will feel that they are in front of a candidate who is a real Piurano, a *paisano*. (Focus Group, Males, AAHH Los Polvorines, Piura)

By preparing the candidate's image for public presentation at campaign events, street politics meets political marketing.

But what are the important aspects of the candidate's performance at campaign events? What do voters take into account as information that is electorally relevant for them? Fenno (1996)'s candidate-centered attributes of success (authenticity, consistency, and good character) broadly coincide with the qualities recognized as being important for poor voters in Peru. Nonetheless, given the relatively low reelection rates and high electoral volatility, the third attribute is the most relevant for deciding actual vote choices. Basically, Peruvian voters look for a politician with "good" personal traits. Of course, the precise characteristics voters like may vary. But, all are personal skills and attributes, rather than stands on policy issues. For instance, for some voters it is important that a candidate who wants to be elected can speak fluently in public. The following discussion held at a focus group illustrates this attribute:

> P1: Rubi [candidate running for mayor] is unable to speak or she does not know what to say because she avoids the cameras. 'Ladies, you will receive support', 'I will support you *hijita*', she says, but with her mouth covered…
> P2: She does not know what to say. The advisor talks for her. Talk! Talk! people shouted at her. [Laughs]
> P3: In contrast, the other candidate at least talked: 'Woman's word! Woman's word!' [She imitates her.] Rubi hides.
> P1: The lady [Rubi] did not speak. After she was elected she came here. 'You will be relocated, *hijitas*', she said, still covering her mouth. I told her: 'Why do you cover your mouth? Do you have bad breath?' [Laughs] My friends were concerned, they were afraid they [the municipality] were not going to install electricity because I said she should talk, that she should not remain silent… Everybody else here followed her. She got into her van and took off. And she only said two or three words: 'You will be relocated, *hijitos*'. But she did not even say where! Nothing! Trelles Lara [former regional president who lost in 2010] did not talk either. (Focus Group, Females, AAHH Los Polvorines, Piura)

Other citizens stress, in contrast, the candidate's charisma. For the following voter, for example, a popular candidate is a cheerful, easygoing one,

> P1: Given that there are polls in the radio and TV channels, they always want to keep the first place… many times they do not even occupy a position among the front runners but they pay the media and journalists to appear as doing so…
> P2: But in the last elections what mattered more was popularity: the most charismatic candidate, the most jovial, the most cheerful, was the one who gained popularity. (Focus Group, Females, Osccollompampa, Cusco)

In another focus group, a small farmer contended that, for him, it is important to know if the politician is a warm or a cold person. That is why, he explained, people in his community try to shake hands when politicians visit their community. Other voters stress they do not like candidates who are arrogant. These voters prefer candidates who treat the people well during visits. A citizen from Cusco explicates this belief in the following way:

> Compañeros, there are many candidates who want to access power. [To decide our vote] we take into account their qualities. For example, we want to make sure that, while campaigning, the candidate is an agreeable person… We see if he is nice. Afterwards, we also evaluate his capabilities, if he is prepared to command people or not. Then, we observe who his candidates for Council are: if they are from the countryside or from the city, or maybe if they are his relatives… We observe the way in which the candidate talks, his attitudes, his disposition to work and his capacity to negotiate [*gestiona*]. Although sometimes we get it wrong, this is what decides our vote. (Focus Group, Males, Rural Cusco)

Bad candidates, in turn, are exposed at campaign events. The following discussion provides another good illustration of how candidates' attitudes while campaigning can hurt them electorally:

> P1: During the last municipal elections there was a candidate who did everything he could do. He distributed presents almost house by house… He had run as a candidate two or three times but this year he did it forcefully. The people realized: Where does all that money come from? And how is he going to recuperate it?
> I: Did he give away *that* much?
> P2: You should have seen the campaign trail. There was no wall without propaganda or painted with his name… It was too much! Exaggerated!
> P3: He already felt like the winner! But, at the end, he ended up around the fourth place.
> I: So, people did not support him?
> P1: You know what happened? This gentleman [Mogrovejo] is a little prepotent. In one moment he said 'brother…' [Treats them well] But afterwards, someone approaches him and he stares at you 'Arrgh' [He makes a derogatory gesture] He is a despotic person. If he were mayor, how would he treat people?
> P3: You can also notice this when politicians are in caravans. If by any chance they bump into another caravan, an altercation arises. They insult the others, threw water on them… It is apparent that it is the candidate who instigates his followers. People analyze how candidates behave, the way they express themselves, if they are proposing something that could be useful. (Focus Group, Mixed, APV Villa Primavera, Cusco)

In sum, Peruvian voters evaluate candidates' traits during campaign events. Voters evaluate personal traits at all types of opportunities, but turnout buying campaign

events are particularly important for politicians. These events are ideal opportunities to persuade poor constituencies about candidates' electoral desirability. Underprivileged voters inform themselves about politics less deeply and less often than any other socioeconomic strata. As explained in the previous chapter, politicians have greater difficulties reaching and persuading poor constituencies when relying solely on media advertisements.

Furthermore, poor citizens also tend to be less politically sophisticated (see Figure 5.3). They tend to have less political information than wealthier citizens. The challenge of acquiring and processing electoral information is exacerbated by the lack of stable partisan attachments and policy positions that can work as cognitive shortcuts. Poor voters are experienced at evaluating personal traits, however. Indeed, their everyday experiences and socialization, has taught them to garner insights into personal characteristics and behavior during social interactions. Thus, underprivileged voters in Peru often evaluate a candidate's desirability based on his personal traits. As a result, the public performances of candidates at campaign events ends up being particularly important for determining this constituency's electoral preferences.

Underprivileged voters, being less politically sophisticated, thus put more weight on personal characteristics to decide their vote choices than do wealthier voters (Slosar 2011). This is why interacting with the candidates at campaign events is so important for underprivileged voters. By visiting poor neighborhoods and remote areas candidates can build credibility and potentially influence voters. Deprived voters believe that someone who wants to govern must personally know the places in which the poor live and work. Otherwise, it would be more difficult for them to understand the people's needs and frustrations. From this perspective, only people who live in poverty or are close to it can

Figure 5.3. Political Knowledge by SES



understand this way of life. This thought process is reflected, for example, in the following focus group comments:

> I: What would we need to change the way politicians behave [while governing]?
> P1: They need an advisor, but an advisor who lives in a place like Los Polvorines so he can transmit their people's need...
> P2: A small group of well-trained persons that can explain the needs.
> P3: In the case of mayors, I believe that they should be present there [in the field] to see the problems and not to wait for an intermediary. (Focus Group, Females, AAHH Los Polvorines, Piura)

Campaigning personally and intensively, therefore, helps candidates build legitimacy. As Cánepa and Málaga comment while describing political marketing strategies used in Cusco, "During the campaign, a candidate must be *everywhere.* This ubiquity provides

him with legitimacy to speak, from his experience, about the region's and the city's problems." (Cánepa and Málaga 2011: 34)[145]

Moreover, the poor read additional signs in the candidate's public performance. To begin with, the *way* turnout buying is carried out matters greatly. Giving away things is certainly not just about throwing out goods or money: candidates and their campaign staff have to show they *care* about assisting the needy. Therefore, they should follow certain social codes (or at least pretend to do so). In the words of a former candidate,

> You need a great dose of sympathy and to eat and drink with people. You also need to reciprocate with simple favors: computers for a school, to pay for a band, to distribute toys for kids, etc. To meet these obligations you look for donors or pay with your own money. You need maximum compliance, to be seen as someone who fulfills his promises. (Guido Lucioni, Fujimorismo candidate to Congress, February 5, 2010)

Political operators are aware of this need and advise candidate to behave in certain ways. As the political operator quoted at the beginning of this section pointed out, the candidate's image is important:

> People vote for the good neighbor… because they think the candidate is a good guy. The candidate needs to connect with the people, with the poor [*con el pueblo de base*]. He has to gain people's trust… He cannot be arrogant. (Absalón Vásquez, Lima, December 12, 2012)

As explained by another politician,

> He [the political operator] becomes the transmission belt of your image. And, evidently, they want to sell the image that you are the good guy, you are a guy predisposed to give stuff away, that you would give even your life and, of course,

[145] The wording Spanish is: "Un candidato, mientras dure su campaña, debe estar en *todas partes*. Esta ubicuidad le da legitimidad para hablar desde la experiencia sobre los problemas de la ciudad y la region."

> rice, oil. [He laughs] That you are willing to go and get your shoes dirty in the shanty town and spend a night there with people. That is the image you start to sell. Evidently, according to these political operators, they do this aiming to guarantee that people will vote for you. For that, they need your presence, resources, and propaganda. That is how the system works. (Maximiliano Ruiz, Unidos Construyendo's candidate for regional vice presidency, Piura July 20, 2010)

Candidates also need to maintain some degree of balance in the amount of goods they distribute. If they give away too little, they risk being perceived as irrelevant candidates who are not able to collect enough contributions. But giving away too much risks offending poor voters or transmitting the wrong message. That is, they could be perceived as being arrogant and unscrupulous. As this political operator explains,

> You need to know *how* to invest, it is not just about throwing away more things. For example, there was a case of an intermediary who sells meat at Yerbateros and who ran as candidate for mayor in Ilave. People call him "the bull". He has tons of money. During the campaign everybody named him *padrino* so he would give things away. But people asked him, let's say, for 1 meter of fabric and he gave 4. Or they asked for 1 box of beer and he gave 4. People started saying that he was showing off too much [he lost]… If you do that people will believe that you are investing that much because what you really aim is to recover that while in power. So the idea is to do something but not to go to the extremes: not much, not few… You need to know how to invest. (Jorge Nuñez, political operator, Puno, June 12, 2010).

The long focus group discussion presented earlier also suggests that exaggerating while investing in turnout buying (and propaganda) can actually be electorally counterproductive. The participants refer to a similar case in which a candidate wasted too much money and was not elected. This candidate, who was not able to fully convince

voters of his desirability, ended up third, 10 percentage points behind the second candidate.[146]

During campaign events poor voters also seek to assess the candidate's authenticity and consistency, albeit with some limitations.[147] For example, citizens try to evaluate if candidates are being truthful in presenting themselves or if they are "just faking it." Learning is not necessarily seen as something bad; for example, learning how to behave while visiting poor neighborhoods can be quite productive. However, pretending to be nice when you are not is detrimental. People examine not only how candidates treat them but also how a candidate treats his staff.

Similarly, poor voters evaluate the candidate's consistency, particularly after they are elected. During focus groups, voters frequently complained about a politician's inconsistency after rising to power. Numerous participants, for example, narrate how candidates change the way they treat people after gaining power: authorities treat poor people coldly when they later go to visit the office, or these authorities do not recognize them anymore; most elected authorities stop visiting their neighborhoods and villages, and they even forget their promises. A couple of quotes may be enough to illustrate this inconsistency:

> P1: In Ocongate district, candidates go to town. They talk with the dirigentes, they present the candidates for Council in the assembly, then the candidate running for mayor presents himself … But we see now, after elections, that no candidate has come back to our communities, even though they committed to work with us.

---

[146] Something similar happened with Mario Vargas Llosa in the 1990 presidential election. The electoral alliance he ran for, the *Frente Democrático Popular* (FREDEMO), threw away too much money in advertisement. FREDEMO was increasingly perceived as the party representing the wealthy. Many poor voters preferred instead to support Fujimori; an unknown candidate who ran a very humble campaign and whose slogan was "*un president como tú*" (a president like you).

[147] Not being part of established parties most candidates in Peru do not maintain a relationship with voters after the campaign is over. Accurately assessing authenticity and consistency can only be done in a reliable way over time. In other words, it is possible to evaluate these traits when elections are over and only for those candidates who get elected or at least run on repeated occasions.

> They said 'we will work together because I am a peasant like you are, I use *ojotas* like you'.[148] And now they do not even get off the truck they use…
> P2: The councilman or the mayor is not the same anymore. They always change. When you greet them it's not like before. During the campaign they greet you using terms such as "brother", "friend". And they do come to the faena [mandatory community work] and work with us; they carry the tools and work with us. But when he is already mayor or councilman, he even changes the ojotas for shoes and is no longer the same. (Focus Group, Males, Rural Cusco)

This inconsistency is even recognized by politicians themselves. This experienced political operator explains the problem in the following terms,

> Reelections? Not that many... Authorities believe they can do and undo. For instance, Butrón, Puno's mayor, has not transcended. He isolates himself in urban areas in which he has delivered public works. But he does not project himself beyond. He should walk, visit local associations all the time. This estrangement made him lose… After gaining office, authorities abandon the relationship they had with people while campaigning. People now have to get an appointment to talk with them and they do not go out. So people start saying 'he is no longer to be seen', 'I look for him and he does not receive me'. They also surround themselves with functionaries who do not know how to treat people. 'I don't have time', they say… (Jorge Nuñez, political operator, Puno, June 12, 2010)

Thus, the majority of elected authorities seem inconsistent in the relationships they have with their constituencies. Very few exceptions are mentioned in the focus groups. This may be why, as the political operator implies, few authorities get reelected in Peru.[149] It is precisely because poor citizens do not trust politicians that meeting them in person makes sense and is so important for these voters: direct interaction can help them examine more accurately the candidates' traits and attitudes. During campaigns politicians have to overcome this mistrust and build personal credibility. Turnout buying events provide them with an excellent opportunity to do that.

---

[148] Ojotas are traditional sandals made with rubber.
[149] See also chapter 3.

However, the investment in campaign clientelism also poses a dilemma for politicians: the widespread use of campaign clientelism exacerbates social distance with poor voters. Buying poor voters' turnout at campaign events requires access to resources—either personally or via donations—to finance the distribution of goods. In other words, campaign clientelism is a strategy accessible for candidates who are well-off or can build close connections to well-off people during the campaign. Resource-rich candidates buy poor voters' attendance at campaign events, but not their support. Consequently, the big challenge for candidates is trying to bridge this social gap while campaigning: the candidate needs to create an impression of responsiveness, to show poor people that he is not some "elite" member who cannot relate to them and will not do much (if anything) for them. Ideally, he has to convince turnout clients that he will actually be "*un presidente como tú*".[150] Personally interacting with turnout clients provides the candidate with the best chances to achieve this.

In summary, the candidate's public presentation at bought campaign events is crucial for persuading poor voters and diminishing the social distance between candidates and the poor that campaign clientelism itself accentuates. For voters, campaign events such as rallies and candidate visits are ideal opportunities for interacting with candidates and evaluating their personal characteristics. During these public gatherings candidates perform and thus convey their political persona. Evaluating candidates' personal performance at rallies is particularly important and helpful for poorer voters. The underprivileged, who are usually less informed and politically sophisticated, put more weight on personal traits in defining their vote choices. By getting the opportunity to personally evaluate the candidates' attitudes and behavior, poor voters can decide which

[150] Fujimori's slogan in the 1990 campaign. See footnote 146.

candidate would most effectively represent them and be responsive to their needs. Thus, they can *form* their electoral preferences and rank viable candidates according to their desirability. Electoral clientelism can thus spur personalistic voting among turnout clients.

THE MASS MOOD AND THE BUZZ

As explained in chapter four, political information is transmitted through social interaction among peers: rumors about politicians' mobilization capabilities affect the public perception of their electoral strength. This interaction explains why it is important for candidates to demonstrate electoral viability to the general public by mobilizing large numbers of voters at rallies. But turning out large numbers of people is equally important for a second reason: it can help candidates persuade turnout clients and other participants at campaign events of their electoral desirability.

To be successful in their efforts at influence, campaign teams must make sure that they demonstrate that their candidate is both a viable *and* a desirable candidate to the people attending their campaign events. Voters' impressions about the candidate and the campaign event itself will be used to update their information. The more enthusiastic the public mood during a rally, the better it will be for influence purposes. An enjoyable, positive, and cheerful environment reassures participants that the candidate is liked by the majority and that he, in fact, has high electoral potential.

However, the goal is not only to make a good impression on participants at campaign events. The idea is also to get the attendees to talk about the candidate, hopefully in a positive way. If the event is exciting enough, it will give people something to chat about once it is over. A positive buzz could help the candidate to amplify the

original message: that he/she is electorally viable and a desirable option. As a voter puts it, "Most people follow what the majority says."[151]

While observing campaign events one realizes that participants not only examine and scrutinize the candidate but also their peers' reactions. In fact, attendees actively interact with each other at campaign events. For instance, participants comment among themselves about the proposals they like or dislike. If they strongly disagree with something a candidate said, they will let their neighbors know it. Some will even dare to shout it to the masses. Other times, participants do not talk but glance at each other or express their discomfort with facial expressions (see Figure 5.2). If, on the contrary, rally participants like a particular proposal or promise, they will react by enthusiastically cheering the candidate. Indeed, in successful rallies groups of participants compete with each other in terms of the level of enthusiasm shown with their cheers. Rally participants, thus, get exposed to participants' reactions during these mass gatherings: one can feel when the public's mood is, for example, negative, indifferent, or inspiring.

As an illustration, it will be useful to describe what I observed during the final rallies of the two leading candidates for regional government in Piura: César Trelles Lara (APRA) and Javier Atkins (Unidos Construyendo). The rallies took place in a similar setting (in the same street in downtown Piura) on different days. Unidos Construyendo's rally seemed to have more participants: the space looked more crowded. APRA's rally took up more space, but it did so because of the way apristas displayed their people in the space (they dispersed participants more). However, the turnout was large enough in both rallies. The difference in turnout was not visually obvious from a distance. Indeed, it was not emphasized that much in the press coverage.

[151] Focus group participant, APV Villa Primavera, Huancaro, Cusco.

Without a doubt, the greatest contrast between both events was the mood of the rally and their participants' interactions. UC's rally was extremely enthusiastic and entertaining. People were happy, enjoying it—an observer could tell they were. The rally was crowded because people were trying to get closer to the stage. In fact, many participants tried to catch the candidate's attention so he would approach the first row and greet them. Moreover, the attendees' enthusiasm for the candidate and his wife seemed sincere, not faked. Delegations coming from different districts frequently cheered for the candidate and his wife, calling them by their first names (Javier and Sandra). While walking, one could hear that the participants' comments about the candidate were positive. In short, people were celebrating: the rally was in fact an electoral party. It went so well that people stayed there dancing for a while after the event was over.

APRA's rally, in contrast, was anything but a party. Walking through the crowd was quite easy because participants were more dispersed in the space than they were at Unidos Construyendo's rally. As mentioned before, APRA is the most organized party in Peru and Piura is one of APRA's historical strongholds. APRA militants are disciplined. Therefore, many militants had followed their leaders' commands and showed up for the final rally. However, the public's mood was not enthusiastic at all. On the contrary, the mood was gloomy and skeptic. Participants did cheer the candidate, as instructed by other apristas. But the cheers did not sound very sincere or truly enthusiastic. Many participants actually looked annoyed. One could see long faces everywhere. I repeatedly heard many ironic comments from the public and complaints about APRA's government performance and the party's presidencial candidate. They voiced many of these comments in reaction to Trelles Lara's speech. In sum, the rally reassured voters about the candidate's non-desirability.

Comparing the following pictures may give the reader a better sense of the contrast between the public's moods in both events. In particular, notice the faces of the participants located near the stage in APRA's picture: people look tired, some of them glance at others, skeptically.

Figure 5.2. Trelles Lara (APRA). Final Rally. Piura, September 30, 2010

Source: El Tiempo - Piura

Unfortunately, I could not access a great picture of Atkin's rally. This picture, however, captures at least partly the mood during the mass event described above. One can observe, for example, people waving flags.

Figure 5.3 Javier Atkins (Unidos Construyendo). Final Rally. Piura, September 29, 2010.

Source: El Tiempo - Piura

During other types of campaign events, attendees also interact with each other. At candidate presentations at local association assemblies, for instance, participants often comment on the proposals the candidate makes and express their approval by applauding the ones they like. Voters also chat and gossip about the candidate's attitudes, physical

traits, and behavior. Most of the time, at these smaller gatherings participants even have the chance to speak to the candidate (and the audience). Besides transmitting their demands, voters can also express their doubts or criticisms, or encourage him to change a proposal or attitude. Recall the focus group conversation presented earlier. In this conversation a voter recalls an episode in which she publicly questioned a candidate for not talking enough during her visit to the shanty town. The candidates' walks through shanty towns are often tempestuous. Besides cheers and indifference to the candidates' presentation I also witnessed some instances in which residents shouted at a candidate they disliked, calling him "liar," "thief," or "corrupt."

Peer effects can also influence vote intentions in another way: by giving participants something to talk about afterwards. They can create positive or negative "buzz" or word-of-mouth. Participants can become effective transmission belts of electoral information. Through social interaction the event's effect can be amplified. Participants may get a story to tell others. It could be a good or a bad one. On the one hand, attendees can diffuse a description of how charming the candidate was, how he danced or sang, how humble and honest he seems and, consequently, how credible his promises are. On the other hand, participants can just gossip about how bad a rally was, what a disaster the candidate was, how he seemed arrogant and did not treat people well, how mad people were at the event, etc. In this way, the positive or negative buzz generated can reach and (hopefully) influence voters who did not attend the event or who were still undecided after attending.

In short, all of these types of voters' interactions during and after campaign events will be weighed by the voters into deciding whether the candidate is desirable. Interpersonal communication among voters at campaign events, therefore, factors into voters' electoral considerations: by interacting with their peers voters can receive

reassurance about the impressions candidates leave. Furthermore, interpersonal communication can also help candidates to amplify the impact of their appeal: participants themselves can become transmission belts of electoral information and thus help other voters form their electoral preferences.

CONCLUSION

This chapter provided empirical evidence showing how influencing clients at campaign events is crucial for attaining electoral success. In a highly volatile political context candidates must do something beyond demonstrating their electoral potential to retain voters' attention and gain their support. To increase their chances of getting elected, a candidate must persuade turnout clients of his electoral desirability. Personalized communication at campaign events provides candidates with the best chances to accomplish this goal.

There are three ways in which politicians can convince turnout clients to support them. First, during campaign events candidates particularize and target their policy proposals in a much more effective way than they can do through media advertisements. Campaign events guarantee politicians a captive audience that will listen to them for extended periods of time. Campaign teams regularly gather information of particular constituencies' needs before the event takes place. Therefore, candidates can offer group-oriented proposals and promise the delivery of local public goods. Moreover, voters present candidates with their needs and requirements during those campaign activities. By listening to different candidates, voters can evaluate and contrast their proposals and promises. Some poor voters even recall collectively deliberating about which candidate fits best with their organization or community's interests.

Second, and probably more important, campaign events and rallies provide candidates with perfect occasions for presenting their personality to the public. Conveying personal traits is easier through direct personalized communication. Campaign events are performances and politicians are aware of it. Campaign teams plan the logistics and set up the stage for the show ahead of time. The goal is to create an environment that is as interesting and entertaining as possible in order to engage the audience. During these events candidates and turnout clients have the opportunity to interact directly and spontaneously. Poor voters will pay a lot of attention to the candidate's public performance: the way he speaks, interacts with people, his gestures, how reliable and trustworthy he seems. Since the underprivileged place greater emphasis on personal traits for their vote choices, candidates can take advantage of campaign events to "level" with poor voters and bridge the social distance that separates them. In general, guaranteeing a connection with the public at these public events increases the electoral chances of the candidates.

Finally, achieving a positive public mood at campaign events can help politicians reassure participants of their viability and desirability as candidates. Enthusiasm for a candidacy can be effectively transmitted through interaction with peers. Rallies and other mass events provide the ideal setting to develop a contagious mass environment. Participants are not passive consumers at these public gatherings. They chat and comment about the candidate's proposals, his behavior, the people who surround him, and many other details they deem important to evaluating their electoral choices. They also evaluate other participants' reactions to the candidate's presentation. If the event is interesting enough, participants will have something to talk about with their peers after the event. Word-of-mouth can thus be an amplifier of the event's success (or failure).

By attending multiple campaign events opportunistic clients become more informed about electoral offers than they would otherwise be. Each event these clients attend allows them to update their electoral information and compare and contrast whatever elements may be most important for them: the particular proposals candidates offer, the candidates' personal traits, and/or their peers' impressions and opinions about the candidates. Thus, through these various means, campaign turnout buying allows undecided clients to learn about the different candidates' proposals and rank candidates according to their preferences.

This chapter has also shown that electoral clientelism actually reinforces personalistic politics in Peru. More than anything, campaign events are ideal opportunities for engaging in personalized political communication. In a context with low partisan identification and high distrust in politics, candidates build credibility based on their personal trajectory, traits, and attitudes. Thus, for example, any sort of targeted proposal would be more credible in poor voters' eyes if it comes from a candidate they deem reliable. Rather than being alternative electoral strategies (Kitschelt 2000, Stokes 2007), electoral clientelism and personalism can complement each other.

Chapter Six: Conclusions

This dissertation's main contribution is a new theory of electoral clientelism that explains why politicians use clientelistic inducements during campaigns in when they lack solid political organizations. I propose an informational approach that stresses the *indirect* effects that investments in electoral clientelism have on vote intentions. I demonstrate that an important yet often ignored form of electoral clientelism, campaign clientelism, takes place in Peru despite the absence of established political organizations. Politicians commonly distribute material goods during electoral contests in order to buy turnout at campaign events and rallies. I contend that campaign clientelism generates valuable information that is later utilized by strategic political actors to make electoral decisions. By influencing the dynamics of the race, campaign clientelism affects electoral preferences and thus the outcome of elections. In contrast, particular subtypes of electoral clientelism normally studied, such as vote buying and turnout buying at the polls, rarely take place in Peru because they are not viable electoral strategies for winning elections.

Campaign clientelism affects election outcomes through two types of informational mechanisms, as I showed in Chapter two. First, campaign turnout buying establishes candidates' electoral *viability*. By turning out large numbers of people at campaign events, candidates demonstrate their electoral prospects to the media, donors, benefit-seeking activists, and the general public. Candidates who mobilize more people increase their chances of winning elections. Campaign turnout serves as an especially important signal of electoral viability to voters because the dearth of party organization means that there are few alternative sources of electoral information on the strength of candidates.

Second, turnout buying at campaign events is important for convincing voters of the candidates' electoral *desirability*. Turnout clients receive valuable electoral information while participating in campaign events. Voters are informed about the candidates' proposals, which are targeted to their particular constituencies. Clients are directly exposed to the candidates' public performance. This exposure constitutes the best way to evaluate the candidates' personal traits. Finally, attendees at rallies also observe their peers' reactions to the candidate, and such reactions often lead to "buzz" or positive word-of-mouth. Thus, whereas the size of campaign rallies can affect strategic voting considerations by all citizens through news coverage of the events, the content of rallies can influence voters who show up and members of their social networks that hear about the content post-hoc.

Turnout buying at campaign events can be effective because it affects how voters perceive both candidate viability and desirability. Demonstrating electoral viability is the first hurdle to pass for any candidate. Because voters lack standard cognitive shortcuts to predict electoral strength in a race, such as partisanship, they will concentrate their information gathering efforts on the candidates who are expected to fare well. Demonstrating the capability to mobilize large numbers of voters is a way of indicating electoral viability but, it does not imply that voters will simply and blindly support: electorally viable candidates also need to make sure that they convince voters of their electoral desirability. As I have argued, this influence is more easily achieved when candidates personally interact with poor voters at campaign events. Candidate appeal can make the difference in electoral results, especially in tight races. In other words, viable *and* desirable candidates have better chances of actually winning office.

Why is Peru a good case for examining the leverage of this theory? As I show in chapter three, Peru lacks both organized political parties and enduring clientelistic

machines that could structure vote intentions long before the campaign season begins. Electoral politics is instead structured around individual candidates, who put together their own personalistic vehicles at the start of their campaigns. Because vote intentions are highly volatile during the campaigns, politicians have a hard time securing re-election and building lasting machines. Furthermore, the state apparatus is no longer used as a substitute for a machine, as was the case during Fujimori's authoritarian regime.

Despite the lack of stable political networks on the ground, politicians intensively distribute material goods while campaigning. The actual distribution of material benefits, nevertheless, does not match conventional approaches' expectations. First, because there are very few established machines, regular distribution of goods and favors to the needy is uncommon. Second, the distribution of goods starts early in the campaign, sometimes even several months prior to it. Distribution of material gifts increases as election day approaches but does not take place only on or soon before this day. In fact, distribution usually takes place at various campaign events. Candidates thus do not begin campaigns with the benefit of a base of voters, routinely serviced by ongoing political machines; rather, nearly all candidates start campaigns with limited pre-existing support and a strong incentive to quickly increase their perceived viability above that of their competitors.

Buying turnout for campaign events even overshadows standard vote-buying and turnout-buying practices. Turnout buying at the polls is not widespread because mandatory voting laws are enforced and because the low levels of party identification mean that candidates rarely know if they are buying the turnout of their own supporters. Vote buying is not a viable strategy in Peru either. As I showed in chapter three, monitoring vote choices in Peru, whether at the individual or group level, is virtually impossible. On the one hand, the absence of traditional machines means that candidates

lack loyal local brokers and thus cannot reliably monitor choices in the voting booth or even attendance at campaign events. On the other hand, voters' belief in ballot secrecy is robust, meaning that they are invulnerable to the standard threat of taking away valuable selective benefits if they do not support the politician at the polls. Thus, when incumbents use threats to mobilize beneficiaries of social aid programs to their rallies, these campaign clients still decide their vote freely.

But why do politicians distribute material benefits although they lack the organizational structure that could guarantee the direct electoral pay-off of those investments? As demonstrated in chapter four, politicians actively invest in campaign clientelism in Peru precisely *because* they lack stable political organizations. The chapter shows that candidates distribute material incentives in order to attract poor voters at campaign events and to access crucial constituencies. By turning out large numbers of voters, politicians expect to demonstrate that they are strong candidates and should, therefore, be seen as serious contenders for election. Both candidates and political operators interviewed recognized this key point. During focus group discussions, poor voters also said that politicians distribute goods as a "hook," to attract large numbers of people "for the picture." In addition, experimental evidence confirms that other things being equal, Peruvian voters do take mobilization at campaign events into account when deciding their vote choices.

Second, as developed in chapter five, buying turnout at rallies and campaign events also provides politicians with captive audiences towards whom they can target their influence strategies. While attending campaign events, poor voters gather several types of relevant information. They learn about specific proposals that may benefit them, especially the provision of club goods that their communities are promised. They also get to know the candidates' personal traits and they witness their peers' reactions to the

candidacies. To make their electoral choices, voters compare and contrast these types of information. Some voters even meet, debate, and collectively decide which candidate is the best electoral option for their communities. Thus, turnout clients learn about the candidates' proposals and traits and rank viable candidates according to their preferences. In addition, personally interacting with candidates allows poor voters to devise mechanisms to assess candidate credibility and help ensure they deliver on their promises.

In sum, this dissertation demonstrates the importance of early investments in electoral clientelism during campaigns. Politicians devote resources and time to electoral clientelism in spite of a lack of established political organizations because turnout buying *indirectly* affects electoral choices. What are the broader implications of these findings for comparative politics? How do they inform our understanding of the relations between politicians and the poor? What do they add to existing debates in the party literature? Does this subtype of electoral clientelism affect the quality of democracy? Can these findings be generalized to settings with more established political organizations? In the rest of this chapter, I focus on these theoretical issues. I divide this discussion in two sections. First, I present the theoretical contributions of my theory for different topics in comparative politics. Subsequently, I show that the informational theory has implications for and can be generalized to areas where organized partisan machines exist.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

My theory informs broader theoretical debates in comparative politics. In the following subsections, I discuss the implications of my theory for the general literature on electoral clientelism as well as debates about political parties, the relation between media and campaigns, and the effects of clientelism on the quality of democracy.

Contributions to the Literature on Clientelism and Political Parties

My dissertation pinpoints several limitations in extant theories of electoral clientelism and addresses many of those issues. First, existing approaches have exaggerated the importance of monitoring and of the logistical contributions of established networks. For the informational theory, however, political organization is not a necessary condition for electoral clientelism, or a prerequisite for politicians to make efficient electoral investments. Certainly, established networks are important for sustaining relational clientelism (long-term clientelistic relations). But they do not need to be present for more sporadic political exchanges to take place. This theoretical revision is an important one. It implies changing the focus of the causal effect of interest. Rather than assuming that the effect of distributing material benefits on electoral choices is principally a direct one, as conventional approaches do, my informational theory emphasizes, instead, the powerful *indirect* effects that material investments during campaigns generate. Once indirect causal effects are taken into account, the puzzle of having clientelistic distribution without political organization vanishes.

The recent wave of literature on political clientelism in comparative politics focuses so singularly on the mechanics of targeting and voter compliance that theories sometimes isolate clientelistic exchanges from the broader context of political competition for office. For instance, leading work, assumes that a single dominant incumbent buys votes or turnout at the polls (Stokes 2005, 2007; Dunning and Stokes 2007; Stokes et al. 2011; Nichter 2008, 2010; Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter 2009).[152] I instead show that candidates compete, partly, through turnout buying. They use it to convey several types of information both to the general public and to turnout buying clients themselves. Competition under uncertainty is, indeed, at the core of my

[152] Finan and Schechter (2009) and Zarazaga (2011) are important exceptions.

informational theory. Moreover, as my empirical research demonstrates, campaign turnout buying is a strategy of mobilization accessible to most candidates as long as they are able to gather the necessary financial resources. By explicitly theorizing political competition, my informational theory explains why electoral clientelism can be associated with volatile and competitive political contexts. Dominant machines immune to competition do exist, but they are far from being the modal case of clientelistic relations under democracy. Indeed, researchers have documented the coexistence of widespread distribution of material benefits during campaigns in various countries outside of Latin America that lack institutionalized party systems, such as Kenya, Malawi, and Zambia (Van de Walle 2007, Banégas 2011, Kramon 2011).

Moreover, I put campaigns at the center of my theory of clientelism and electoral competition. My approach theorizes electoral clientelism as a complex game that takes place *throughout* the campaign and that affects not just vote choices but the dynamics of the race itself. Campaigns in contexts without organized parties are more volatile and uncertain than in more institutionalized political contexts. Voters face a greater number of candidates and have less prior information about them than voters would in institutionalized party systems. The fortunes of candidates can thus fluctuate considerably during campaigns and politicians know it. Turnout buying strategies are devised precisely to manipulate public perceptions and thus be able to influence the campaign's dynamics.

While focusing on the tactics of elites, the informational approach also emphasizes the strategic logic of citizens during campaigns. In making their electoral choices, clients not only compare the benefits they receive relative to their political preferences, but as we know from Duverger (1954) and Cox (1997), they also weigh the changing electoral prospects of contending candidates. In contrast, most formal models of political clientelism assume that voters vote sincerely-–that is, they do not weigh their

utilities by the probability that the parties will win.[153] As Nichter points out, most contemporary studies of vote buying in the discipline, including his previous work, stress the strategic nature of voters but model *only* the tactics of politicians (Nichter 2009). My informational theory, by contrast, takes into account strategic voting.

A third issue addressed in this dissertation is how politicians assure loyalty at the polls. Existing approaches of electoral clientelism differ in the micro-level mechanisms they propose: fear of punishment (Brusco et al. 2004; Stokes 2005; Chandra 2007; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Nichter 2008a; Nichter 2010a; Dunning and Stokes 2007), reciprocity (Gouldner 1960; Lemarchand and Legg 1972; Scott 1972; Auyero 2001; Schaffer 2007a; Wang and Kurzman 2007; Finan and Schechter 2009; Lawson and Greene 2011), and alignment of interests (Magaloni, Díaz-Cayeros, and Estévez 2007; Díaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and Estévez, 2007; Oliveros 2012; Zarazaga 2012). However, all of these theorists assume that, in one way or another, consolidated organizational networks or long-term clientelistic relations are important in assuring that clients fulfill their commitments at the polls.

But how do politicians influence vote choices with electoral investments if they do not have established machines? Extant theories fall short of providing a convincing answer to this question. My informational theory explicitly addresses it: by focusing on the indirect effects of turnout buying at campaign events, this theory highlights the importance of influencing voters while campaigning also *through non-clientelistic means*. Without stable attachments, voters are highly opportunistic, and politicians are fully aware of this opportunism. Therefore, after buying participation at campaign events, they need to convince turnout clients to support them at the polls. To be able to influence

[153] See, for instance, Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter 2009; Nichter 2008, 2010; Zarazaga 2011.

voters—even with promises of a future delivery of club and clientelistic goods—candidates need to build credibility first (Kramon 2011). And they do so while campaigning. The candidates' personal characteristics and their interaction with voters at campaign events is what helps them build credibility and influence indifferent voters. As Auyero (2001) has suggested, the *way* politicians distribute the handouts and the way they relate with turnout clients matter. Hence, from this perspective, influence is not just a function of the material benefits received.

Finally, why do politicians in some contexts, such as Peru, not invest more in building longer standing political organizations? Why have new parties (or machines) not been able to consolidate two decades after the traditional party system collapsed? My dissertation provides some clues regarding why parties may not be *re-built* in competitive regimes where parties are weak or nonexistent. The overlooked clientelistic tactic of buying voter turnout at campaign events requires little organizational capacity but can profoundly influence the electoral behavior of political actors (donors, benefit-seeking activists, and voters). It is very easy for amateur politicians to improvise electioneering structures that deal with the problems that partisan organizational structures used to solve during campaigns. The availability of these organizational substitutes may explain the delay in the construction or reconstruction of organized parties (Hale 2006; Zavaleta 2012). Such organizational substitutes might be particularly attractive in countries with widespread poverty and inchoate parties, such as Kenya, Malawi, or Zambia, since candidates may benefit more from investing in campaign clientelism than engaging in party building.[154]

[154] See, for example, Kramon's (2011) description of electoral clientelism in Kenya and Banégas's (2011) analysis of Benin.

Besides engaging with the party literature, my theory also informs the contemporary debate about media and campaigns. The following section examines this debate and shows how my theory reconciles conflicting positions.

MEDIA AND CAMPAIGNS

Since the advent of the use of mass media in elections, many political scientists have predicted the decline of traditional campaigning. Door to door canvassing, rallies, and other forms of interpersonal contact during campaigns were expected to be progressively replaced by communication through mass media (Norris 2000: 179). Moreover, some scholars have argued that the media also threatens mass political parties. They pointed out that, being increasingly dependent on the media, Western countries were experiencing the rise of "parties without partisans"; that is, of institutions with diminishing organizational capacity to reach people on the ground during campaigns (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). This process of increasing dependence of political institutions on the media was called the "mediatization" of politics (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999).

However, these academics have exaggerated the level of "mediatization". As early as the 1970s, Wolfinger demonstrated that political machines had not withered away in the United States. Machine politics' precinct work was still widespread and visible, particularly in low-salience elections such as state and local contests or party primaries (Wolfinger 1972). Moreover, recent research reaffirms the importance of social communications and close contact, even in environments sometimes characterized as highly penetrated by the mass media. For instance, experimental studies have shown that partisan mobilization efforts (Get out the Vote operations), including door-to-door canvassing, are still important in American campaigns. These studies find that GOTV

efforts affect turnout levels at the polls (Shaw 2006; Green and Gerber 2008). In addition, Nielsen's recent study of congressional campaigns has confirmed that personalized interaction (face-to-face communication about politics) during campaigns is very important in the United States today (Nielsen 2012). In his own words, the mass media:

> have not crowded out everything else nor put an end to the development of older practices of communication. Campaigns need to spread the word, and they cannot rely on 'the media' alone to do it, no matter how much they massage reporters or how many thirty-second television spots they buy. There is simply too much content out there, too little attention being paid. Hence, campaigns develop what political operatives called a 'layered' approach. They rely not only on advertisements and news coverage but also on direct mail, digital marketing, and field operations. (Nielsen 2012: 17)

In addition to confirming the continuing importance of electioneering despite the rise of media politics and polling, my informational theory provides an explanation as to *why* street campaigning did not fade away even in contexts without consolidated political organizations. As in the past in Latin America, when candidates had to mobilize partisans and sympathizers to the plazas to demonstrate electoral strength, my dissertation confirms that *visual* demonstrations of strength still matter in the region. Particularly in low organization settings, characterized by electoral volatility, head counting is still a powerful cue to assess appeal and electoral viability. Moreover, my informational theory contends that street politics and media politics complement each other, as the media can *amplify* the effects of turnout buying. Indeed, political marketing and traditional campaigning have more intersections than commonly thought. For instance, Cánepa and Málaga (2011) examine the cultural content of spots and propaganda of the last election in Cusco (Peru) held in 2010. They find that many of the spots and videos they analyze actually use the candidates' performance at campaign activities to produce a culturally

and politically appealing message. Through campaign turnout buying, therefore, political marketing meets street politics.

In summary, traditional campaigning is still an important part of present day electoral contests. Street mobilization is a particularly effective way of persuading voters of a candidate's electoral viability, especially in contexts lacking stable political organizations as well as in low-salience elections. Indeed, street mobilization may be even more relevant in Latin America today, given the increasing number of authorities elected since decentralization processes took place. While scholars have emphasized the increasing importance of televised campaigns in contemporary Latin America (Weyland 2001; Mazzoleni, Stewart, and Horsfield 2003; Boas 2005; Boas 2010), the simultaneous persistence and relevance of rallies and campaign events has also been recently stressed (De la Torre 2006; Szwarcberg 2009, 2012). This trend does not come as a surprise given that different strategies of political communication coexist and complement each other in the region.

In addition to its theoretical relevance, the informational theory also has normative implications. The next section discusses the implications of my theory for democracy.

QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY

> They [politicians] have money but no organization. (Víctor Villa, political operator, Cusco, May 25, 2010).

If electoral clientelism works as my informational theory contends, it may be less problematic for democratic accountability than scholars have suggested. Some scholars have pointed out that clientelism should not necessarily be seen as a diminished form of political linkage: relational clientelism implies bonds of accountability and

responsiveness between patrons and clients. Clientelism can, in fact, be a mechanism that the underprivileged use for securing regular access to state benefits in the absence of welfare states (Weingrod 1968; Powell 1970; Archer 1990; Kitschelt 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Zarazaga 2012). Nonetheless, the consensus in the existing literature of electoral clientelism is that it has profoundly negative implications for the way democracy works (Hicken 2011: 302). From this conventional perspective, clientelism is viewed as a relationship based on political *subordination* in which a voter exchanges part of his or her political rights for material benefits (Weingrod 1968; Powell 1970; Scott 1969; 1972; Graziano 1973).[155] Even if clientelistic relations are viewed as legitimate and normal by a broker's followers, clientelistic networks reproduce domination and inequality (Auyero 2000: 75; 2001).

In vote buying models, the political right that is exchanged is assumed to be the vote (Stokes 2005; 2007b).[156] The machine induces voter compliance by monitoring clients and threatening them with punishment. In other words, clients abide by the agreement because they fear losing particularistic benefits. Alternative models emphasize that clients vote for the machine out of gratitude. In either case, however, "a person whose vote is purchased for an individualized payment is, for all practical purposes, lost to the process of collective deliberation, mandate making, and retrospective evaluations of governments." (Stokes 2007b: 90)[157]

This dissertation has demonstrated, however, that the model of clientelism Stokes refers to does not work in contexts lacking solid political organizations. In such settings

[155] See also Fox (1994: 153).
[156] Other theories identify other political rights that are potentially restricted by clientelistic conditionality, such as the right to associational autonomy (Fox 1994).
[157] As Nichter points out, Stokes's (2005) influential model assumes that the machine rewards citizens for voting *against* their electoral preferences (Nichter 2010: 3).

citizens do sell their participation in campaign events but decide whether to support the buyers with their votes according to their tactical preferences. Indeed, as I have shown, poor voters portray themselves as pragmatic citizens and not frightened and submissive clients. Thus, although campaign clientelism still raises some normative concerns--voters *can* be misled when public perceptions of electoral prospects are manipulated by turnout buyers--clients are not passive citizens subject to perverse accountability.

Thus, campaign turnout buying clients are not diminished citizens—they do evaluate and express their electoral preferences and they do engage in public deliberation. In the informational model politicians still need to convince clients to support them at the polls. By participating in campaign events clients are informed and this information helps them form their electoral preferences. They do so taking into consideration other participants' reactions and preferences. Many clients, in fact, explicitly discuss the desirability of different candidates with their peers before deciding their vote choices. Moreover, as my research shows, campaign clients can retrospectively evaluate their governments and thus hold unresponsive ones accountable at the polls. In fact, information generated through turnout buying can help strategic voters coordinate their electoral choices and vote out unpopular incumbents.

In a context without stable and organized political affiliations, however, turnout buying at campaign events cannot prevent other negative outcomes for the quality of democracy. First, while retrospective evaluations are plausible and commonly employed, most campaign turnout buying clients do not enter stable clientelistic relations after campaigns are over. Consequently, most poor voters do not get the regular clientelistic good and services and governmental responsiveness that voters in long-term clientelistic relationship sometimes enjoy (Scott 1976, Kitschelt 2000, Auyero 2001, Zarazaga 2012).

Second, in the absence of organizational infrastructure, campaign clientelism may skew electoral politics towards the wealthier even more than where long-lasting clienteslitic relations exist. Campaign clientelism could raise the financial barriers to entry to becoming a viable candidate since one needs to have enough resources to distribute goods at campaign events. To be able to buy turnout from the initial stages of the campaign onward, candidates need to be well-off or have close connections to wealthy people. Organizations have historically allowed for the rise of individually less well-off people into elected positions, like was the case with communist and social democratic parties in Europe (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) and labor-mobilizing parties in Latin America (Roberts 2002; Burgess and Levitsky 2003), as well as the left-wing parties that organized and mobilized the poor during the late 1970s and 1980s in Peru (Cameron 1994; Stokes 1995; Dietz 1998; Tanaka 1998).

The lack of organized parties to cover campaign expenses for either media ads or clientelistic rallies makes it difficult for poorer people to get elected, unless they "sell their soul" to better-off donors. Several interviewees who were politically active in the 1980s complain about this fact. The increase of participation of businessmen in politics during the last decade (Muñoz 2010; Muñoz and García 2011; Zavaleta 2012; Levitsky forthcoming) is not coincidental. The main difficulty that dirigentes from poor neighborhoods confront when competing for office is the lack of resources.[158] As Washington Román, union leader and former candidate for Cusco's regional president comments, the last elections have been won principally by "businessmen with money

[158] Personal interview with political operator Víctor Raúl Tomaylla (Cusco, May 23, 2010); union leader and former candidate Washington Román (Cusco, May 17, 2010); former candidate Sergio Sullca (Cusco, December 15, 2010)

who utilize dirigentes".[159] Without political parties, the monetization of politics reaches its highest peak.

Finally, while citizens are able to vote out unresponsive incumbents, they cannot prevent the entrenchment of diffused corruption at multiple levels of government in this context of high and non-institutionalized political competition (Tanaka 2005c). As shown in chapter three, without stable political organizations that lengthen politicians' time horizons, plain, exploitative corruption is widespread. After gaining office, most politicians do not build long-term clientelistic linkages but they extract resources for personal gain. The main goal of politicians is to maximize the immediate extraction of resources rather than implementing desired policies. Businesses are pretty aware of this, so they try to position themselves better in future negotiations by generously supporting viable candidates during the campaign season. These strategic donations often translate into corruption. Consequently, elected officials end up being more accountable to campaign donors than to clients. Thus, although voters are not submissive subordinates accountable to patrons in this country without political organizations, most voters are not the principals in these political relationships either.

Until now I have discussed different theoretical and normative implications of my informational theory in contexts with low political organization. But how generalizable are my findings? Do the informational effects of electoral clientelism operate only in unorganized contexts? And, if these effects also operate in organized settings, how do politicians' strategies differ? The last section addresses these questions by showing that the informational theory can also help explain electoral clientelism in more organized political settings, although the strategies will vary.

[159] Personal interview. Cusco, May 17, 2010.

THE INDIRECT EFFECTS OF ELECTORAL CLIENTELISM IN CONTEXTS WITH CONSOLIDATED CLIENTELISTIC MACHINES

By analyzing the indirect effects of electoral clientelism, my informational theory provides a more precise understanding of an electoral strategy widely used in developing countries. From this new perspective, electoral clientelism is more than just a marginal vote-getting strategy: it is a *campaigning* tool. By generating and transmitting valuable information, electoral clientelism influences not just clients but also politicians and the broader electorate.

What would this new approach expect to observe in an organized political context? While the way in which campaign clientelism is conducted surely differs in organized contexts, this strategy should produce indirect effects on electoral choices. Turnout at rallies and other public events should still inform strategic actors about the potential electoral strength of candidates *and* local brokers. This information helps them make their electoral choices. In organized settings such as Argentina, there may be more unorganized interstices in politics than prevailing approaches are willing to recognize. Therefore, politicians should have incentives to try to influence unattached poor voters while campaigning.

What nuances should we expect to find in organized political contexts? First, buying unaffiliated voters' participation with goods should be, overall, *less* frequent than in contexts with low political organization, where turnout buying helps politicians improvise organizational structures on the campaign trail. In contrast to what happens in contexts where politicians lack stable links at the local level, most (but not all) of turnout selling clients should be stable machine members. Moreover, in organized contexts, turnout buying organizers will typically be local brokers who are able to monitor clients' attendance at rallies and may do so if it is thought necessary.

Second, in organized contexts turnout buying at campaign events should be essential for signaling candidate viability (but not for influence) during primaries and other sorts of party elections. In these types of elections, partisan preferences are held constant and stable clients have incentives to support their brokers in order to continue receiving benefits. Therefore sheer numbers should matter more as an indicator of candidates' and brokers' power *within* the party. During general elections, in contrast, candidates' partisanship informs voters about their electoral viability.

Third, in general elections turnout buying at campaign events should be crucial for persuading voters but not necessarily for signaling candidate viability. During general elections politicians and brokers have greater incentives to mobilize and influence non-machine poor voters. Given that the party needs to appeal to a wider constituency in order to win, it makes more sense to buy non-machine voters' participation at campaign events and expect that the candidate will be able to influence them in situ. During general elections opposition candidates may also have the chance to use campaign clientelism and try to persuade voters of their electoral desirability.

Finally, in a context with organized machines and political parties, electoral volatility and turnover is lower than in unorganized settings. Politicians will be more likely to follow a partisan political career and political parties should have better chances of getting reelected. Therefore, in organized settings clientelistic resources should be obtained mostly from the state—while campaign clientelism resources come principally from private donors in unorganized contexts.

In the next section, I provide preliminary evidence supporting these theoretical expectations. I focus on Argentina, a case that greatly contrasts with Peru, given the strength of Argentine partisan machines. This case is hence well-suited to explore the generalizability of my theory to organized settings. Fortunately, clientelism has been

intensively studied in Argentina. This body of research (Auyero 2000; Auyero 2001; Levitsky 2003; Calvo and Murillo 2004; Calvo and Murillo 2008; Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes 2004; Stokes 2005; Kemahlioglu 2006; Weitz-Shapiro 2008; Szwarcberg 2009; Zarazaga 2011; Zarazaga 2012; Oliveros 2012; Scherlis Perel 2010) focuses principally, but not exclusively, on different subnational branches of the *Partido Justicialista* (PJ), also known as Peronist Party. The PJ is a well-established machine party that has increased its subnational electoral dominance in Argentina during the last few decades. Although I rely mostly on evidence from the Argentine case, I will also present some results from studies of clientelism in other countries.

Empirical Analysis

The level of consolidation of clientelistic machines in Argentina is not its only difference from Peru. Argentina has also been historically more economically developed than Peru, giving rise to a considerably larger middle class and a bigger and stronger labor force. Although Argentina is plagued by institutional weakness (Levitsky and Murillo 2005), this weakness certainly pales when compared to Peru (Levitsky forthcoming). Certainly, in the 2000s Argentina's oldest mass political party—the *Unión Cívica Radical* (UCR)—collapsed and became, along with other small and newer political parties, electorally irrelevant (Lupu 2011). However, Argentina's whole party system did not collapse like the Peruvian party system. The PJ, a populist party once compared to APRA in terms of its historical trajectory (Collier and Collier 1991), was able to transform and successfully adapt to the neoliberal challenges of the 1980s and 1990s (Levitsky 2003; Burgess and Levitsky 2003). APRA, by contrast, was not that successful in achieving this transformation and was thus unable to stop the party system collapse at the beginning of the 1990s. Moreover, the PJ has become a hegemonic actor

in Argentine politics, with increasingly strong subnational strongholds (Levitsky 2003, Calvo and Murillo 2004; Levitsky and Murillo 2008), whereas APRA has enjoyed only sporadic electoral success and has declined at the subnational level (Vergara 2012). Argentina's confederation of strong Peronist provincial factions stands in sharp contrast to Peru's "democracy without parties". Finally, while the neoliberal status quo has taken root in Peru in spite of the recent Latin American left turn (Meléndez and León 2009; Dargent and Muñoz 2012), Argentina's recent governments have moved the country back toward a more regulated economy.

Despite important differences between Peru and Argentina, the informational logic of campaign clientelism is nevertheless strongly present in Argentina's organized setting. While a good part of the literature on electoral clientelism has focused almost exclusively on Argentine machines as vote buyers, the activities and strategies of local brokers actually go beyond direct vote-getting practices. As Zarazaga rightly points out,

> Scholars and the media have systematically underestimated brokers' most conventional way of gaining votes— by campaigning. … Brokers and their followers cover walls with campaign posters or graffiti and bring people to rallies. How efficient brokers are as propaganda agents defines their relationship with their political bosses. (Zarazaga 2012b: 20)

Indeed, mobilizing clients is part of Argentine local brokers' "usual business." As Auyero (2001) and Szwarcberg (2009) aptly show, besides helping solve their clients' daily problems, *referentes* spend a considerable part of their full-time political job mobilizing their clients to attend political rallies. As Oliveros explains,

> Many low and mid-level positions in the bureaucracy are distributed with the goal of maintaining a network of activists on the ground that performs a number of different political activities, such as helping with electoral campaigns or attending rallies, that are key for getting or keeping electoral support. (Oliveros 2012: 2)

Surprisingly, with the exception of Szwarcberg, scholars do not theorize about the informational effects of attending rallies. As Szwarcberg has persuasively shown, turnout at rallies in Argentina does provide information to strategic actors, both within and outside political machines (Szwarcberg 2009; 2012). First, turnout buying offers information about political competition within partisan machines. Rallies give party brokers and bosses an opportunity to make the number of their followers visible and quantifiable. For instance, political bosses can monitor their brokers' reliability by comparing turnout at rallies and at the polls. These numbers are subsequently used by party members to advance their political careers, negotiating positions, offices, and clientelistic resources.

Second, turnout at rallies also provides information for non-partisans about the incumbent's strength. As Szwarcberg explains:

> By publicly displaying the party's support, rallies encourage or discourage opposition coordination by signaling potential or existing rivals within and outside the party the strength or weakness of the machine. Overcrowded rallies send the opposition a powerful signal that there is not much space for political alternatives, and increase the costs and potential benefits of building a parallel political organization for party members who might be considering leaving the party (Szwarcberg 2012: 6).

Turnout figures can help incumbents diffuse an image of invincibility that will encourage voters, activists, and funders to abandon hopeless opposition candidates (Magaloni 2006: 9; Szwarcberg 2012). However, they can also help the opposition coordinate and vote out incumbents, even when a consolidated clientelistic machine is in power. According to Szwarcberg:

> The rallies organized by the Alianza contributed to coordinating the opposition and assuring voters that it was possible to defeat the PJ in its electoral stronghold: the province of Buenos Aires. Overcrowded rallies provided the Alianza's

> candidate, Graciela Fernández Meijide, the confidence necessary to call voters 'to receive with one hand [welfare programs and goods delivered by the government] and to vote with the other'(Szwarcberg 2012: 14).[160]

In addition, the structure of political networks in Argentina, which are vertically organized around political parties to foster intra-party competition, confirms that networks are important for electoral coordination (Calvo and Murillo 2008: 37). Thus, I can confidently conclude that bought turnout provides strategic actors with information about electoral viability even in contexts with organized machines and parties.

What differences do we find in how electoral clientelism is practiced in Argentina with respect to Peru? First, many of these rallies are organized during non-electoral times to demonstrate support for the local incumbent or receive a party authority in the district. For instance, Auyero (2001) opens his book with a very detailed account of how PJ *punteros* organized the mobilization of their clients to a rally commemorating the birthday of the leader of the Peronist movement in the city of Cóspito (Buenos Aires). This rally, however, was also meant to publicly show support for Cóspito's mayor, who had been recently accused of corruption.

Although Argentine *referentes* mobilize their own clients, they *buy* their attendance at each rally: they distribute minor consumer goods and small amounts of cash to convince voters to come to these rallies (Auyero 2001b; Szwarcberg 2009). Goods serve as selective incentives to assure clients' participation. Brokers buy the participation of individuals by distributing, for example, boxes of food, mattresses, construction materials, school supplies, and T-shirts. As Szwarcberg explains, the exchange of small goods for participation is a common practice in political mobilization in Argentina:

---

[160] *Alianza por el Trabajo, la Justicia y la Educación* was a political coalition formed in 1997 by the UCR and the *Frente País Solidario* (FREPASO). The Alianza won national office in 1999 but was disolved after president Fernando De la Rúa resigned amidst a severe economic crisis in 2001.

> Anyone who stops by at a broker's house or political association (when these two do not overlap) the day of a rally will observe the distribution of free food, construction materials, cleaning products, alcohol, and in some cases even marijuana, to voters in exchange for participation. In addition, one will observe one or more buses, parked in the street ready to pick up and drive voters to attend rallies." (Szwarcberg 2009: 182)

In turn, a client from La Matanza (Gran Buenos Aires) describes this practice in the following way,

> They come to pick us up at home with the bus. The first stop is in San Justo. They make you go to the local political association that belongs to the broker who brought you in, and after taking attendance they give you a pack of cigarettes, a sandwich, and wine. When we get back from the rally, they give you the merchandise [generally a box with cooking and cleaning products]. (Otero 1997: 36; quoted by Szwarcberg 2009: 158)

In contrast to Peru, rallies are organized in Argentina on such a frequent basis that brokers must take some sort of action to assure their clients' participation. So, they provide machine clients, who are already receiving help and some permanent benefits, with additional selective incentives to participate at rallies. Besides distributing minor consumption goods, some brokers alternate the invitations among different clients to try to avoid overwhelming them with requests and tiring them with too much participation,

> 'Did you make the invitations already?', we asked Chana when we were going with her to a partisan event in Florencio Varela. 'Yes, I invited Nely, Justina, and two other neighbors. But the people I am mobilizing today are not the same as the ones I mobilized the day of the electricity project', she clarified. 'I always proceed this way. I alternate invitations to avoid getting people tired.' In the temporal circuit of favors and reciprocal favors, Chana alternates invitations, evaluating who to call in order to ask or require no more and no less than she believes necessary. (Vommaro and Quirós 2011: 76)

Brokers also combine persuasive and coercive tactics to mobilize clients to rallies (Szwarcberg 2009). As already noted, the goal of all these different tactics is to assure a large turnout at public events.

Undoubtedly, Argentine clients and local brokers are not as "free" as Peruvian ones. Argentine clients depend on *referentes* for their *daily* survival, so they cannot unilaterally decide to sell their participation at any political event taking place in the area. There is a tacit rule that guides the broker-client relationship: "when you follow a *referente*, you follow this one and not another; and if, eventually, you want to follow another [to a rally], you have to first rule out the possibility that your broker needs you" (Vommaro and Quirós 2011: 78). "Whereas voter actions inside the ballot box are invisible to brokers, their participation in rallies is not." (Szwarcberg 2009: 125) Local brokers *can* monitor clients' participation by taking attendance at rallies and, thus, credibly threaten them with punishment if they do not show up when expected (Szwarcberg 2009). If a client decides, individually, to participate in another broker's rally, she risks being punished by her patron.

Moreover, while Argentine local brokers and their networks can certainly change their political allegiances, serving different candidates at different campaigns, they cannot be as opportunistic as Peruvian brokers, most of whom do not have a stable network of regular followers. To be able to sustain their networks, Argentine brokers depend on transfers from their political patrons. Therefore, when they negotiate or change patrons, they have to do it carefully. It is more common for brokers to move between bosses belonging to the same partisan 'family of origin' (Scherlis Perel 2010: 252) than it is for them to switch between parties, as in Peru. Indeed, subnational clientelistic networks in Argentina have a higher degree of stability than political networks organized at higher echelons of the state: as long as they continue receiving resources, the brokers' clientelistic networks can easily survive the change of governor or mayor (Scherlis Perel 2010: 230).

Finally, the evidence also shows that Argentine politicians rely much more on state resources to engage in clientelism than Peruvian politicians do. Clientelistic machines in Argentina are usually organized based on the distribution of two types of valuable resources provided mostly from subnational state offices: temporary public jobs and social benefits (Auyero 2001b; Szwarcberg 2009; Scherlis Perel 2010; Zarazaga 2012). Public jobs are particularly important for recruiting local brokers and assuring a stable income for them and their close collaborators. Most local brokers live in the neighborhood they organize and represent. Therefore, they are well informed about people's needs and help them solve their problems on a daily basis. Machine clients, in turn, receive social benefits, such as food aid, unemployment benefits, handouts, medicines, etc., and services on a regular basis. As already explained, in addition to these regular benefits, brokers distribute minor consumer goods and small amounts of cash to convince poor voters to attend their rallies. Politicians use mostly public resources to finance these handouts. In particular, access to municipal resources seems to be crucial in Argentina (Auyero 2001b; Weitz-Shapiro 2008b; Szwarcberg 2009; Oliveros 2012).

Despite these differences, what similarities can we find in how campaign clientelism is carried out in organized and unorganized contexts? First, rallies and other public events are particularly important during campaigns. During elections, *referentes* actively engage in campaigning, for the most part mobilizing their clients to rallies and other campaign events. For example, 73% of the PJ brokers interviewed by Zarazaga said they visited voters' homes during the 2009 legislative election and 64% answered that they organized neighborhood meetings so that voters could meet the candidates (Zarazaga 2012: 20). Szwarcberg studies turnout buying at rallies during the 2005 mid-term election, the 2006 Radical primary, and the 2009 legislative election. She was particularly impressed by the amount of electoral activities that took place in the province

of San Luis during the 2009 election (Szwarcberg 2010: 32). As she remarked, activities "took place not only daily, but also two or three times during the same day. This is yet another indicator of Peronists' incessant and intense campaigning to diffuse their image of invincibility." (Szwarcberg 2010: 32)

Moreover, as expected, mobilizing clientelistic machines is particularly important *during primary elections* in Argentina (Scherlis Perel 2010: 249, Zarazaga 2012) as well as in Paraguay (Transparencia Paraguay and Alter Vida 2005). It is important because there is greater electoral uncertainty in primaries than in general elections (Bartels 1988a). In general elections partisanship plays a bigger role in determining vote choices. During primaries, brokers and their stable clients "generate votes and supervise the process." (Zarazaga 2012: 25). Brokers buy the votes of their followers and also transport them to vote to assure participation (Ibid: 27). They do so because their political career and survival depends on it, as they are evaluated based on the number of people they turn out (Szwarcberg 2009).

Buying poor voters' participation at campaign events is common in other Latin American countries with consolidated party machines as well, such as Mexico (Schedler 2004). In this country, partisan machines also buy turnout during campaigns by distributing goods. As Schedler explains for Mexico:

> The majority of goods that parties distribute during electoral campaigns are minor consumer goods, such as caps, T-shirts or pencils. Invariably, these articles display some type of message. So, besides its practical use, they also have a propaganda-added value. Using such types of promotional items of limited value serves both the donors' and beneficiaries' purposes and accepting them does not create any binding commitment. (Schedler 2004: 77)

In "Mexican," *los acarreados* ("the hauled people") is the equivalent of the Peruvian term, *portátil.* During the last presidential elections several websites denounced and discussed the *acarreados* that Peña Nieto's party, the *Partido Revolucionario*

Institucional (PRI), hauled to campaign events.[161] A similar phenomenon has been observed in Ecuador: politicians mobilize poor *acarreados* to rallies, and these include both voters from established clientelistic networks as well as poor voters who are not part of existing problem-solving networks (De la Torre 2006).

Second, even though campaign mobilization is mostly conducted with machine clients, Argentine brokers also buy the participation of out-of-the-network citizens at rallies; that is, poor voters who do not depend on brokers' benefits in a regular way. Candidates commonly buy participation from organizations that are not affiliated with the machine, such as soccer hooligans and gangs (Auyero 2001; Szwarcberg 2009, 2010: 15-16). Some of the voters mobilized at rallies are on the fringes of the network, waiting their turn to become clients (Auyero 2001, Szwarcberg 2009, Quirós 2006); but they are not regular machine beneficiaries. Thus, even where dominant machines govern there are in fact more unorganized margins in poor neighborhoods than is usually recognized by most scholars studying clientelism.

Brokers buy non-machine voters' participation at rallies both during electoral and non-electoral times. Nevertheless, this practice becomes more common and attractive during general campaigns, when brokers are expected to prove their efficiency at persuading non-affiliated voters to support their candidate (Zarazaga 2012). *Referentes* are especially likely to mobilize unaffiliated voters when they are not able to fulfill their expected turnout quota of buses with regular clients. A broker from La Matanza provided this account:

---

[161] See, for instance, the following notes: http://thinkmexican.tumblr.com/post/24736013907/pri-azteca-stadium-confront-anti-pena-nieto-protest, http://vivirmexico.com/2012/04/acarreados-la-rudimentaria-estrategia-politica-para-buscar-votos, http://www.taringa.net/posts/videos/14996864/Infraganti-PRIistas-Pagando-a-acarreados-Mexico.html.

> For the last time that the President came I gave US $12 or a food handout to each person. They got to pick which one they preferred. I even got some members of the Radical Party in my bus. I just needed to show I could fill a bus. (Cited in Zarazaga 2012: 23)

Thus, turnout size is important even in organized contexts.

Preliminary evidence also indicates that, as expected, buying turnout of non-affiliated voters is more common during general elections. As recent studies have shown, an important part of brokers' activities during general elections includes campaigning and organizing rallies (Szwarcberg 2009; 2012; Oliveros 2012; Zarazaga 2012). Indeed, 86% of the brokers whom Zarazaga interviewed "declared that their bosses gave them far more resources during the general election, and all of them said that brokers in general use material incentives to get votes." (Zarazaga 2012: 28) Moreover, it is important to point out that the quantitative indicator used by scholars to study vote buying in Argentina (Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes 2004; Stokes 2005) actually asks survey respondents only if they received something from a candidate or party during the campaign. What scholars have interpreted as direct vote-getting strategies (vote buying or turnout buying at the polls) may actually be turnout buying at rallies. Of course, more data would be needed to verify this point.

Intuitively, it makes sense that machines buy turnout of non-machine members more frequently during general elections. In these elections, both party bosses and brokers have incentives to reach as many unaffiliated or undecided voters as possible. Given that brokers organize rallies in which voters can get to know the candidate (Szwarcberg 2009; Zarazaga 2012; Oliveros 2012), politicians will have chances to influence non-affiliated voters *in situ*. During primary elections, by contrast, brokers must make sure that militants affiliated with the party turn out and vote for their nominee.

In addition, as explained by Szwarcberg, opposition candidates also engage in turnout buying at campaign events during general elections and sometimes they are even able to coordinate and vote out consolidated machines (Szwarcberg 2012: 14). This looks similar to what happens in Peru. Obviously, opposition candidates will be more effective at buying non-machine members' rather than machine members' participation at campaign events. Recent field experimental studies conducted in São Tomé and Principe (Africa) also confirm that *both* incumbents and political challengers distribute cash and gifts during campaigns. Moreover, these studies also find that, in contexts of incumbent dominance, the challengers benefit electorally *more* from this type of campaign investment, as they are able to counteract the incumbency advantage (Vicente 2007; 2012). This fact provides some additional evidence indicating that competition does increase the overall frequency of turnout buying of unaffiliated poor voters.

Up to here, I have shown that turnout buying at campaign events does take place in Argentina and that referentes mobilize mostly (but not exclusively) established machine clients to attend these public events. They do so because politicians take turnout size into account in evaluating the effectiveness of brokers and because voters use this information to update the perceived viability of candidates during elections. But, how do clients decide their vote intentions in organized contexts? Several authors stress that machine and patronage clients generally have *established* political loyalties in Argentina. According to Auyero, "attendance at rallies provides information about individuals' commitments to brokers (and brokers' commitments to their followers)." (Auyero 2001: 99). These commitments are not forged during the campaign but are the result of long-term interactions in which brokers prove to be useful for solving their clients' daily problems. Turnout buying is, therefore, a practice that reinforces a (meaningful and/or

convenient) *ongoing* patron-client relationship. From this perspective, clients' political loyalties are decided long before the campaign season begins.

Note, however, that these electoral loyalties are *conditional* on the brokers' continuing transfers (Díaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and Estévez, 2007, Zarazaga 2012). To assure voters' loyalty at the polls, Argentine brokers must demonstrate that they are credible and reliable; they have to build and sustain a *reputation* by showing that they deliver on a regular basis and fulfill their promises (Zarazaga 2012). In fact, brokers recognize that "without resources they would sooner or later lose their followers' vote … all of them (120) said that brokers in general use material incentives to get votes." (Zarazaga 2012: 28). Similarly, in the specific case of patronage contracts, public sector employees vote for the machine because they understand that their jobs are tied to the political success of the incumbent: the interests of clients and political bosses are aligned (Oliveros 2012).

Hence, does influence of voters at campaign rallies take place in Argentina? Despite these ongoing and apparently self-enforced commitments, candidates and brokers still employ "persuasive strategies" at rallies with voters in Argentina. For example, they use pronouncements and the charisma of the party's nominee to woo support (Szwarcberg 2009: 126). Auyero, for example, has emphasized the dramaturgical content of rallies, in which candidates and brokers publicly perform as Eva Perón and, therefore, appeal to and reproduce Peronist identities (Auyero 2001: Chapter Four). The efficacy of these persuasive strategies, Szwarcberg clarifies, relies on the ability of brokers and candidates to *convince* clients: "charismatic leaders are able to persuade voters to support them [at the polls] without the need to turn to coercive strategies." (Ibid: 145). According to this author, brokers turn to coercive strategies (monitoring attendance at rallies and

threatening clients with punishment) principally when they have chosen an unpopular nominee for the election:

> Attendance can be taken before, during, and after the rally. Fieldwork notes suggest that brokers who take attendance in all the instances support an unpopular candidate. In taking attendance throughout the rally, brokers might be trying to avoid clients sneaking out. This observation supports the hypothesis that coercive strategies are intensified in cases where there is a mismatch between broker and client preferences. (Szwarcberg 2009: 150) [162]

In addition, we should remember that brokers also mobilize non-machine voters to attend rallies. The politicians' performance at these public gatherings is directed at these constituencies as well since they hope to convince some of these non-affiliated poor voters to support their candidate.

Furthermore, research conducted in Argentina also indicates that poor voters' perceptions about the reliability of brokers vary according to their *position* in the clientelistic network (Auyero 2001, Calvo and Murillo 2008). A quantitative study demonstrates that voters' proximity to partisan networks of activists increases their perceived likelihood of receiving handouts and a public job from the PJ and the *Unión Cívica Radical* (UCR) (Calvo and Murillo 2008: 33-34). In addition, ethnographic studies show that collective representations about clientelism vary according to voters' level of familiarity with the brokers (Auyero 2001). Auyero distinguishes between the brokers' "inner" and "outer" circles (Auyero 2001: 93-94). The broker's inner circle is composed of family members, friends, and close collaborators. In other words, clients in this inner circle have close, personalized relations with the broker. In contrast, the outer circle is

[162] As Szwarcberg notes, formal models of vote buying applied to Argentina (Brusco et al. 2004; Stokes 2005) assume that clients' preferences will always be *different* than those of their brokers. However, empirically, this is not always the case.

constructed through "weak ties" (Granovetter 1983). The broker helps the clients in the outer circle but their contacts are intermittent; clients do not really develop ties of friendship or fictive kinship with him. Consequently:

> Those with less intimate relationships with brokers are able to obtain goods and services when they need them, but they do not always offer loyalty in return. Nevertheless, this outer circle is an important part of the network surrounding the broker. And the distinction between the inner and outer circle is a fluid one, more a product of analysis than of reality. Status (inner vs. outer circle) depends on such factors as amount of resources available, number of brokers competing for electoral posts, and the opportunity structure in local politics. (Auyero 2001: 179)

This variation in the *intensity* of patron-client ties may make a difference for influence. Clients who are closer to brokers will be a great deal more loyal on election day. They do not need to be influenced at campaign events: they show up there to demonstrate their support and gratitude towards their broker. In contrast, clients located in the broker's outer circle may need to be influenced, as Peruvian turnout clients are. Thus, although more data will be necessary to confirm the effectiveness of the influence mechanism in organized settings, the existing evidence suggests that politicians *do* try to influence attendees at rallies, particularly clients in the outer network and non-affiliated participants.

In summary, this comparative section has shown that my informational theory can also inform our understanding of electoral clientelism in contexts with organized parties and machines. Both signaling turnout and influence at campaign events seem to be relevant in Argentina. As the evidence shows, machine brokers buy participation at rallies and other campaign events because turnout provides visible information about the politicians' power and electoral viability. Moreover, local brokers mobilize and work permanently trying to ensure that established machine clients continue supporting them at

the polls. However, politicians' influence skills may be crucial to convince clients in brokers' outer circles to keep supporting their boss' candidate at the polls. Moreover, brokers also mobilize non-machine voters to attend the rallies where they seek to persuade them to support their candidates. Signaling electoral viability is more important during primaries and persuading clients at rallies seem to be more relevant during general elections. While more research is necessary to confirm these preliminary findings, this section does suggest that my informational approach can shed light on clientelistic behavior in organized political contexts.

In conclusion, my informational theory provides a rationale for why politicians buy turnout at campaign events even in contexts with low political organization. This theory informs important debates in comparative politics and can be productively applied to organized political contexts as well. Mobilizing large numbers of people to attend rallies during campaigns will be important as long as strategic actors lack complete electoral information, regardless of the degree of organization in the political system. Therefore, the overall lesson from this dissertation is that a proper understanding of electoral clientelism requires assessing informational dynamics as well as direct vote-getting ones. My research shows that, as in the past, when candidates had to mobilize sympathizers to the streets to demonstrate electoral strength, head counting is still a powerful cue to assess power and electoral viability.

Appendix A: Calvo and Murillo Method

Calvo and Murillo's method relies on recent developments in network analysis to estimate hard to count populations and uncover network structures from individual-level data (McCarty et al. 2001, Zheng, Salganik, and Gelman 2006). This survey methodology relies on interviews consisting of a series of count questions of the general type "How many X's do you know?" Using these count questions as input, Calvo and Murillo's method allows for the indirect measurement of political networks through the simultaneous estimation of each respondent's personal network and their predisposition to establish ties with particular political groups. The advantage of this survey strategy is its ability to retrieve valid samples from populations that are poorly represented among adult voters (in this case, political networks of local intermediaries).

Following Zheng, Salganik, and Gelman (2006), Calvo and Murillo (2008) use a overdispersed Poisson model to estimate three sets of parameters of interest: i) parameters measuring the relative size of the respondent's personal network; ii) parameters measuring the prevalence of different political networks in the population; and iii) parameters that explore individual-level deviations from the estimated personal network and group prevalence. To this end, the instrument asks the respondents to provide counts of groups whose frequency in the population is known (i.e. "How many individuals do you know whose name is *Rosa*?", frequency known in the population from the electoral registry) and counts of groups whose frequencies in the population we seek to estimate (i.e. "How many militants from the Partido Aprista Peruano do you know?").

The information about the known groups (i.e. frequency of people named Rosa in the population) is used as *offset* to estimate a model that measures the size of the respondents' personal networks. Then, in a second stage, these first estimates are used for

estimating the prevalence of political networks in the population. The vector of over-dispersed parameters provide us information about individual-level deviations from the overall group prevalence; that is, the degree to which a respondent knows more individuals (e.g., of party X) than would be expected given her personal network size and group prevalence. In other words, this last set of parameters allows us to measure the relative proximity of respondents to different political groupings.[163]

The Peruvian survey included questions about the following known parameters: the nine most common first names of Peruvian voters in the 2010 electoral registry, and people who were born, married, and passed away during the last year.[164] The items for estimating the networks of interest included questions about the number of militants and candidates of different political groupings as well as questions about the number of public employees of different sorts each survey respondent personally knows. To maximize the chances of getting reliable estimates, the questionnaire included only questions about political parties that, by 2010, were represented in Congress *and* had won the national executive office after 1980. This condition left the following political groups: Acción Popular, APRA, Fujimorismo, and Perú Posible. In addition, the survey included a generic question about the number of candidates and collaborators from regional or local movements the respondent personally knows. This was intended to provide a rough estimate to capture the countless number of regional and local groupings that compete in elections since the collapse of Peru's party system. The estimation was conducted using the statistical program R.

---

[163] For technical details about the estimation procedure see Calvo and Murillo (2008).

[164] Before asking the questions, the interviewer read a text that explained them that "knowing someone" means that the respondent knows someone *personally*, meaning that: that person knows the respondent as well (her name or at least who they are), that the respondent has been in contact with this person during the last two years and that she can contact the person via telephone, email, or in any other way.

Appendix B: Experiment Randomization Balance*

Variable	Group	Operationalization	Obs	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Prob > F (ANOVA)	Prob>chi2**
Female	Low turnout		401	0.491272	0.500548	0	1	0.2821	0.997
	High turnout	Male=0, Female=1	401	0.541147	0.498927	0	1		
	Control		401	0.493766	0.500586	0	1		
Age	Low turnout	18-29=1, 30-44=2, 45+=3	401	2.01995	0.842378	1	3	0.7121	0.651
	High turnout		401	1.972569	0.804205	1	3		
	Control		401	2.002494	0.8231	1	3		
Lima	Low turnout	Lima=1, Interior=0	401	0.366584	0.482473	0	1	0.9348	0.991
	High turnout		401	0.379052	0.485757	0	1		
	Control		401	0.371571	0.483828	0	1		
Rural	Low turnout	Rural=1, Urban=0	401	0.21197	0.409214	0	1	0.6169	0.572
	High turnout		401	0.201995	0.40199	0	1		
	Control		401	0.184539	0.388407	0	1		
Urban Interior	Low turnout	Urban interior=1, Lima and Rural=0	401	0.421446	0.494408	0	1	0.7347	0.988
	High turnout		401	0.418953	0.494004	0	1		
	Control		401	0.44389	0.497462	0	1		

SES	Low turnout	A=1, B=2, C=3, D=4, E=5	401	3.326683	1.010204	1	5	0.6233	0.282
	High turnout	Where A is the highest strata	401	3.371571	1.002043	1	5		
	Control	and E the lowest	401	3.396509	1.076981	1	5		
Indigenous	Low turnout	Indigenous=1, Not indigenous=0	401	0.189526	0.392416	0	1	0.3192	0.167
	High turnout		401	0.15212	0.359586	0	1		
	Control		401	0.184539	0.388407	0	1		
Education	Low turnout		401	5.421446	2.060204	1	10	0.9998	0.573
	High turnout		401	5.42394	2.069982	1	10		
	Control		401	5.421446	2.160889	1	10		

* Unweighted data

**Bartlett's test for equal variances - One-way-ANOVA

The p-values suggest strong balance across the covariates.

Appendix C: Interviews and Focus Groups

INTERVIEWS

Lima

Abugatas, Javier. Professor, PUCP. Former Vice Minister of Finance. September 18, 2009.

Acurio Velarde, Gastón. Former senator, AP. Lima, April 20, 2010.

Alcazar, Lorena. Expert in public policy; senior researcher, GRADE. Lima, June 9, 2010.

Alva Orlandini, Luis. Former deputy, senator, congressman, minister, AP. Lima, April 7, 2010.

Anonymous political operator, Fujimorismo. February, 17, 2010.

Arizabal, Hernando. Former member of the National Intelligence Service during the Transition Government (2000-2001). Lima, August 3, 2010.

Armas Vela, Carlos. Former congressman, APRA. Lima, March 8, 2010.

Ballón, Eduardo. Expert in regional politics, DESCO. Party member of Vanguardia Revolucionaria in Piura during the 1980s. Lima, July 6, 2010.

Barreda, Javier. Member of the Political Committee, APRA. Lima, September 6, 2012.

Barreda, Santiago. Party member, APRA. Lima, June 9, 2009.

Blondet, Cecilia. Former Minister of Women and Development; Executive Director of Proética. Lima, November 6, 2010.

Caballero, Victor. Head of PRONAA during the Toledo administration. October 23, 2009.

Caceres Velazquez, Roger. Former deputy, senator, and congressman, Frente Nacional de Trabajadores y Campesinos (FRENATRACA). March 23, 2010

Chavez, Martha. Congresswoman, Fujimorismo. Lima, April 16, 2010.

Contreras, Carlos. Professor, Pontifica Universidad Católica del Perú.

Du Bois, Fritz. Director of Perú21, daily newspaper. Lima, August 13, 2009.

Fort, Ricardo. Development expert; associate researcher, GRADE. Lima, April 14, 2010.

Francke, Pedro. Social policy expert. Head of FONCODES during the Toledo administration. Lima, April 6, 2010.

Gómez, Jorge. San Martín de Porras (Lima) councilman. Lima, June 16, 2011.

Gonzales de Olarte, Efrain. Professor, PUCP; regional economy specialist. Lima, July 14, 2009.

Grandez, Felix. Technical Secretary, Mesa de Concertación Para la Lucha Contra la Pobreza. Lima, April 27, 2010.

Guerra Garcia, Francisco. Former member of the Democracia Cristiana party. March 12, 2010.

Hinojosa, Iván. Professor, PUCP. Worked in the Centro Bartolomé de las Casas (CBC) in Cusco during the 1980s. Lima, November 6, 2009.

Huber, Ludwig. Researcher, IEP. Lima, October 15, 2009.

Hume, María Jesús. Viceminister of commerce in the 1980s. October 30, 2009.

Illescas, Javier. World Bank - Peru. July 22, 2009.

Kouri, Alex. Former Regional President of Callao, Chim Pum Callao regional movement. Lima, January 10, 2010.

Lombardi, Guido. Journalist and former congressman. August 5, 2012.

Losada, Carmen. Former congresswoman, Fujimorismo. Lima, April 8, 2010.

Lucioni, Guido. Candidate for congressman, Fujimorismo. Lima February 5, 2010.

Matta, Walter. Teacher, former reform committee at the Ministry of Education. Lima, April 20, 2010.

Medina, Percy. Technical Secretary, Asociación Civil Transparencia. Lima, April 13 and April 30, 2010.

Monge, Carlos. Expert in decentralization and regional politics. October 12, 2009.

Monteagudo, Manuel. Official, Banco Central de Reserva. July 3, 2009.

Pajuelo, Ramón. Researcher, IEP; former associate researcher at the CBC, Cusco. Lima, April 9, 2010.

Pedraza, Magno. Former political operator in Northern Lima. Lima, June 13, 2010.

Pollarolo, Pierina. Specialist in public employment. September 30, 2009.

Prieto, Janette. Former Oxapampa (Junín) mayor, Somos Perú Party. Lima, October 10, 2009.

Quiñones, Nilton. Budget specialist, Mesa de Concertación Para la Lucha Contra la Pobreza. Lima, April 30, 2010.

Remy, Marisa. Researcher, IEP; expert in local politics; worked at the Centro de Investigación y Promocion del Campesinado (CIPCA) in Piura during the 1990s. Lima, October 30, 2009.

Roca, Carlos. Former deputy and mayoral candidate for Lima, APRA. April, 6, 2010.

Rocha, Blanca. Former deputy, AP. Lima, March 23, 2010.

Romero, Jhon. Politician, APRA. Lima, June 10, 2009.

Roncagliolo, Rafael. Executive Director, International Idea - Peru. October 14, 2009.

Sanborn, Cynthia. Professor, Universidad del Pacífico. October, 14, 2009.

Tanaka, Martin. Professor PUCP; researcher IEP. Lima, September 29, 2009.

Távara, Jose. Former mayor of Carabayllo district (Lima), Izquierda Unida. March 2, 2010.

Tejada, David. Politician, Partido Nacionalista del Peruano (PNP). Lima, October 7, 2009.

Torres, Javier. Director, Asociación Servicios Educativos Rurales (SER); specialist in electoral education. October 22, 2009.

Torres, Marcos. Political operator and congressional adviser, Fujimorismo. Lima, February 5, 2010.

Trivelli, Carolina. Researcher, IEP. October 16, 2009.

Ugarte, Mayen. Professor PUCP; public administration specialist. July 15, 2009.

Vásquez, Absalón. Political operator and former Minister of Agriculture, Fujimorismo. Lima, December 12, 2012.

Vasquez, Enrique. Professor, Universidad del Pacífico. Chief of PRONAA during Fujimori's first term. October, 19, 2009.

Velorio, Gloria. Former District Coordinator, PRONAA. Lima, August, 10, 2010.

Webb, Richard. Researcher, Instituto del Perú, Universidad San Martín de Porres. June 8, 2009.

Cusco

Alatriste, Germán. Party member, APRA. May, 23, 2010.

Aldazábal, José. Political operator and councilman of Santiago district. Cusco, September 6, 2010.

Anonymous political operator; former member of Puka Llacta Party who worked for Fujimori. Cusco, August 2 and September 1, 2010.

Ayala, Fernando. Official, Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales (ONPE) - Cusco. Cusco, May 21, 2010.

Azpur, Javier. Expert in regional politics, Grupo Propuesta Ciudadana. Worked in Arariwa in Cusco during the 1990s. November 10, 2009.

Berríos, Marleni. Officer, World Vision - Pachacutec Office. Cusco, December 17, 2010.

Bornza, Sarina. Coordinator Transparencia - Cusco. Cusco, May 12, 2010.

Campana, Silvio. Ombudsman Representative. Cusco, May 24, 2010.

Carrillo, Carlos. Journalist, Radio Programas del Perú (RPP) corresponsal. Cusco, September 6, 2010.

Carrión Astete, Mario. Journalist; conductor of "La Jornada Informativa" TV show, Channel 35. Cusco, August 27, 2010.

Chacón, Carlos. Former mayor of Cusco (1986-1989); independent who ran for APRA. Lima, April 16, 2010.

Chávez, Rubén. Official, World Vission - Huancaro. Cusco, December 20, 2010.

Chevarría, Franz. Candidate for mayor, APRA. Cusco, August 27, 2010.

Choque, Miguel. Legal representative, PNP. Councilman of San Sebastián municipality. Cusco, May 19 and 20, 2010.

Coa, Gabriela. School of Gobernability, Centro Guamán Poma y Ayala. Cusco, December 22, 2010.

Coa, Rubén. General Secretary and candidate for Congress, PNP. Former councilman of Espinar province. Cusco, May 25, September 4, December 18 2010.

Del Carpio, Anibal. Politician, Fuerza 2011. Former congressman and President of CTAR Cusco. May 25, 2010.

Delgado, Alberto. Former Coordinator, Mesa de Lucha Contra la Pobreza - Cusco. Cusco, May 13, 2010.

Delgado, Oliver. Journalist and media political operator; advised William Cuzmar, Qosqollay's mayoral candidate for Cusco. Cusco, September 1, 2010.

Eliorreta, Igor. Expert in local government, Centro Guamán Poma y Ayala. Cusco, September 7, 2010.

Estrada, Aldo. Legal representative, Regional Movement PAN. Cusco, December 20, 2010.

Fernández Baca, Inés. Director COINCIDE. Former Coordinator Mesa de Concertación Para la Lucha Contra la Pobreza. Cusco, May 19, 2010.

Figuero, Serly. Councilwoman of Cusco. Candidate for reelection, PAPA. Cusco, December 21, 2010.

Florez Ochoca, Jorge. Anthropologist, Universidad San Cristóbal Abad del Cusco. May 14, 2010.

Fuentes, Juan. Political operator and adviser to Wanchaq mayor (Qosqollay movement). Former adviser of mayor Daniel Estrada of Cusco. Cusco, September 6, 2010.

García, Alexander. Former Coordinator of the Glass of Milk Program (Cusco Municipality). Cusco, December 21, 2010.

Gatica, Admundo. Political operator, Fujimorismo. Cusco, September 6, 2010.

Gutiérrez Samanez, Julio. Former councilman of Santiago district, IU. Cusco, May 24, 2010.

Hancco, Ricardo. Candidate for councilman of Santiago, Tierra y Libertad. Former councilman of Santiago (IU). Cusco, September 7, 2010.

Huamán, Marco Antonio. Candidate for councilman of Cusco, Tierra y Libertad; President of the Northeast Defense Front. Cusco, September 7, 2010.

Huañac, María Luisa. Political operator, Norwest Cusco, APRA. Cusco, August 27, 2010.

Huilca, Flor. Former journalist, La República - Gran Sur. Lima, April 29, 2010.

Huillca, Carlos. Candidate for councilman of Santiago, Tierra y Libertad. Cusco, May 13, 2010.

Mamani, Adolfo. Political operator working for Tierra y Libertad. Cusco, August 31, 2010.

Mamani, Efraín. Member of Autogobierno Ayllu regional movement. Cusco, December 16, 2010.

Marín, Henry. Journalist and media political operator. Cusco, Septmber 2, 2010.

Martorell, Mario. Adviser to Cusco's mayor. Former aprista; former congressional and mayoral candidate. Cusco, May 17, 2010.

Members of the Pata Pata Producers Association, San Jerónimo. Cusco, May 17, 2010.

Mendoza, Juan. Former member of Vanguardia Revolucionaria in Cusco. November 9, 2009.

Molero, Rubén. Councilman of Cusco; candidate for reelection, PAPA. Cusco, September 1, 2010.

Monzón, Dora. State Attorney for Corruption Cases. Cusco, September 6, 2010.

Moscoso, Carlos. Candidate for mayor of Cusco, Fuerza Cusco local movement. Cusco, December 18, 2010.

Nieto Degregori, Luis. Centro Guamán Poma y Ayala. Cusco, May 22, 2010.

Noa, Víctor Raúl. President of the Agrarian League of Santiago. Cusco, December 22, 2010.

Oporto, Delia. Organization Coordinator, Fuerza 2011 (Fujimorismo). Cusco, May 19, 2010.

Paredes, Carlos. Former member of Vanguardia Revolucionaria (later Partido Unificado Mariateguista – PUM) in Cusco. Lima, November 7, 2009 and August 13, 2010.

Pasapera, Marco. Regional Coordinator, ONPE - Cusco. Cusco, May 24, 2010.

Peralta, Rosario. Women Affairs Secretary, Partido Humanista. Cusco, May 17, 2010.

Pezo, Ricardo. Candidate for councilman of Santiago, Patria Arriba Perú Adelante (PAPA) regional movement. Cusco, September 2, 2010.

Pino, Vidal. Former member of IU and adviser to Cusco's mayor Daniel Estrada. Cusco, December 21, 2010.

Polo y La Borda, Jorge. Historian, Universidad San Cristóbal Abad del Cusco. May 14, 2010.

Quispe, Felipe. Member of the Agrarian League of Santiago. Cusco, December 22, 2010.

Román, Washington. Journalist and union leader. Former candidate for regional president. Cusco, May 17, 2010.

Romero, Roberto. Adviser to Cusco's mayor. Former party member of Patria. Cusco, August 27 and December 17, 2010.

Rozas, Rolando. Political operator, PNP. Cusco, September 3, 2010.

Rozas, Wilber. Candidate for regional president, Tierra y Libertad regional movement. Former mayor of Anta province. Cusco, May 24, 2010.

Salcedo, Víctor. Journalist, La República - Gran Sur newspaper. Cusco, September 1, 2010.

Saloma, Adolfo. Politician, Movimiento Nueva de Izquierda (Patria Roja). Former President of Cusco's Regional Assembly (1990-1992). Cusco, May 20, 2010.

Saucedo, Elena. Community Advisor for Huancaro; member of the Central de Organizaciones de Mujeres del distrito de Santiago (CODEMUSA). Cusco, May 17, 2010.

Sicus, Julia. Peasant Communities' representative to Cusco's Community Council. Cusco, December 20, 2010.

Sullca, Sergio. Candidate for mayor of Santiago, Tierra y Libertad regional movement. Cusco, May 25, August 25, and December 12, 2010.

Tomaylla, Víctor Raúl. Secretary of Organization Cusco and candidate for mayor of Wanchaq, APRA. May 23, 2010.

Valcárcel Villegas, Alberto. Candidate for mayor of Urubamba province, AP. Urubamba, August 30, 2010.

Valcárcel, Jorge. Political operator. Political adviser to candidate Máximo San Román, PAN regional movement. Cusco, December 19, 2010.

Valencia Miranda, Carlos. Candidate for regional president, Fuerza 2011. Former mayor of Cusco, Vamos Vecino. Cusco, May 20, 2010.

Vargas, Robert. Coordinator of the "Voto Informado" Program in Cusco, Jurado Nacional de Elecciones. Cusco, May 13, 2010.

Verano, Wilfredo. Political operator in Santiago district, working for Qosqollay. Cusco, September 7, 2010.

Vilca Ochoa, Danilo. Provincial Secretary, Unión Por el Perú. Cusco, May 20, 2010.

Villa, Pablo. Secretary, Pata Pata Producers Association, San Jerónimo. Cusco, May 24 and December 17, 2010.

Villa, Víctor. Political operator. Founder of Maíz Movement, former aprista. Cusco, August 31, 2010.

Villanueva, Armando. Former candidate to Congress and regional president, AP. May 14, 2010.

Wilfredo, Teresa. Local Governments Program, CBC. Cusco, May 18, 2010.

Zeisser, Marco. Director of CBC. Cusco, May 18, 2010.

Piura

Aguilar Hidalgo, Juan. Former Coordinator of Transparencia - Piura; Coordinator, Coordinadora Rural. July 19, 2010.

Albirena, Luis. Gobernability Program, CIPCA. Piura, July 20, 2010.

Albuquerque, Manuel. Local Governments Program, CIPCA. Piura, July 21, 2010.

Atkins, Javier. Candidate for regional president, Unidos Construyendo. Piura, July 7, 2011.

Bayona, Robespierre. Deputy for Piura (1985-1990), IU-PUM. Piura, July, 23, 2010.

Bejarano, Jaime. APRA militant. General Secretary of AAHH La Florida Neighborhood Council. Piura, November 23, 2010.

Bustamente, Cecilia. Coordinator Mesa de Lucha Contra la Pobreza - Piura. July 22, 2010.

Calle, Alex. Political operator, APRA. Assistant of congressman Jhony Peralta in Piura. November, 15, 2010.

Castillo Navarrete, Juan. Former mayor of Canchaque (Huancabamba), APRA. September 26, 2010.

Castillo, Juan. Political operator and adviser to congressman for Piura Jhony Peralta (APRA). Lima, July 9, 2010.

Chasquero, Francisca. APRA, General Secretary of Ciudad del Niño Local Committee. Piura, November 25, 2010.

Chávez, Flor de María. Expert in gender and social policy. Piura, November 17, 2010.

Chumacero, Alberto. Secretary of Organization in Piura, APRA. November 23 and 24, 2010.

Coronado, Kelly. Candidate for councilwoman of Piura, APRA. General Secretary of Los Olivos local committee. Piura, September 28, 2010.

Correa, Humberto. Economist; adviser of Piura's Regional Government. Piura, July 22, 2010.

de Jo, Maruja. Former Coordinator, Mesa de Lucha Contra la Pobreza - Piura. July 20, 2010.

Diez, Alejandro. Anthropologist; specialist in Piura. Professor, PUCP. Lima, June, 15, 2010.

Farfán, Rocío. Journalist, Cutivalú Radio. Piura, July 22, 2010.

Fernández, Jhon. Journalist, Cutivalú Radio. July 11, 2011.

Fuentes, Francisco. General Secretary of AAHH San Sebastián Neighborhood Council. Piura, November 23, 2010.

Galecio, Miguel. Regional councilman, Obras+Obras. Piura, November 23, 2010.

García Santillán, Roberto. Campaign Coordinator for the Northwest of Piura city, Unidos Construyendo. October 2 and November 23, 2010.

García, Flor. Activist, Unidos Construyendo. General Secretary of Los Sauces Neighborhood Council. Piura, October, 2, 2010.

Guevara, Lili. Journalist, El Tiempo newspaper. Piura, November 20, 2010 and July 7, 2011.

Gulman Checa, Luis. Candiate for regional president of Piura, Obras+Obras regional movement. July 20, 2010.

Gutiérrez, Rolando. Councilman of Piura, Obras+Obras. Piura, November 23, 2010.

Helguero, Luz María. Director of El Tiempo newspaper and former candidate to Congress for Piura. July 22, 2010.

Huamanchumo, Mariano. Political operator. July 21, 2010.

Loja, Luis. Political operator. Assistant of congressswoman Marisol Espinoza (PNP) in Piura. Piura, July 19 and September 27, 2010.

Luna Vargas, Andrés. Candidate to congress for Piura, PNP. Senator (1985-1990) for IU - PUM. Piura, September 22, 2010.

Miñán, Daniel. Obras+Obras activist, AAHH El Rosal. Piura, November 23, 2010.

Miranda, Karina. Journalist, La Hora newspaper. Piura, July 22, 2010.

Mora, Inuñán. General Secretary of AAHH El Rosal Neighborhood Council. Piura, November 23, 2010.

More, José. Mayor of Catacaos and candidate for councilman of Piura, Obras+Obras. Piura, September 18, 2010.

Mulatillo, Segundo. Political operator, Obras+Obras. Piura, November 25, 2010.

Muro, Gregoria. Political operator, Unidos Construyendo. Piura, July 23, 2010.

Nakasaki, Carlos. Councilman for Piura, Obras+Obras. Piura, November 16, 2010.

Ortiz Granda, Luis Alberto. Candidate for regional vicepresident of Piura, APRA. Piura, July 26, 2010.

Parrilla, Abraham. Political operator working for Unidos Construyendo in the 2010 regional election. July 26, September 23 and November 17, 2010.

Patiño, Ramiro. Former Coordinator of Transparencia - Piura. Piura, July 23, 2010.

Paz, Telmo. Adviser to congresswoman for Piura Fabiola Morales (Unidad Nacional). Lima, July 2, 2010.

Peña, Óscar. Obras+Obras activist, AAHH La Molina. Piura, November 23, 2010.

Pinday, Mari. Political operator. Piura, November 26, 2010.

Pulache, Joel. General Secretary of Antonio Raymondi local committee, APRA. October 2, 2010.

Revesz, Bruno. Expert in rural development in Piura, CIPCA. Lima, July 16, 2010.

Rodríguez, Elizabeth. Political operator. Piura, July 24, 2010 and June 7, 2011.

Ruíz, Maximiliano. Candidate for regional vicepresident of Piura, Unidos Construyendo. Former mayor of Morropón. Piura, July 20 and November 17, 2010; July 7, 2011.

Saavedra, María. Resident of AAHH La Florida, Northwest Piura. Piura, November 20, 2010.

Saldarriaga, José. Unidos Construyendo activist, Northwest Piura. Piura, November 23, 2010.

Sueiro, Ernesto. Expert in rural development. Member of Vanguardia Revolucionaria during the 1980s in Piura. Lima, July 12, 2010.

Talledo, Miguel. Legal representative, APRA. July 23 and November 17, 2010.

Tinoco, Nancy. Obras+Obras activist, AAHH Los Algarrobos. Piura, November 23, 2010.

Toro, Humberto. Politician. Former candidate to congress. Member of PUM. Piura, September 23, 2010.

Tume Ruesta, César. Political operator, APRA. Piura, November 26, 2010.

Urbina, Rodrigo. Political operator. Former member of the Movimiento Institucional Revolucionario (MIR). Piura, July 23 and November 15, 2010.

Ventura, Gamaniel. Political operator working for Unidos Construyendo in the 2010 regional election. July 26, 2010.

Vílchez, José Guillermo. President of the Producers Association of Cura Mori. Piura, November 17, 2010.

Vilela, Ana Lilian. Adviser to congresswoman for Piura Marisol Espinoza (PNP). Lima, July, 2, 2010.

Zapata, Nardi. APRA, General Secretary of López Albújar Local Committee. November 25, 2010.

Zapata, Vicente. Member of the Civic Committee, Bank Employees Federation neighborhood. Piura, July 25, 2010.

Zárate, Gloria. Member of Transparencia - Piura. Piura, September 22, 2010.

Zegarra, Miguel. Coordinator of Transparencia - Piura; Program Coordinator, CIPCA. Piura, July 19, 2010.

Puno

Flores, Gustavo. Fujimorismo candidate and former congressman. Puno, June 10, 2010.

Herquinio, Luz. Ombudsman Representative. Puno, June 12, 2010.

Nuñez, Jorge. Political operator working for Reforma Regional Andina, Integración, Participación Económica y Social Puno (RAICES-PUN) regional movement in the 2010 subnational election. Puno, June 12, 2010.

Valdivia, Miguel. Political operator, Partido Democrático Regional (PDR) regional movement. Former activist of the Partido Unificado Mariateguista (PUM). Puno, June 10, 2010.

FOCUS GROUPS

Cusco

1. Female voters. APV Camino Real. Cusco, July 22, 2011.
2. Female voters. APV Pueblo Nuevo - Huancaro, Santiago. Cusco, July 23, 2011.
3. Male voters. APV Villa Primavera - Huancaro, Santiago. Usco, July 23, 2011.
4. Female voters. Rural Cusco. Cusco, Centro Bartolomé de las Casas, August 15, 2011.
5. Male voters. Rural Cusco. Cusco, Centro Bartolomé de las Casas, August 18, 2011.
6. Female voters. Glass of Milk Committee, Picol Community, San Jerónimo. Cusco, September 3, 2011.
7. Female voters. Sucso Auccaylle Community, San Jerónimo. Cusco, September 4, 2011.
8. Male voters. Ocoruro Community, Province of Anta. Cusco, September 8, 2011.
9. Voters. Compone Community, Province of Anta. Cusco, September 8, 2011.
10. Female voters. Ocollompampa Community, San Jerónimo. Cusco, September 11, 2011.

Piura

1. Female voters. AAHH Los Polvorines. Piura, July 9, 2011.
2. Female voters. AAHH El Indio, Castilla. Piura, July 10, 2011.
3. Male voters. AAHH Los Polvorines. Piura, July 11, 2011.
4. Male voters. AAHH El Indio, Castilla. Piura, July 11, 2011.
5. Female voters. Bellavista, Sullana. Piura, August 7, 2011.
6. Male voters. Bellavista, Sullana. Piura. August 7, 2011.
7. Female voters. Alamor village, Lancones, Sullana. Piura, August 1, 2011.
8. Young voters. Jibito village, Sullana. Piura, August 5, 2011.
9. Male voters. Jibito village, Miguel Checa, Sullana. Piura, August 6, 2011.
10. Female voters. Jibito village, Miguel Checa, Sullana. Piura, August 6, 2011.

References

Abramson, Paul R., John H. Aldrich, André Blais, Matthew Diamond, Abraham Diskin, Indridi H. Indridason, Daniel J. Lee, and Renan Levine. 2010. "Comparing Strategic Voting Under FPTP and PR." *Comparative Political Studies* 43 (1) (January): 61 –90. doi:10.1177/0010414009341717.

Alberti, Giorgio, and Fernando Fuenzalida. 1969. "Pluralismo, Dominación y Personalidad." In *Dominación y Cambios En El Perú Rural*, edited by José Matos Mar et al., 285-324, Lima, Perú: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, IEP. http://archivo.iep.pe/textos/DDT/dominacioycambiosenelperurural.pdf

Alcázar, Lorena. 2007. "¿Por Qué No Funcionan Los Programas Alimentarios y Nutricionales En El Perú? Riesgos y Oportunidades Para Su Reforma." In *Investigación, Políticas y Desarrollo En El Perú*, edited by Grupo de Análisis para el Desarrollo,185–234. Lima: GRADE. http://www.grade.org.pe/upload/publicaciones/archivo/download/pubs/Libros/InvPolitDesarr.pdf#page=180.

Alcázar, Lorena, José Roberto López, and Erik Wachtenheim. 2003. "Las Pérdidas En El Camino. Fugas En El Gasto Público: Transferencias Municipales, Vaso De Leche y Sector Educación." http://www.grade.org.pe/upload/publicaciones/archivo/download/pubs/LA-perdidas%20en%20el%20camino.pdf.

Ansión, Juan, Alejandro Dierz, and Luis Mujica, ed. 2000. *Autoridad En Espacios Locales. Una Mirada Desde La Antropología.* Lima: Fondo Editorial PUCP.

Archer, Ronald P. 1990a. *The Transition from Traditional to Broker Clientelism in Colombia: Political Stability and Social Unrest*. Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame, Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies.

Arellano, Javier. 2008. "Resurgimiento Minero En Perú: ¿una Versión Moderna De Una Vieja Maldición?" *Colombia Internacional* 67 (January-June): 60–83.

Asamblea Nacional de Gobiernos Regionales. 2012. "Informe Anual Del Proceso De Descentralización 2011. Informe Presentado a La Comisión De Descentralización, Regionalización, Gobiernos Locales y Modernización De La Gestión Del Estado Del Congreso De La República." Lima: ANGR.

Auyero, Javier. 2000. “The Logic of Clientelism in Argentina: An Ethnographic Account.” *Latin American Research Review* 35 (3): 55–81.

———. 2001. *Poor People’s Politics: Peronist Survival Networks and the Legacy of Evita*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Baker, Andy, Barry Ames, and Lucio R. Rennó. 2006. “Social Context and Campaign Volatility in New Democracies: Networks and Neighborhoods in Brazil’s 2002 Elections.” *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (2) (April): 382–399. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00190.x.

Banégas, Richard. 2011. “Clientelismo Electoral y Subjetivación Política En África. Reflexiones a Partir Del Caso De Benín.” *Desacatos. Revista De Antropología Social* 36 (Mayo-Agosto): 33–48.

Bartels, Larry M. 1988. *Presidential Primaries and the Dynamics of Public Choice*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.

Berelson, Bernard, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee. 1954. *Voting: a Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Berger, Peter L., and Thomas Luckmann. 1967. *The Social Construction of Reality: a Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*, edited by Anchor books. Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday.

Blondet, Cecilia. 2004. “Los Comedores Populares: 25 Años De Historia.” In *Cucharas En Alto. Del Asistencialismo Al Desarrollo Local: Fortaleciendo La Participación De Las Mujeres,* edited by Cecilia Blondet and Carolina Trivelli. Sociología y Política 39. Lima: IEP.

Boas, Taylor C. 2005. “Television and Neopopulism in Latin America: Media Effects in Brazil and Peru.” *Latin American Research Review* 40 (2): 27–49. doi:10.1353/lar.2005.0019.

———. 2010. “Varieties of Electioneering: Success Contagion and Presidential Campaigns in Latin America.” *World Politics* 62 (4): 636–675.

Boesten, Jelke. 2010. *Intersecting Inequalities: Women and Social Policy in Peru, 1990-2000*. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Boix, Carles. 1999. “Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies.” *The American Political Science Review* 93 (3) (September): 609–624. doi:10.2307/2585577.

Bourricaud, Francois. 1966. “Structure and Function of the Peruvian Oligarchy.” *Studies in Comparative International Development* 2 (2) (February): 17. doi:Article.

Brusco, Valeria, Marcelo Nazareno, and Susan C. Stokes. 2004. “Vote Buying in Argentina.” *Latin American Research Review* 39 (2) (January): 66–88. doi:10.2307/1555401.

Burgess, Katrina, and Steven Levitsky. 2003. “Explaining Populist Party Adaptation in Latin America Environmental and Organizational Determinants of Party Change in Argentina, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela.” *Comparative Political Studies* 36 (8) (October): 881–911. doi:10.1177/0010414003256112.

Burt, Jo-Marie. 2007. *Political Violence and the Authoritarian State in Peru: Silencing Civil Society*. 1st ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Calvo, Ernesto, and María Victoria Murillo. 2004. “Who Delivers? Partisan Clients in the Argentine Electoral Market.” *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (4) (October): 742–757. doi:10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00099.x.

Calvo, Ernesto, and María Victoria Murillo. 2008. “When Parties Meet Voters: Partisan Networks and Distributive Expectations in Argentina and Chile.” Paper presented at the 2008 Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 28-31, Boston, Massachusetts.

Cameron, Maxwell A. 1994. *Democracy and Authoritarianism in Peru: Political Coalitions and Social Change*. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Campbell, Angus, Philip Converse, Donald Stokes, and Warren Miller. 1960. *The American Voter*. Edited by University of Michigan. New York: Wiley.

Cánepa, Gisela, and Ximena Málaga. 2011. “Marketing Electoral: El Uso De Viejos y Nuevos Repertorios Culturales En Busca De La Representatividad Política. El Caso Del Cusco En Las Elecciones De 2010.” In *Perú Debate. El Nuevo Poder En Las Regiones. Análisis De Las Elecciones Regionales y Municipales 2010*, 29–39. Lima: Departamento de Ciencias Sociales - PUCP.

Carrión, Julio, ed. 2006. *The Fujimori Legacy: The Rise of Electoral Authoritarianism in Peru*. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Chandra, Kanchan. 2004. *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Headcounts in India*. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2007. "Counting Heads: a Theory of Voter and Elite Behavior in Patronage Democracies." In *Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*, edited by Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson, 84–109. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Chhibber, Pradeep, and Irfan Nooruddin. 2004. "Do Party Systems Count? The Number of Parties and Government Performance in the Indian States." *Comparative Political Studies* 37 (2) (March): 152–187. doi:10.1177/0010414003260981.

Chubb, Judith. 1981. "The Social Bases of an Urban Political Machine: The Case of Palermo." *Political Science Quarterly* 96 (1) (April): 107–125. doi:10.2307/2149679.

Cicero, Quintus Tullius. 2012. "Campaign Tips From Cicero." *Foreign Affairs*, May 1. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137527/quintus-tullius-cicero-and-james-carville/campaign-tips-from-cicero?page=2.

Collier, Ruth Berins, and David Collier. 1991. *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.

Conaghan, Catherine M. 2005. *Fujimori's Peru: Deception in the Public Sphere*. Pitt Latin American Series. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Contreras, Carlos. 2002. "El Centralismo Peruano En Su Perspectiva Histórica". Lima: IEP.

Converse, Philip E. 1964. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics." In *Ideology and Discontent,* edited by David E. Apter, New York, NY: Free Press.

Córdova, Beatriz, and José Incio. 2012. "La Ventaja Del Incumbente En El Ámbito Subnacional: Un Análisis De Las Dos Últimas Elecciones Municipales En Perú." Manuscript.

Coronel, José, Carlos Iván Degregori, and Ponciano Del Pino. 1998. "Gobierno, Ciudadanía y Democracia: Una Perspectiva Regional." In *El Perú De Fujimori:*

1990-1998, edited by John Crabtree and James J. Thomas, 437–465. Lima, Perú: Universidad del Pacífico/IEP.

Cotler, Julio. 1967. "The Mechanics of Internal Domination and Social Change in Peru." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 3 (12) (December): 229–246. doi:Article.

———. 1969. "Actuales Pautas De Cambio En La Sociedad Rural Del Perú." In *Dominación y Cambios En El Perú Rural*, edited by José Matos Mar et al., 60-79, Lima, Perú: IEP.

———. 1978. *Clases, Estado y Nación En El Perú*. 1. ed. Perú Problema ; 17. Lima: IEP.

Cotler, Julio, and Romeo Grompone. 2000. *El Fujimorismo: Ascenso y Caída De Un Régimen Autoritario*. 1. ed. Serie Indeología y Política 15. Lima: IEP.

Cox, Gary W. 1997. *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*. Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2007. "Swing Voters, Core Voters and Distributive Politics." http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=45865.

———. 2009. "Authoritarian Elections and Leadership Succession, 1975-2004". American Political Science Association 2009 Annual Meeting. Toronto, Canada. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1449034.

Cox, Gary W., and Morgan Kousser. 1981. "Turnout and Rural Corruption: New York as a Test Case." *American Journal of Political Science* 25 (4) (November): 646.

Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1986. "Electoral Politics as a Redistributive Game." *The Journal of Politics* 48 (2) (May): 370–389. doi:10.2307/2131098.

Cyr, Jennifer. 2012. "Collapse to Comeback? Explaining the Fates of Political Parties in Latin America". Ph.D. Dissertation, Chicago: Northwestern University, Department of Political Science.

Dalton, Russell J., and Martin P. Wattenberg, ed. 2000. *Parties Without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Comparative Politics. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.

Dargent, Eduardo. 2012. “Technocracy Under Democracy: Assessing the Political Autonomy of Experts in Latin America”. Ph.D. Dissertation, Austin: The University of Texas at Austin, Department of Government.

Dargent, Eduardo, and Paula Muñoz. 2011. “Democracy Against Parties? Party System Deinstitutionalization in Colombia.” *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 3 (2): 43–71.

———. 2012. “Perú 2011: Continuidades y Cambios En La Política Sin Partidos.” *Revista De Ciencia Política (Santiago)* 32 (1) (January): 245–268. doi:10.4067/S0718-090X2012000100013.

De la Torre, Carlos. 2006. “Escenificaciones, Redes y Discursos En La Segunda Vuelta Electoral.” *Ecuador Debate* (69): 37–50.

Desposato, Scott W. 2007. “How Does Vote Buying Shape the Legislative Arena?” In *Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying*, edited by Frederic Charles Schaffer, 101-121, Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Díaz-Cayeros, Alberto, Beatriz Magaloni, and Federico Estevez,. 2007. “Strategies of Vote Buying: Social Transfers, Democracy and Welfare in Mexico.” Manuscript.

Dietz, Henry A. 1998. *Urban Poverty, Political Participation, and the State: Lima, 1970-1990*. Pitt Latin American Series. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Dixit, Avinash, and John Londregan. 1996. “The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics.” *The Journal of Politics* 58 (4) (November): 1132–1155. doi:10.2307/2960152.

Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper.

Dunning, Thad, and Susan Stokes. 2007. “Persuasion vs. Mobilization”. Paper Prepared for the Conference on Elections and Distribution Held at Yale University, October 25-26, New Haven, Connecticut.

Duverger, Maurice. 1954. *Political Parties, Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*. London, New York: Methuen; Wiley.

Eisenstadt, S. N, and Luis Roniger. 1984. *Patrons, Clients, and Friends: Interpersonal Relations and the Structure of Trust in Society*. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge University Press.

Fenno, Richard F. 1996. *Senators on the Campaign Trail: The Politics of Representation*. Julian J. Rothbaum Distinguished Lecture Series v. 6. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Finan, Federico, and Laura Schechter. 2009. "Vote-Buying and Reciprocity." http://ipl.econ.duke.edu/bread/papers/working/214.pdf.

Fox, Jonathan. 1994. "The Difficult Transition from Clientelism to Citizenship: Lessons from Mexico." *World Politics* 46 (2) (January): 151–184. doi:10.2307/2950671.

Fuenzalida, Fernando. 1971. "Poder, Etnia y Estratificación Social En El Perú." In *Perú: Hoy*, edited by Fernando Fuenzalida et al., 86-174, México D.F.: Siglo XXI.

Gans-Morse, Jordan, Sebastián Mazzuca, and Simeon Nichter. 2009. "Who Gets Bought? Vote Buying, Turnout Buying, and Other Strategies". Working Paper 2009-0006, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/node/4767.

Gay, Robert. 1990. "Community Organization and Clientelistic Politics in Contemporary Brazil: A Case Study from Suburban Rio De Janeiro." *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 14 (4) (December): 648–666.

Gerber, Alan S., James G. Gimpel, Donald P. Green, and Daron R. Shaw. 2011. "How Large and Long-Lasting Are the Persuasive Effects of Televised Campaign Ads? Results from a Randomized Field Experiment." *American Political Science Review* 105 (01): 135–150. doi:10.1017/S000305541000047X.

Goffman, Erving. 1959. *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*. Doubleday Anchor Books A174. Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday.

González-Ocantos, Ezequiel, Chad Kiewiet de Jonge, Carlos Meléndez, Javier Osorio, and David W Nickerson. 2012. "Vote Buying and Social Desirability Bias: Experimental Evidence from Nicaragua." *American Journal of Political Science* 56 (1): 202–217. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00540.x.

González Ocantos, Ezequiel, Chad Kiewiet de Jonge, and David W. Nickerson. 2011. "The Conditionality of Vote Buying Norms: Experimental Evidence from Latin America." Manuscript.

Gouldner, Alvin W. 1960. "The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement." *American Sociological Review* 25 (2) (April): 161–178. doi:10.2307/2092623.

Graham, Carol. 1991. “The APRA Government and the Urban Poor: The PAIT Programme in Lima’s Pueblos Jovenes.” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 23 (1) (February): 91–130. doi:10.2307/157535.

———. 1992. *Peru’s APRA: Parties, Politics, and the Elusive Quest for Democracy*. Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers.

Graham, Carol, and Cheikh Kane. 1998. “Opportunistic Government or Sustaining Reform? Electoral Trends and Public-Expenditure Patterns in Peru, 1990-1995.” *Latin American Research Review* 33 (1) (January): 67–104.

De Gramont, Diane B. 2010. “Leaving Lima Behind? The Victory and Evolution of Regional Parties in Peru”. Thesis, Harvard College.

Granovetter, Mark. 1983. “The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited.” *Sociological Theory* 1: 201–233. doi:10.2307/202051.

Graziano, Luigi. 1973. “Patron-Client Relationships in Southern Italy.” *European Journal of Political Research* 1 (1) (April): 3–34. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.1973.tb01281.x.

Green, Donald P., and Alan S. Gerber. 2008. *Get Out the Vote: How to Increase Voter Turnout*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Grompone, Romeo. 2000. “Al Día Siguiente: El Fujimorismo Como Proyecto Inconcluso De Transformación Política y Social.” In , 1. ed, 77–174. Serie Indeología y Política 15. Lima: IEP.

Grupo Propuesta Ciudadana. 2007. “Vigilancia Del Proceso De Descentralización. Reporte Nacional N^{o} 11 – Balance 2003-2006”. Lima: GPC.

Grzymala-Busse, Anna. 2008. “Beyond Clientelism.” *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (4-5) (April): 638 –673. doi:10.1177/0010414007313118.

Guasti, Laura. 1977. “Peru: Clientelism and Internal Control.” In *Friends, Followers, and Factions. A Reader in Political Clientelism*, 422–438. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press.

Gutiérrez Sanín, Francisco. 2007. *Lo Que El Viento Se Llevó?: Los Partidos Políticos Y La Democracia En Colombia, 1958-2002*. 1. ed. Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma.

Hale, Henry E. 2006. *Why Not Parties in Russia? Democray, Federalism, and the State*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hawkins, Kirk A, and Guillermo Rosas. 2006. “Social Spending in Chávez’s Venezuela.” Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA, January.

Heckelman, Jac C. 1998. “Bribing Voters Without Verification.” *The Social Science Journal* 35 (3): 435–443. doi:16/S0362-3319(98)90010-6.

Hicken, Allen. 2007. “How Do Rules and Institutions Encourage Vote Buying?” In *Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying*, edited by Frederic Charles Schaffer, 47–60. Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

———. 2011. “Clientelism.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 14 (1): 289–310. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.031908.220508.

Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. http://ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/login?url=http://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb.04043.

Huckfeldt, Robert, and John Sprague. 1987. “Networks in Context: The Social Flow of Political Information.” *The American Political Science Review* 81 (4) (December): 1197. doi:10.2307/1962585.

Keefer, Philip. 2007. “Clientelism, Credibility, and the Policy Choices of Young Democracies.” *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (4) (October): 804–821. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00282.x.

Kemahlioglu, Ozge. 2006. “When the Agent Becomes the Boss: The Politics of Public Employment in Argentina and Turkey”. Ph.D. Dissertation, United States -- New York: Columbia University.

King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.

Kitschelt, Herbert. 2000. “Linkages Between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities.” *Comparative Political Studies* 33 (6-7): 845 –879. doi:10.1177/001041400003300607.

———. 2007. “The Demise of Clientelism in Affluent Capitalist Democracies.” In *Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*, edited by Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson, 298–321. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Kitschelt, Herbert, and Daniel Kselman. 2011. "Organizational Extensiveness and Political Clientelism: The Formal and Informal 'Ties That Bind'". Paper prepared for presentation at the Workshop on Democratic Accountability Strategies, Duke University, May 18-19, Durham NC.

Kitschelt, Herbert, and Arturas Rozenas. 2011. "Contingent Exchange and Contractual Opportunism: Making Clientelistic Relationships Work." Paper prepared for presentation at the Workshop on Democratic Accountability Strategies, Duke University, May 18-19, Durham NC.

Kitschelt, Herbert, and Steven Wilkinson, eds. 2007. *Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Kitschelt, Herbert, and Steven Wilkinson. 2007. "Citizen-politician Linkages: An Introduction." In *Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*, edited by Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson, 1–49. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Kramon, Eric. 2011. "Vote Buying and the Credibility of Clientelistic Appeals Experimental Evidence from Kenya." Paper Prepared for Delivery at the 2011 Midwest Political Science Association Meeting, March 31- April 3,Chicago, Illinois.

Krishna, Anirudh. 2007. "Politics in the Middle: Mediating Relationships Between the Citizens and the State in Rural North India." In *Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*, edited by Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson, 141–158. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Lago, Ignacio. 2008. "Rational Expectations or Heuristics?" *Party Politics* 14 (1) (January): 31 –49. doi:10.1177/1354068807083822.

Lavine, Howard, and Thomas Gschwend. 2007. "Issues, Party and Character: The Moderating Role of Ideological Thinking on Candidate Evaluation." *British Journal of Political Science* 37 (1) (January): 139–163. doi:10.1017/S0007123407000075.

Lawson, Chappell, and Kenneth F. Greene. 2011. "Reciprocity and Self-Enforcing Clientelism." Manuscript.

Lawson, Chappell, and James A. McCann. 2005. "Television News, Mexico's 2000 Elections and Media Effects in Emerging Democracies." *British Journal of Political Science* 35 (1) (January): 1–30.

Lemarchand, Rene, and Keith Legg. 1972. "Political Clientelism and Development: A Preliminary Analysis." *Comparative Politics* 4 (2) (January): 149–178. doi:10.2307/421508.

Levitsky, Steven. forthcoming. "Peru: Challenges of a Democracy Without Parties." In *Constructing Democratic Governance*, edited by Michael Shifter and Jorge Dominguez, 4th ed., Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

———. 2003. *Transforming Labor-based Parties in Latin America: Argentine Peronism in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge, U.K. ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Levitsky, Steven, and Max Cameron. 2003. "Democracy Without Parties? Political Parties and Regime Change in Fujimori's Peru." *Latin American Politics and Society* 45 (3) (September): 1–33.

Levitsky, Steven, and María Victoria Murillo, eds. 2005. *Argentine Democracy: The Politics of Institutional Weakness*. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Levitsky, Steven, and María Victoria Murillo. 2008. "Argentina: From Kirchner to Kirchner." *Journal of Democracy* 19 (2): 16–30.

Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan Way. 2002. "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism." *Journal of Democracy* 13 (2) (April): 51–65.

Lindbeck, Assar, and Jörgen W. Weibull. 1987. "Balanced-Budget Redistribution as the Outcome of Political Competition." *Public Choice* 52 (3) (January): 273–297.

Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Stein Rokkan. 1967. *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-national Perspectives*. International Yearbook of Political Behavior Research v. 7. New York: Free Press.

Lohmann, Susanne. 1994. "The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-91." *World Politics* 47 (1) (October): 42–101. doi:10.2307/2950679.

López, Sinesio. 1997. *Ciudadanos Reales e Imaginarios: Concepciones, Desarrollo y Mapas De La Ciudadanía En El Perú*. Lima, Perú: Instituto de Diálogo y Propuestas.

Lowenthal, Abraham F., ed. 1975. *The Peruvian Experiment: Continuity and Change Under Military Rule*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.

Lupia, Arthur, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1998. *The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know?* Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions. Cambridge, U.K. ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Luskin, Robert C. 1987. "Measuring Political Sophistication." *American Journal of Political Science* 31 (4) (November): 856–899. doi:10.2307/2111227.

Lyne, Mona M. 2007. "Rethinking Economics and Institutions: The Voter's Dilemma and Democratic Accountability." In *Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*, edited by Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson, 159–181. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico*. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Leiden: Cambridge University Press.

Magaloni, Beatriz, Alberto Díaz-Cayeros, and Federico Estévez. 2007. "Clientelism and Portafolio Diversification: A Model of Electoral Investment with Applications to Mexico." In *Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*, edited by Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson, 182–205. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Mahler, Matthew. 2011. "The Day Before Election Day." *Ethnography* 12 (2) (June): 149–173. doi:10.1177/1466138110392470.

Marcus-Delgado, Jane, and Martín Tanaka. 2001. *Lecciones Del Final Del Fujimorismo: La Legitimidad Presidencial y La Acción Política*. 1. ed. Colección Mínima 47. Lima: IEP.

Mazzoleni, Gianpietro, and Winfried Schulz. 1999. "'Mediatization' of Politics: A Challenge for Democracy?" *Political Communication* 16 (3): 247–261. doi:10.1080/105846099198613.

Mazzoleni, Gianpietro, Julianne Stewart, and Bruce Horsfield, ed. 2003. *The Media and Neo-populism: a Contemporary Comparative Analysis*. Praeger Series in Political Communication. Westport, Conn: Praeger.

McCarty, Christopher, Peter D. Killworth, H. Russell Bernard, Eugene C. Johnsen, and Gene A. Shelley. 2001. "Comparing Two Methods for Estimating Network Size." *Human Organization* 60 (1) (March): 28–39.

McKelvey, Richard D, and Peter C Ordeshook. 1985. “Elections with Limited Information: A Fulfilled Expectations Model Using Contemporaneous Poll and Endorsement Data as Information Sources.” *Journal of Economic Theory* 36 (1) (June): 55–85. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(85)90079-1.

Mead, George Herbert. 1947. *Mind, Self & Society from the Stand-point of a Social Behaviorist*. Chicago: Univ. of Chic. Press.

Meléndez, Carlos, and Carlos León. 2009. “Perú 2008: El Juego De Ajedrez De La Gobernabilidad En Partidas Simultaneas.” *Revista De Ciencia Política* 29 (2).

Menéndez-Carrión, Amparo. 1985. *Clientelismo Electoral Y Barriadas: Perspectivas De Análisis*. Lima, Perú: IEP.

Morgan, Hannah. 2011. *Bankrupt Representation and Party System Collapse*. University Park, Pa: Penn State University Press.

Moser, Robert G. 2001. *Unexpected Outcomes: Electoral Systems, Political Parties, and Representation in Russia*. Pitt Series in Russian and East European Studies. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Moser, Robert G., and Ethan Scheiner. 2009. “Strategic Voting in Established and New Democracies: Ticket Splitting in Mixed-member Electoral Systems.” *Electoral Studies* 28 (1) (March): 51–61. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2008.06.011.

Hicken, Allen. 2007. “How Do Rules and Institutions Encourage Vote Buying?” In *Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying*, edited by Frederic Charles Schaffer, 47–60. Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Muñoz, Paula. 2005. *El diseño institucional municipal 1980-2004 y sus implicancias para las zonas rurales*. Lima: Asociación Servicios Educativos Rurales (SER).

———. 2007. “La Incertidumbre De La Política Regional. Estudio Sobre La Articulación Entre El Gobierno Regional y Los Gobiernos Locales De Puno (2003-2007)”. Puno: SER. ´http://www.scribd.com/doc/93070447/La-Incertidumbre-de-La-Politica-Regional-Puno.

———. 2010. “¿Consistencia Política Regional o Frágiles Alianzas Electorales?” *Argumentos* 3 (Julio). http://revistargumentos.org.pe/index.php?fp_cont=950.

Muñoz, Paula, and Andrea García. 2011. “Balance De Las Elecciones Regionales 2010: Tendencias, Particularidades y Perfil De Los Candidatos Más Exitosos.” In *El Nuevo Poder En Las Regiones. Análisis De Las Elecciones Regionales y Municipales 2010*, 8–17. Lima: Departamento de Ciencias Sociales - PUCP.

Murakami, Yusuke. 2007. *Perú En La Era Del Chino: La Política No Institucionalizada y El Pueblo En Busca De Un Salvador*. 1. ed. Serie Ideología y Política 27. Lima: IEP.

Nichter, Simeon. 2008. "Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot." *American Political Science Review* 102 (01). doi:10.1017/S0003055408080106.

———. 2009. "Declared Choice: Citizen Strategies and Dual Commitment Problems in Clientelism." *SSRN eLibrary* (September 5). http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1449058.

———. 2010. "Politics and Poverty: Electoral Clientelism in Latin America". Ph.D. Dissertation, Berkeley: University of California, Department of Political Science.

Nielsen, Rasmus Kleis. 2012. *Ground Wars: Personalized Communication in Political Campaigns*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. http://www.UTXA.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=829587.

Norris, Pippa. 2000. *A Virtuous Circle: Political Communications in Postindustrial Societies*. Communication, Society, and Politics. Cambridge, UK ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Oliveros, Virginia. 2012. "Public Employees as Political Workers. Evidence from an Original Survey in Argentina." Paper for Delivery at the Congress of the Latin America Studies Association. San Francisco, California, May 23-26,.

Parodi Trece, Carlos. 2000. *Peru, 1960-2000: Políticas Económicas y Sociales En Entornos Cambiantes*. 1. ed. Lima, Perú: Universidad del Pacífico, Centro de Investigación.

Persson, Torsten, Guido Tabellini, Francesco Trebbi. 2003. "Electoral Rules and Corruption." *Journal of the European Economic Association*: 958–989.

Peterson, David A. M. 2005. "Heterogeneity and Certainty in Candidate Evaluations." *Political Behavior* 27 (1) (March): 1–24.

Piattoni, Simona, ed. 2001. *Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation: The European Experience in Historical and Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Planas, Pedro. 1998. *La Descentralización En El Perú Republicano (1821-1998)*. Lima: Municipalidad Metropolitana de Lima.

Popkin, Samuel L. 1991. *The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Powell, John Duncan. 1970. "Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics." *The American Political Science Review* 64 (2) (June): 411–425. doi:10.2307/1953841.

Pro Descentralización. 2006. *Proceso De Descentralización 2005-Abril 2006. Balance y Desafíos*. Lima: PRODES/USAID.

Quirós, Julieta. 2006. "Movimientos Piqueteros, Formas De Trabajo y Circulación De Valor En El Sur Del Gran Buenos Aires." *Anuario De Estudios De Antropología Social*: 151–159.

Roberts, Kenneth M. 1995. "Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America: The Peruvian Case." *World Politics* 48 (1): 82–116. doi:10.1353/wp.1995.0004.

———. 2006. "Populism, Political Conflict, and Grass-Roots Organization in Latin America." *Comparative Politics* 38 (2) (January 1): 127–148. doi:10.2307/20433986.

Roberts, Kenneth M., and Moisés Arce. 1998. "Neoliberalism and Lower-Class Voting Behavior in Peru." *Comparative Political Studies* 31 (2) (April): 217–246. doi:10.1177/0010414098031002004.

Robinson, James A., and Thierry Verdier. 2003. "The Political Economy of Clientelism." http://scholar.harvard.edu/jrobinson/files/jr_clientel.pdf.

Roniger, Luis. 1990. *Hierarchy and Trust in Modern Mexico and Brazil*. New York: Praeger.

Rousseau, Stéphanie. 2009. *Women's Citizenship in Peru: The Paradoxes of Neopopulism in Latin America*. 1st ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Sánchez, Omar. 2009. "Party Non-Systems A Conceptual Innovation." *Party Politics* 15 (4) (July): 487–520. doi:10.1177/1354068809334566.

Sartori, Giovanni. 1976. *Parties and Party Systems: a Framework for Analysis*. Cambridge [Eng.] ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Schady, Norbert R. 2000. "The Political Economy of Expenditures by the Peruvian Social Fund (FONCODES), 1991-95." *The American Political Science Review* 94 (2) (June): 289–304. doi:10.2307/2586013.

Schaffer, Frederic Charles, 2007 ed. *Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying*. Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Schaffer, Frederic Charles. 2007a. "How Effective Is Voter Education?" In *Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying*, edited by Frederic Charles Schaffer, 161–179. Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Schaffer, Frederic Charles. 2007b. "Why Study Voe Buying?" In *Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying*, edited by Frederic Charles Schaffer, 1–30. Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Schaffer, Frederic Charles, and Andreas Schedler. 2007. "What Is Vote Buying?" In *Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying*, edited by Frederic Charles Schaffer, 17–30. Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Scheiner, Ethan. 2007. "Clientelism in Japan: The Importance and Limits of Institutional Explanations." In *Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*, edited by Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson, 276–297. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Scherlis Perel, Gerardo Ezequiel. 2010. "Patronage and Party Organization in Argentina : the Emergence of the Patronage-based Network Party". Ph.D. Dissertation, Netherlands- Leiden: Leiden University. https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/14598.

Scott, James C. 1969. "Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change." *The American Political Science Review* 63 (4) (December): 1142–1158. doi:10.2307/1955076.

———. 1972. "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia." *The American Political Science Review* 66 (1) (March): 91–113. doi:10.2307/1959280.

———. 1976. *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Seawright, Jason Woodland. 2006. "Crisis of representation: Voters, party organizations, and party-system collapse in South America". Ph.D. Dissertation, Berkeley: The University of California at Berkeley. http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/pqdtft/docview/305347406/abstract/1399346FE0E7DFBE43E/1?accountid=7118.

Shaw, Daron R. 2006. *The Race to 270: The Electoral College and the Campaign Strategies of 2000 and 2004*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Shefter, Martin. 1994. *Political Parties and the State: The American Historical Experience*. Princeton N.J: Princeton University Press.

Singer, Matthew. 2009. "Buying Voters with Dirty Money: The Relationship Between Clientelism and Corruption". SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 1449001. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1449001.

Slosar, Mary C. 2011. "The Power of Personality : Candidate-centered Voting in Comparative Perspective". Ph.D. Dissertation, Austin: The University of Texas at Austin.

Stokes, Susan C. 2007b. "Is Vote Buying Undemocratic?" In *Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying*, edited by Frederic Charles Schaffer, 81–99.

———. 2005. "Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina." *The American Political Science Review* 99 (3): 315–325.

———. 2007. "Political Clientelism." In *Oxford University Press Handbook of Comparative Politics*, edited by Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, 604–627. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.

———. 1995. *Cultures in Conflict: Social Movements and the State in Peru*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Stokes, Susan, Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco. 2011. "Buying Votes: Distributive Politics in Democracies." Prepared for Discussion at the Seattle Seminar, University of Washington, October 28-29, 2011.

Suárez Bustamante, Miguel. 2003. "Caracterización Del Programa Vaso De Leche". Lima: Dirección de General de Asuntos Económicos y Sociales del Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas. http://www.mef.gob.pe/contenidos/pol_econ/documentos/carac_vaso.pdf.

Szwarcberg, Mariela. 2009. "Making Local Democracy: Political Machines, Clientelism, and Social Networks in Argentina". Ph.D. Dissertation, Illinois: The University of Chicago.

———. 2011. “The Microfoundations of Political Clientelism: Lessons from the Argentine Case”. The Kellogg Institute Working Papers, #377. http://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/377.pdf.

———. 2012. “Political Parties and Rallies in Latin America.” *Party Politics* (March 30). doi:10.1177/1354068811436049. http://ppq.sagepub.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/content/early/2012/03/28/1354068811436049.

Tanaka, Martín. 2005c. “La Estructura De La Oportunidad Política De La Corrupción En El Perú: Una Hipótesis De Trabajo.” In *El Pacto Infame*, edited by Felipe Portocarrero, 355–375. Lima: Red para el Desarrollo de las Ciencias Sociales en el Perú.

———. 1998. *El Espejismos De La Democracia: El Colapso Del Sistema De Partidos En El Perú, 1980-1995, En Perspectiva Comparada*. 1. ed. Serie Ideología y Política 9. Lima, Peru: IEP.

———. 1999. “La Participación Social y Política De Los Pobladores Populares Urbanos: ¿del Movimentismo a Una Política De Ciudadanos? El Caso De El Agustino.” In *El Poder Visto Desde Abajo: Democracia, Educación y Ciudadanía En Espacios Locales*, edited by Martin Tanaka, 103–153. Serie Urbanización, Migraciones y Cambios En La Sociedad Peruana 14. Lima: IEP.

———. 2001. “¿Crónica De Una Muerte Anunciada? Determinismo, Voluntarismo, Actores y Poderes Estructurales En El Perú 1980-2000.” In *Lecciones Del Final Del Fujimorismo. La Legitimidad Presidencial y La Acción Política,* edited by Jane Markus-Delgado and Martín Tanaka, 57-112. Colección Mínima 47. Lima: IEP.

———. 2002. “La Dinámica De Los Actores Regionales y El Proceso De Descentralización”. Lima: IEP.

———. 2005a. *Democracia Sin Partidos, Perú, 2000-2005: Los Problemas De Representación Y Las Propuestas De Reforma Política*. 1a. ed. Colección Mínima 57. Lima: IEP.

———. 2005b. *Democracia Sin Partidos, Perú, 2000-2005: Los Problemas De Representación y Las Propuestas De Reforma Política*. 1a. ed. Colección Mínima 57. Lima: IEP.

Transparencia Paraguay and Alter Vida. 2005. “Recolección De Fondos y Gastos Electorales En Las Elecciones Municipales. Informe Final De Investigación.

Proyecto Piloto Financiamiento De Los Partidos Políticos y Campañas Electorales." Manuscript.

Vera, Sofía. 2010. "Radiografía a La Política En Las Regiones: Tendencias a Partir De La Evidencia De Tres Procesos Electorales (2002, 2006 y 2010)." *Revista Argumentos* 4 (5). http://www.revistargumentos.org.pe/index.php?fp_cont=916.

Vergara, Alberto. 2012. "United by Discord, Divided by Consensus: National and Sub-national Articulation in Bolivia and Peru, 2000–2010." *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 3 (3): 65–93.

Vicente, Pedro C. 2007. "Is Vote Buying Effective? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in West Africa." http://www.gprg.org/pubs/workingpapers/pdfs/gprg-wps-065.pdf.

———. 2012. "Is Vote-buying Effective? Evidence from a Field Experiment in West Africa." http://www.pedrovicente.org/banho.pdf.

Vommaro, Gabriel, and Julieta Quirós. 2011. "'Usted Vino Por Su Decisión': Repensar El Clientelismo En Clave Etnográfica." *Desacatos. Revista De Antropología Social* 36 (May-August): 65–84.

Van de Walle, Nicolas. 2007. "Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss? The Evolution of Political Clientelism in Africa." In *Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*, edited by Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson, 50–67. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Wang, Chin-Shou, and Charles Kurzman. 2007. "The Logistics: How to Buy Votes." In *Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying*, 61–78. Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Weingrod, Alex. 1968. "Patrons, Patronage, and Political Parties." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 10 (4) (July): 377–400.

Weitz-Shapiro, R. 2008. "Choosing Clientelism: Political Competition, Poverty, and Social Welfare Policy in Argentina". Ph.D. Dissertation, New York: Columbia University.

Weyland, Kurt. 1998. "Swallowing the Bitter Pill Sources of Popular Support for Neoliberal Reform in Latin America." *Comparative Political Studies* 31 (5) (October): 539–568. doi:10.1177/0010414098031005001.

———. 2001. “Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics.” *Comparative Politics* 34 (1) (October): 1–22. doi:10.2307/422412.

Wise, Carol. 2002. *Reinventing the State: Economic Strategy and Institutional Change in Peru*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Wolfinger, Raymond E. 1972. “Why Political Machines Have Not Withered Away and Other Revisionist Thoughts.” *The Journal of Politics* 34 (2) (May): 365–398. doi:10.2307/2129360.

Zarazaga, Rodrigo. 2011. “Vote-buying and Asymmetric Information: A Model with Applications to Argentina.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting Program, American Political Science Association, Seattle, Washington.

———. 2012. “Brokers Beyond Clientelism: The Case of the Peronist Hegemony.” Manuscript.

Zas Fris, Johnny. 2005. *La Insistencia De La Voluntad. El Actual Proceso De Descentralización Política y Sus Antecedentes Inmediatos (1980-2004)*. Lima: Defensoría del Pueblo/SER.

Zavaleta, Mauricio. 2012. “La Competencia Política post-Fujimori. Partidos Regionales y Coaliciones De Independientes En Los Espacios Subnacionales Peruanos”. Tesis para optar el Título de Licenciado en Ciencia Política y Gobierno, Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.

Zheng, Tian, Matthew J Salganik, and Andrew Gelman. 2006. “How Many People Do You Know in Prison?” *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 101 (474): 409–423. doi:10.1198/016214505000001168.